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Introduction
Over the last thirty years findings from economic experiments substantially contributed to
a better understanding of a wide variety of phenomena in different branches of economics
(Plott and Smith 2008). In areas like industrial organization, game theory, public choice
or labor economics controlled laboratory experiments became commonplace.
In contrast, in health economics the use of laboratory experimentation is rather in its
infant stages. This is somewhat surprising as prominent proponents, like the US health
economist Victor R. Fuchs, have already argued that incorporating methods of experi-
mental economics into health economic research might lead to great benefits for the latter
(Fuchs 2000).
Similarly, very little experimental research has focussed on individual risk attitudes of
higher orders, like prudence and temperance1, so far. Various experimental methods have
been developed to investigate risk aversion (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002) and to test theo-
ries of decision-making under risk (e.g., Camerer 1989, Hey and Orme 1994). It is, thus,
surprising that an appropriate method to test for higher-order risks is still lacking.
The four experimental studies presented in the dissertation at hand aim to fill this gap
in the two respective research areas. The first two chapters present novel experimental
methods to explore individual attitudes towards higher-order risks. In the third chapter,
a laboratory experiment is introduced in order to study the influence of payment incen-
tives on physician behavior. The final chapter analyzes the link between other-regarding
motivations and physician payment incentives for two different subject pools. The follow-
ing paragraphs provide some background and briefly introduce the four chapters of the
dissertation.
Risk and uncertainty are important in numerous economic decision situations. Conse-
quently, understanding individual risk attitudes is closely related to the purpose of pre-
1Within the expected utility framework, assuming differentiability of a utility function u, prudence and
temperance are defined as u′′′ > 0 and u(4) < 0, respectively.
1
dicting economic behavior (Dohmen et al. forthcoming b). Indeed, it is well known that
risk aversion only partially captures individual risk attitudes (e.g., Gollier 2001). Numerous
important behavioral traits, like precautionary savings and preventive behavior, are rather
driven by higher-order risk preferences such as prudence or temperance. In particular, pru-
dence exhibits a broad range of important implications on economic behavior within the
expected utility framework. In his seminal article, Kimball (1990) shows that prudence
is necessary and sufficient for a precautionary savings motive. Moreover, prudence has
been shown, for example, to play an important role for precautionary bidding in auctions
(Esö and White 2004) and insurance demand (Fei and Schlesinger 2008). However, the
predictions derived from prudence might be nothing more than interesting mind games if
one cannot test for prudence empirically.
So far, only very few papers have looked at the empirical support for prudence, mostly
via the precautionary demand for savings (e.g., Dynan 1993, Carroll and Kimball 2008). In
a first attempt to use methods of experimental economics, Tarazona-Gomez (2004) found
weak evidence for prudence relying on an expected utility setting.
In a recent article, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) showed, outside expected utility
theory, equivalence of prudence to a preference over a simple lottery pair that is appropri-
ate for experimental testing. In their definition, a prudent individual prefers—given two
equally likely future states—to have an unavoidable zero-mean risk in the state where her
wealth is higher. Put differently, prudence shows a type of preference for the disaggrega-
tion of two harms—a sure loss and a zero-mean risk.
A novel experimental method to test individuals for prudence, employing the lotteries
of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, is presented in Chapter 1.2 Moreover, it compares prudence
with a preference for a high third moment, referred to as skewness-seeking. The method-
ology allows for a rather general implementation of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s prudence
lotteries. In the experiment, subjects are asked to make choices on prudence lottery pairs.
The new ballot box representation of the compound lotteries employed in this study could
find application in other experiments on decision-making under risk. To contrast prudence
with skewness seeking, subjects are also asked to make choices on lottery pairs testing for
a skewness preference.
The only other experimental study testing for prudence, employing Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger’s lotteries, has been introduced by Deck and Schlesinger (2010) who find evi-
2Chapter 1 is based on the joint working paper with Sebastian Ebert entitled “An Experimental Method-
ology Testing for Prudence and Third-order Preferences”, Bonn Econ Discussion Paper No. 2009/21.
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dence for prudence. Behavioral data of the experiment in Chapter 1 also evidence prudence
on the aggregate as well as at the individual level. 65% of subjects’ choices are prudent.
47% of individuals are classified as prudent whereas only 8% are imprudent. Although
the experimental presentation and the lotteries employed are different from Deck and
Schlesinger, the proportion of prudent choices in the experiment is similar to their finding
of 61%. The first significant extension to their result is that behavioral data indicate more
prudent decisions when the zero-mean risks are left-skewed, indicating also that kurtosis is
influential on subjects’ choices. Another major finding is that prudence is not sufficiently
well captured by skewness-seeking.
The purpose of the experiment introduced in Chapter 2 is to measure risk aversion,
prudence and temperance, and to compare their relative importance.3 Notice that similar
to prudence, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define temperance as a preference for the
disaggregation of two independent zero-mean risks. Whereas the experiment in Chapter 1
and that of Deck and Schlesinger test for risk attitudes in a yes-or-no fashion, this chapter
investigates the intensity of risk preferences. To the best of our knowledge no empirical
comparison of the strength of the different risk attitudes exists and, thus, the experimen-
tal study presented in Chapter 2 marks the first step in this direction. The experimental
approach is a combination of the method introduced in Chapter 1 and the multiple price
list format which is popular to measure risk aversion (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002). The
experimental method, outside the expected utility framework, elicits premia that make
individuals indifferent between the risk averse (prudent, temperate) and risk loving (im-
prudent, intemperate) choice. The lotteries used in the experiment were calibrated such
that premia are comparable. The main result is somewhat surprising. Namely, the desired
compensation for prudence is significantly higher than that for risk aversion, which in turn
is significantly higher than that for temperance. This may suggest that prudence has re-
ceived not enough attention compared to risk aversion, which itself and its implications
are investigated both theoretically and empirically in numerous papers. Moreover, we ob-
serve that the well documented gender effect that women are more risk averse (Croson and
Gneezy 2009) extends to risks of higher order.
A crucial issue in health economics research is to understand how incentives from payment
systems affect providers of medical services, i.e., physicians (McGuire 2000). In particular,
3The experimental study presented in Chapter 2 is a joint work with Sebastian Ebert entitled “Joint
Measurement of Risk Aversion, Prudence and Temperance”.
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to achieve socially desirable outcomes payment incentives must be structured appropriately.
However, in most health systems fee-based payments are the dominant form to pay physi-
cians. Recently, lump-sum payments per patient have been introduced as an alternative
form of physicians’ remuneration. From a theoretical point of view, fee-for-service payment
schemes may encourage physicians to provide too many medical services whereas the op-
posite incentive, namely to provide too few services, is embedded in lump-sum capitation
payments (Ellis and McGuire 1986, Newhouse 2002). Empirical evidence on the effect of
payment incentives on physician provision behavior is rather mixed, although an influence
in general can be acknowledged (e.g., Dumont et al. 2008). Moreover, field studies face
various difficulties, like, for example, multiple and unobservable influences on physicians’
decisions or country-specific payment system variations, that make the generalization of
results rather difficult (Gosden et al. 2001).
A controlled laboratory experiment, analyzing the influence of fee-for-service and capi-
tation payments on physicians’ provision behavior, is introduced in Chapter 3 to overcome
these possible problems. Prospective physicians, i.e., medical students, decide on the quan-
tity of medical service for several different patients.4 Behavioral data indicate that patients
are overserved under fee-for-service and underserved under capitation payments. However,
financial incentives are not the only motivation for physicians’ choices as the patient ben-
efit shows to be of considerable importance as well. The patients are affected differently
by the two payment systems. Those patients in need of a low level of medical services are
better off under capitation, whereas patients with a high need for medical services gain a
higher health benefit when physicians are paid by fee-for-service.
The experiment presented in Chapter 4 makes use of the experimental setup introduced
in Chapter 3.5 This chapter explores behavioral differences between prospective physicians
and a ‘standard’ experimental subject pool, i.e., non-medical students. Experimental data
show substantial differences across subject pools. Medical service choices of prospective
physicians indicate a markedly lower tendency to overprovide (underprovide) patients un-
der fee-for-service (capitation) than choices of non-medical students. This behavioral result
suggests that financial incentives work only in an alleviated way for prospective physicians,
as their behavior is mainly driven by patient-regarding (altruistic) motivations.
4Chapter 3 is based on a joint work with Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Reinhard Selten entitled “How
Payment Systems Affect Physicians’ Provision Behavior – An Experimental Investigation” available as
Bonn Econ Discussion Paper No. 29/2009.
5Chapter 4: Hennig-Schmidt, H. and D. Wiesen (2010): “Are Prospective Physicians Different? Evi-
dence from an Experimental Study on a Payment System Variation.”
4
Each chapter is based on a self-contained discussion paper. So readers can explore, in ac-
cordance to their interests, how to test for higher-order risk attitudes (Chapter 1) and how
to measure them (Chapter 2), how incentives embedded in payment schemes affect physi-
cians’ behavior (Chapter 3) and how prospective physicians and ‘standard’ experimental
subjects respond to incentives differently (Chapter 4).
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Chapter 1
Testing for prudence and skewness
seeking
1.1 Introduction
It is well known that risk aversion only partially captures an individual’s risk preferences.
An example is the following lottery pair defined by Mao (1970). LotteryMA pays zero with
a probability of p = 14 and 2000 with the counter-probability of
3
4 . Lottery MB pays 1000
with a probability of 34 and 3000 with a probability of
1
4 . Statistically, these lotteries have
the same mean and variance, but MB is more skewed to the right. While MA may seem
‘riskier’, the preference of MB over MA is not implied by risk aversion but by prudence.
1
This was shown by Menezes et al. (1980) who illustrate thatMB exhibits more downside
risk and who further characterize prudence as downside risk aversion. They also show that
prudence, unlike risk aversion, relates to measures of skewness, in particular to the third
central moment and semi-target variance.2 Thus, prudence plays an important role when
considering preference towards downside and left-skewed risks.
Such risks occur frequently in everyday life. For example, most insurance contracts
address downside risks similar to MA (where the arbitrary choice of p is much smaller
than 14 and refers to the insurance event). Similarly, on the gain side, MB corresponds
to the risk of a typical lottery ticket. The payoff structures of numerous assets exhibit
downside risk. For example, the payoff distribution of a (defaultable) bond resembles MA.
Downside risk might be even more crucial both to investors and private individuals than
1Within the expected utility framework, risk aversion can be defined as u′′ < 0 and prudence as u′′′ > 0.
2Chiu (2005) links prudence to a strong measure of skewness due to van Zwet (1964). See also Chiu
(forthcoming) and Ebert (2010) for more on prudence and skewness.
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comparable symmetric risks which are addressed by risk aversion. This is also evidenced
by the intensive use of downside risk measures such as value-at-risk. In his seminal study,
Mao surveyed business executives’ reasons on investments of the type MA and MB.
Within the expected utility theory (EUT), numerous important implications of pru-
dence on economic behavior have been shown. To name a few, Kimball (1990) coined the
term prudence and showed that it is necessary and sufficient for a precautionary savings
motive.3 Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) analyze the impact of prudence on prevention, i.e.,
the action undertaken to reduce the probability of an adverse effect to occur.
These general concepts find application in various areas of economics and finance. The
broad range of applications, provided in the following non-exhaustive list, emphasizes the
importance of prudence. In health economics, Courbagé and Rey (2006) show that pru-
dence is an important factor in preventive care decisions within a medical decision-making
context. Esö and White (2004) show that there can be precautionary bidding in auctions
when the value of the object is uncertain and when bidders are prudent. Likewise, White
(2008) analyzes prudence in bargaining. Treich (forthcoming) shows that prudence can
decrease rent-seeking efforts in a symmetric contest model. Fagart and Sinclair-Desgagné
(2007) investigate prudence in a principal-agent model with applications to monitoring and
optimal auditing. Within a macroeconomic consumption and labor model, Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2008) analyze the impact of prudence on policy decisions such as changes in
the interest rate. Other examples are insurance demand (e.g., Fei and Schlesinger 2008) or
life-cycle investment behavior (e.g., Gomes and Michaelides 2005). Even in environmental
economics prudence plays a decisive role; Gollier (2010) finds an ecological prudence effect
when discounting future environmental impacts.
Prudence is also necessary (but not sufficient) for decreasing absolute risk aversion,
properness (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1987) and standard risk aversion (Kimball 1993). Fur-
ther, prudence is exhibited by all the commonly used utility functions (Brockett and Golden
1987), in particular power and exponential utility. Thus, implicitly, prudence is assumed
widely in the economics and finance literature.
While preference ofMB overMA is necessary but not sufficient for prudence, Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2006) presented a more general lottery preference which is equivalent to
prudence. Given two equally likely future states, a prudent individual prefers to have
3That means the awareness of uncertainty in future payoffs will raise an individual’s optimal saving
today. The relationship between precautionary savings and the third derivative of the utility function was
already recognized by Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970).
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an unavoidable zero-mean risk in the state where her wealth is higher. Equivalently, she
prefers to have the unavoidable harms of a sure loss and a zero-mean risk in different future
states rather than in the same state. More generally, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger define
proper risk apportionment of all orders (where prudence corresponds to order 3). This new
understanding of risk preferences does not rely on EUT. Further, it can be generalized to
the multi-attribute case as shown in Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) or Tsetlin and Winkler (2009).
Despite the substantial amount of literature on prudence and the frequency of downside
risk in general, there is little empirical, i.e., experimental, research on prudence. This is
in sharp contrast to other theories of decision-making under risk. Theoretical predictions
derived from prudence might be no more than an interesting mind game if we cannot test
their validity. Currently the share between theoretical and empirical, in particular experi-
mental ones, is extremely unbalanced.
Some empirical papers trace prudence via the precautionary savings motive relying on
Kimball’s (1990) EUT-model (e.g., Dynan 1993, Carrol 1994 and Carroll and Kimball
2008). To test the theories and behavioral traits based on prudence in a more controlled
environment, we need a methodology to test individuals for prudence in the laboratory.
The first attempt in this direction was made by Tarazona-Gomez (2004), who finds weak
evidence for the existence of prudence. Her experiment relies on a certainty equivalent
approach involving tabulated trinomial lotteries. It is based on strong assumptions and
approximations within expected utility theory. The only other much more elegant ap-
proach to test for prudence is Deck and Schlesinger (2010). Using six pairs of Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger’s lotteries, they find some evidence for prudence.
The contribution of this study is as follows. Firstly, we propose a method to test for
prudence in a laboratory setting. Some results overlap with those of Deck and Schlesinger,
whose research was started independently of ours. However, our methodology allows for a
more general implementation of the zero-mean risks in the prudence lotteries. This feature
is necessary, because on the theoretical side we show that prudence is not only a preference
for high skewness—just as risk aversion is not only a preference for a low variance—but
that this preference is robust towards different levels of kurtosis. This is referred to as
the “kurtosis robustness feature of prudence.” It is the zero-mean risk that drives the sta-
tistical properties (in particular the kurtosis) of the prudence lotteries. This makes them
different from the simpler lotteries of Mao and from the ones of Deck and Schlesinger, who
considered symmetric risks only. As a left-skewed zero-mean risk constitutes more harm
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to a prudent individual, one could conjecture a greater tendency to ‘apportion the harms
properly’. Indeed, in the experiment we observe significantly more prudent decisions when
the risks to be apportioned are left-skewed. Although the experimental presentation and
parameters are different from Deck and Schlesinger, our overall result that 65% of choices
are prudent is close to their finding of 61%.
Secondly, we implement the lotteries, similar to Mao’s survey, for the first time in
an incentivized experiment. This is done to contrast the rather general Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger lotteries (ES lotteries), equivalent to prudence from simpler lotteries implying
skewness seeking only. This applies to the lotteries used in the experiments of Tarazona-
Gomez and Deck and Schlesinger. Skewness seeking can be motivated by the assumption
of third order moment preferences.4 Although moment preferences, in general, are incom-
patible with EUT, they are widely assumed in economic and financial modeling due to
their simplicity and tractability.5 Under moment preferences, individuals’ decisions be-
tween two prospects only depend on the first few statistical moments of these prospects.
When studying prudence only prospects with equal mean and variance will be compared.
Such third-order moment preferences are equivalent to a preference for or against a high
third central moment and refer to ‘the’ skewness of the prospect. That is, in this setting
prudence is equivalent to skewness seeking. In the experiment the skewness seeking prefer-
ence of MB over MA is more widely observed than preference over the prudence lotteries.
There is also a significant positive correlation between the two and, consistent with theory,
most individuals we diagnose as prudent prefer MB over MA. However, while skewness
seeking has some approximative value in explaining preferences, for a more accurate test
of prudence the ES lotteries should be implemented in a more general way. In particular,
subjects do respond to differences in their kurtosis which leads us to reject the assumption
of third-order moment preferences.
Thirdly, concerning the experimental methodology, we propose a novel graphical rep-
resentation of compound lotteries in experiments. We also present a convenient method
for lottery calibration in terms of their first three statistical moments. In particular, we
analyze the statistical moments of the ES and Mao lotteries, where we also complement a
4Tarazona-Gomez (2004) explicitly makes this assumption. In particular, preferences are given by a
utility function which is truncated at third order.
5For example, they underlie a large number of classical and also modern portfolio choice models, such
as Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) or Briec et al. (2007). This is also why this theory is an active area of
research. See, for example, Eichner (2008). Brockett and Kahane (1992) and Brockett and Garven (1998)
show explicitly that they are incompatible with EUT.
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result in Roger (forthcoming).
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the lotteries underlying the experi-
ment, motivates the parameter choices and outlines the novel lottery calibration technique
applied in this chapter. In Section 3, the research questions are stated. Section 4 describes
the experimental design and procedure. In Section 5, results from the experiment are
provided and Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Prudence and skewness seeking
In this section, we first define the lotteries employed in the experiment. Then we analyze
and interpret their statistical properties and show how they relate to skewness seeking and
prudence. The last subsection is concerned with the calibration of lottery parameters in
the experiment.
1.2.1 Mao’s and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s lotteries
We begin with the definition of binary lotteries in general.
Definition 1. Let x1, x0 ∈ R, x1 > x0 and X is a Bernoulli-distributed random variable
with parameter p ∈ (0, 1).6 A (simple) binary lottery denoted by L = L(p, x1, x0) is defined
as the random variable
L = X · x1 + (1−X) · x0.
In recognition of Mao (1970), we define the following class of lotteries and give an example
in Figure 1.1.7
Definition 2. Two binary lotteries LX = LX(pX , x1, x0) and LY = LY (pY , y1, y0) con-
stitute a Mao lottery pair or a Mao pair if they have equal mean and variances and
pX = 1− pY .
Intuitively, for a Mao lottery pair, if LX has its high payoff associated with the high
probability, then LY has its high outcome associated with the small probability, and vice
versa.8 Next we define the prudence lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and
6A Bernoulli-distributed random variable can take the two values 1 and 0 with probabilities P (X =
1) = p and P (X = 0) = 1 − p, where p ∈ (0, 1). Notice that it is convenient and mathematically
tractable to use Bernoulli-distributed random variables for characterization of simple lotteries; see, e.g.,
Roger (forthcoming).
7Definition 2 specifies a class of lotteries that characterizes the risks analyzed in Mao’s survey. Mao
(1970) considered a concrete example of this class that motivated the paper of Menezes et al. (1980).
8This actually is how skewness manifests in a binary lottery; see our theorem in Subsection 2.3 and
Ebert (2010) for a generalization to higher orders.
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Figure 1.1: Example of a Mao lottery pair (MA,MB)
MA
0
3
4
-801
4
MB
-40
3
4
401
4
The lotteries above correspond to the Mao pair displayed
to subjects in question MAO1 of the experiment. A Mao-
preferent individual prefers lottery MB (with a skewness of
+1.15) over lottery MA (with a skewness of −1.15).
give an example in Figure 1.2.
Definition 3 (Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger Prudence). Let X be a Bernoulli-distributed random
variable with parameter p = 12 and let k > 0. Let  be a non-degenerate random variable
independent of X with E[] = 0. Consider the lotteries
A3 = X · (0) + (1−X) · (−k + ) and B3 = X · (−k) + (1−X) · .
These two lotteries as a pair are called (Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger) prudence lottery pair or
ES pair. An individual is called prudent or said to have the ES preference if she prefers
B3 over A3 for all values of k, for all random variables  and for all wealth levels x (i.e.,
non-random variables x ∈ R>0).
Figure 1.2: Example of a prudence lottery pair (A3, B3)
Wealth level x = 160:
A3
−40
1
2
13.3
9
10
−1201
10
012
B3
0
1
2
13.3
9
10
−1201
10
−4012
The lotteries above correspond to the ES pair displayed to subjects in question ES1 of the
experiment. In the example,  is left-skewed, implying that lottery A3 has a larger kurtosis
than lottery B3 (see Proposition 3).
For the prudent option B3 the additional zero-mean risk  (i.e., the second lottery)
occurs in the good state of the 50/50 gamble (i.e., in the state without the sure reduction
in wealth, −k), whereas for the imprudent option A3 the zero-mean risk occurs in the
bad state. Intuitively, a prudent choice implies a ‘disaggregation of harms’ or ‘proper risk
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apportionment’. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger show that this preference is equivalent to
prudence within EUT, i.e., u′′′ > 0. Menezes et al. (1980) define an increase in downside
risk and show that prudence is equivalent to downside risk aversion. They reinterpret the
results of Mao’s survey and show that the lottery MB has less downside risk than the
corresponding lottery MA.
Proposition 1 (Menezes, Geiss, Tressler, 1980). Let (MA,MB) denote a pair of Mao
lotteries. Prudence is sufficient (but not necessary) for preferring MB over MA.
It is interesting to note that Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define proper risk appor-
tionment of all orders n via an iterative nesting process of lotteries. For these lotteries Bn
and An they then show that preferring Bn over An is equivalent to sgn(u
(n)) = (−1)n+1
within EUT. Risk apportionment of order 4 is called temperance and there is also quite
a large amount of theory concerned with the behavioral implications of temperance. Al-
though in this study we focus on prudence, our methodology could be easily adapted to
test for risk aversion and temperance. The experiment of Deck and Schlesinger (2010)
actually finds some evidence of intemperate decisions.
1.2.2 Prudence, moments and skewness seeking
We now investigate the statistical features of the Mao and ES (prudence) lotteries in more
detail. This will motivate the particular choices of the lottery pairs we implement in the
experiment. If not noted otherwise, ‘moments’ refer to standardized central moments and
the nth moment of a random variable Z is given by µSn(Z) := E[(Z − E[Z])
n]/ (V(Z))n/2 .
With ν(Z) := µS3 (Z) and κ(Z) := µ
S
4 (Z) we denote the third and fourth moment, respec-
tively. All proofs are given in Appendix A.1.1.
Proposition 2 (Statistical Characterization of Mao lottery pairs). Consider a pair of Mao
lotteries given by LX = LX(p, x1, x0) and LY = LY (1 − p, y1, y0). Then for all n ∈ N we
have
µSn(LX) = (−1)
nµSn(LY ),
in particular
ν(LX) = −ν(LY ) and κ(LX) = κ(LY ).
The following proposition generalizes Proposition 4 in Roger (forthcoming).
Proposition 3. Consider an arbitrary Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger lottery pair in Definition 3.
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A3 and B3 have equal expectation and variance and thus V(A3) = V(B3) =: σ
2 is well-
defined. Furthermore,
ν(B3)− ν(A3) =
3kE[2]
2σ3
> 0 and
κ(B3)− κ(A3) =
2kE[3]
σ4
can be positive, negative, or zero.
The third and fourth moments, respectively, are sometimes referred to as ‘the’ skew-
ness and ‘the’ kurtosis. However, there are numerous measures for these properties; see
MacGillivray (1986) for an overview. In a recent paper, Ebert (2010) generalized our
Proposition 3 and showed that µSn(B3) − µ
S
n(A3) > 0 for all n odd. Further, for bi-
nary zero-mean risks such as those employed in our experiment, κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0 ⇐⇒
µSn(B3)− µ
S
n(A3) < 0 for all n even.
9 Therefore, while thinking in third- and fourth-order
terms will provide the reader with the correct intuition, our arguments actually apply to
the very strong notions of skewness and kurtosis that refer to all odd and even moments,
respectively.10
We know that Mao lotteries have equal mean and variance, and have the same kurto-
sis (see Proposition 2). We say that an individual is skewness seeking if she prefers the
Mao lottery with the high (positive) skewness over the one with small (negative) skewness,
which is well-defined as a consequence of Proposition 2.
Comparing Propositions 2 and Proposition 3, we see that both prudence and the Mao
preference imply higher skewness to be beneficial to the individual. Unlike the Mao pref-
erence, prudence further requires that the lottery with the higher skewness is preferred no
matter whether it has the smaller or higher kurtosis. That is, prudence implies a prefer-
ence for skewness, but it also requires this preference to be robust towards variations in
kurtosis. Ebert (2010) puts this observation on a more rigorous basis and refers to the
“kurtosis robustness feature of prudence.”
What is the origin of this extra of statistical structure of the ES lotteries compared
to the Mao lotteries? From Proposition 3 we see that the prudent choice has the smaller
kurtosis if and only if the zero-mean risk that has to be apportioned is left-skewed. The
zero-mean risks of the lotteries employed in the experiment of Deck and Schlesinger (2010)
9The assumption of a binary risk is not crucial to his result. For example, the result also holds if the
majority of odd moments of  is negative; see Ebert (2010) for details.
10For random variables with a compact support, the sequence of (natural) moments characterizes the
probability distribution. In the statistics literature, this is known as Hausdorff moment problem. In this
sense, these descriptions of skewness and kurtosis for prudence lotteries are exhaustive.
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were symmetric. This constantly implies the same kurtosis for the two prudence lotter-
ies. Moreover, Roger (forthcoming) shows that the signs of all moments of ES lotteries
with symmetric ’s coincide with those we derived in Proposition 2 for the Mao lotteries.
Thus, from a statistical point of view, prudence lotteries with symmetric zero-mean risks
are much closer to the skewness seeking lotteries of Mao than to the general proper risk
apportionment lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). Preference between the for-
mer lotteries is solely determined by skewness preference and does not reflect the kurtosis
robustness feature of prudence.
In this study, we not only avoid this restriction, but also evaluate it. This requires
a comprehensive experimental presentation of the compound ES lotteries as the skewed
risks to be apportioned cannot be presented as a fair coin toss to subjects. In the experi-
ment, subjects will also decide over Mao lotteries to test them for skewness seeking, which
(theoretically) is necessary, but not sufficient to imply prudence.
1.2.3 Lottery calibration
In order to have the prudence and Mao lotteries in the same parameter range, Mao lottery
pairs must be calibrated such that they are close to the prudence pairs.11 We start with
a theorem stating that a binary lottery with non-trivial variance and otherwise arbitrary
first three moments always exists and the moments uniquely determine the lottery. It
implies that every non-degenerate probability distribution with finite first three moments
can be approximated up to the third moment by a binary lottery and this approximating
lottery is unique. Binary lotteries are one of the main tools to examine decisions under risk
and for testing associated theories like expected utility (see, e.g., Hey and Orme 1994) or
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Therefore, the following theorem might
find application in many experiments and, in particular, is useful for calibration issues.
The given equations conveniently allow to construct exactly the lottery an experimenter
is looking for. Finally, the theorem gives intuition on how skewness manifests in binary
lotteries; for more, see also Chiu (forthcoming) and Ebert (2010).
Theorem 1. For constants E ∈ R, V ∈ R∗+ and S ∈ R there exists exactly one binary lot-
tery LX = LX(p, x1, x0) such that E[LX ] = E, V[LX ] = V and ν[LX ] = S. Its parameters
11This is a general issue in lottery choice experiments and has been shown to be important, for example,
in the context of multiple price list formats to elicit risk preferences (see, e.g., Harrison and Rutström
2008). We will show that this calibration has an effect on subjects’ decisions in Subsection 1.5.4.
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are given by
p =


4+S2+
√
S4+4S2
8+2S2
if S < 0
1
2 if S = 0
4+S2−
√
S4+4S2
8+2S2
if S > 0
,
x1 = E +
√
V · (1− p)
p
, x0 = E −
√
V · p
1− p
.
Now we use this theorem to calibrate the Mao and ES pairs to each other. The Mao pair
in Figure 1.1 and the ES pair in Figure 1.2 are an example. All four lotteries depicted
have equal mean and variance and the differences in skewness between the ES pair and
the Mao pair are also equal. When an ES pair and a Mao pair are calibrated to each other
in this way, we call them corresponding lottery pairs. The following proposition gives an
existence and uniqueness result for such a calibration.
Proposition 4 (Calibration). Consider a prudence lottery pair (A,B) with finite first
three moments. For every S > 0 there exists exactly one Mao lottery pair (MA,MB) such
that
E[MA] = E[A] and E[MB] = E[B],
V[MA] = V[A] and V[MB] = V[B] as well as
ν[MA] = −S and ν[MB] = S.
For S = 0.5(ν[B] − ν[A]) the difference in third moments of the prudence pair equals the
difference in third moments of the Mao pair and the quadratic error ∆ := (ν[B]−ν[MB])
2+
(ν[A]− ν[MA])
2 is minimized.
1.3 Research questions
We propose a method to test for prudence, employ it in an experiment and test it for
robustness. We put particular focus on whether prudence boils down to skewness seeking
or if, on the other hand, we find evidence for the kurtosis robustness feature of prudence.
This is explained in more detail in this section.
As explained in Section 2, the Mao lotteries are similar in structure to the ones employed
in earlier studies (e.g., Tarazona-Gomez 2004) and differ by their skewness, but not by
their kurtosis. Thus they help us to investigate the relationship of prudence and skewness
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seeking.
Research Question 1. What is the relationship between prudence and the Mao prefer-
ence?
Answering research question 1 is of particular interest for several reasons. If prudence
and the Mao preference are equivalent, skewness seeking seems to characterize prudence
sufficiently well. Moreover, this would support moment preferences up to order three in
general. If Mao-preferent individuals do not exhibit prudence, this implies that prudence
is a stronger property, not only in theory, but also in practice. In particular, it is not
sufficient then to ask lotteries based on the first three moments to test for prudence.
Further, as shown in Subsection 1.2.3, then no binary lottery can be sufficiently complex
to test for prudence.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s definition of prudence (Definition 3) is very broad in
scope. That is, the lottery preference must hold for any random variable , any loss −k,
any wealth level x and, of course, is robust towards framing of the decision task. This
is the reason why a ‘simple binary lottery preference’ can be equivalent to signing the
derivatives of the utility function—looking more closely, the lottery preference is not that
simple. In particular, the fact that the zero-mean risks are arbitrary adds a large amount
of stochastic freedom to these lotteries. We will test in a systematic way which of these
features do significantly influence subjects’ decisions.
Concerning the robustness towards framing, we test whether it makes a difference if the
task is to add the zero-mean risk  or the fixed amount −k to a state of the 50/50 gamble,
given that the other item (−k or , respectively) is already present in one state. This
relates to the intuition of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s definition of prudence as ‘proper
risk apportionment’. Further, Definition 3 of prudence could be adapted such that the
loss −k is replaced by fixed gain in wealth k. The prudent choice then is the one where k
and  appear in the same state (a prudent individual prefers the unavoidable additional
risk when wealth is higher). Further in-depth explanations are provided in Section 1.4. In
short, we state the following research questions.12
Research Question 2. Are individuals’ decisions independent of whether the fixed amount
k corresponds to a gain or a loss?
12Research Questions 2 to 4 have been addressed to some degree in Deck and Schlesinger (2010). We
will compare results in Section 1.5
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Research Question 3. Are individuals’ decisions influenced by the wealth level x?
Research Question 4. Are individuals’ decisions influenced by different framing of the
decision task—whether they are asked to add the zero-mean risk  or the fixed amount k to
a state of the 50/50 gamble?
Research Question 5. Are individuals’ decisions influenced by the skewness of the zero-
mean risk  and, therewith, the kurtosis of the prudence lotteries?
We also will investigate whether the calibration of lotteries in terms of the first three
moments (described in Subsection 1.2.3) does have an effect on subjects’ decisions. Further,
we will investigate whether age, gender and risk aversion have an impact on prudence.
1.4 Experimental design and procedure
The computerized experiment, programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), comprises the
three stages ES, MAO and RIAV. In total, each subject makes 34 individual choices over
lottery pairs. The lottery outcomes are disclosed in Taler, our experimental currency.
One Taler is worth ¤0.15 (about $0.20). Decisions are incentivized by a random-choice
payment technique. That means, one out of 34 decisions is randomly drawn to determine
solely a subject’s payoff.13 The lottery chosen by the individual in the randomly determined
decision is actually played out at the end of the experiment.
In stage ES, we test subjects for prudence. Subjects decide over Mao pairs in stage
MAO. In stage RIAV, we determine subjects’ degree of risk aversion, employing the well-
established method by Holt and Laury (2002). A questionnaire comprising demographic
questions follows the experiment. We now describe the experimental stages in more detail.
13In economic experiments, it has become quite common to elicit a series of choices from participants
and then to pay for only one selected at random; see Baltussen et al. (2010) for a fine overview. The
random choice payment technique enables the researcher to observe a large number of individual decisions
for a given research budget. However, the important question arises whether subjects behave as if each
of these choices involves the stated payoffs. This issue has been analyzed, among various other setups,
in experiments with pairwise lottery choice problems similar to our experiment. For example, Starmer
and Sugden (1991) found clear evidence that under random payment subjects isolate choices as if paid for
each task. Similar evidence was reported by Beattie and Loomes (1997) and Cubitt et al. (1998). In a
lottery experiment with a multiple price list format and low incentives, Laury (2005) reports no significant
difference in choices between paying for 1 or all 10 decision.
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1.4.1 Prudence test embedded in a factorial design – Stage ES
In stage ES, we test whether individuals are prudent according to Definition 3. To this end
subjects are asked to make preference choices over the 16 ES pairs ES1,ES2, . . . , ES16.
We introduce a new ballot box representation to display the compound lotteries of the
ES pairs. Figure 1.3 shows, as an example, how question ES1 (that has already been
illustrated more formally in Figure 1.2) appears on subjects’ decision screens. It must be
understood as follows: Option A and Option B are displayed in the left and right panel of
Figure 1.3, respectively. For both options the 50/50 gamble is depicted as a ballot box that
contains two balls labeled “Up” and “Down”. The displays of both Option A and Option B
themselves are spatially separated, each into an upper panel containing the “Up-ball”, and
into a lower panel containing the “Down-ball”. Now consider Option A. If the draw from
the first ballot box is “Up”, then the subject incurs a loss of 40 Taler and a second lottery
(the zero-mean risk ) follows. The zero-mean risk  is also displayed in a ballot box format
with 10 balls in total. Balls implying a loss (here: −120 Taler) are colored in yellow on
subjects’ decision screens and balls implying a gain (here: 13.3 Taler) are colored in white.
In situation “Down” no second lottery follows and no loss occurs. For Option B, if the draw
from the first ballot box is “Up”, no loss occurs and a second lottery follows (the same 
as depicted in Option A). If the draw is “Down”, a loss of 40 Taler occurs. The order of
subjects’ decision screens occurred for each subject in a different randomized order and
also the position of the prudent option being either left or right on the screen has been
randomized.
The ballot box representation interlinks decisions on the computer screen with the
lottery play at the end of the experiment; see Figure 1.4. Further, it visualizes asymmetric
zero-mean risks and all probabilities in an intuitive way.
To test Research Questions 2 to 5, we employ a completely randomized factorial de-
sign.14 The factors are as follows: sign of k (Factor A), wealth level x (Factor B), framing
(Factor C) and composition of  (Factor D); see columns 6 to 9 in Table 1.1 for a complete
design layout.
Along the illustration in Figure 1.3 we now explain how the factors of the factorial de-
sign translate into subjects’ decision screens. When Factor A is at its low level (k1 = 40),
the outcomes of the 50/50 gamble are 0 Taler and −40 Taler. That is, the fixed amount
added corresponds to a loss. Hence, in the example, the imprudent choice is Option A, as
14For a detailed description of the factorial design technique, see, e.g., Montgomery (2005).
19
Figure 1.3: Example of the lottery display in stage ES (Question ES1)
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Figure 1.4: Sample of ballot boxes
This photograph shows an example of the ballot boxes used to
determine subjects’ payoffs at the end of the experiment from
a decision made in stage ES, e.g., ES1 (compare to screenshot
in Figure 1.3).
the additional zero-mean risk occurs in the bad state. At the alternative level of Factor A
(k2 = −40) the amount 40 is added, which corresponds to a gain and is displayed as a
green bill on subjects’ screens. With Factor A we test for an experimental framing effect
(Research Question 2) and whether individuals really exhibit the intuition of proper risk
apportionment. For example, if a subject consistently prefers the option where  is added
to outcome 0 Taler (independent of the sign of k) we could conjecture that this is due to
framing and conclude that 0 is a so-called focal point.
Factor B tests for a wealth effect according to Research Question 3 and comprises the
levels x1 = 160 or x2 = 80 Taler. This test is limited in that wealth levels are presented
as endowments to subjects that they receive in order to accommodate possible negative
lottery outcomes. However, in some tasks, the wealth effect can actually be quite sub-
stantial.15 The wealth level on subjects’ screens is indicated in the upper left corner. In
Figure 1.3, it is set to 160 Taler.
In the example, the decision between the imprudent Option A and the prudent Op-
15For example, when comparing possible outcomes of prudent and imprudent choices for questions ES4
(x1 = 160) and ES6 (x2 = 80), the difference between subjects’ possible payoff varies between 80 and 100
Taler, i.e., ¤12 to ¤15 (about $ 16 to $ 20).
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tion B is whether in the up-state or in the down-state a fixed loss of 40 Taler is preferred
given that the additional risk will be in the up-state. That is, the question on the decision
screen is “Where do you prefer to add a fixed amount of -40 Taler? To situation “Up” or
“Down” of the first risky event? ” At the other level of Factor C, subjects are asked to which
situation—either 0 or −k—of the 50/50 gamble to add another risky event (). Thus, the
two levels of Factor C are “add k” (a sure reduction or increase in wealth) or “add ” (a
zero-mean random variable). Factor C directly relates to the intuition behind Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger’s prudence definition of proper risk apportionment. It purely checks for a
framing issue as the lotteries across levels of Factor C are identical in distribution.
With Factor D, we test if prudence is invariant under variation of the ’s (Research
Question 5) or equivalently, for the kurtosis robustness feature of prudence. According
to Proposition 3 and Ebert (2010), the prudent lottery choice B3 has always the higher
skewness compared to the imprudent choice A3, i.e., µn() < 0 for all n odd. It has the
smaller kurtosis, i.e., µn(B3) − µn(A3) < 0 for all n even, if and only if  is left-skewed.
Thus, when varying the zero-mean risks, it is natural to vary their skewness systematically
as this is the significant driver of the statistical differences between the prudence lotter-
ies. The skewness of a binary lottery depends on its up-probability.16 In our example, 
is left-skewed, such that the prudent lottery choice has the smaller kurtosis. If  in the
example had the signs of the outcomes switched it would be right-skewed and the prudent
option had the higher kurtosis. As  has a mean of zero, skewness has the following inter-
pretation. A left-skewed  yields a small gain with high probability and a large loss with
a small probability. Further, as we display  as a ballot box containing 10 balls, skewness
translates one-to-one to the number of draws implying losses or gains, respectively. Indeed,
in the example,  implies a loss of 120 Taler with a 10% chance and a gain of 13.3 Taler
with a 90% chance.
We denote the levels of Factor D “κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0” (positive kurtosis difference)
and “κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0” (negative kurtosis difference). However, any of the mentioned
equivalent interpretations (kurtosis difference, skewness of the zero-mean risk, composition
of the ballot box) is captured by Factor D. These practical interpretations of kurtosis dif-
ference support our theoretical argument that restricting to symmetric ’s is a somewhat
severe limitation for a procedure that aims to test for prudence.
To sum up, by specifying the four factors above, we manipulate the requirements in
16For this and the following arguments, see Theorem 1 and its proof in Appendix A.1.1.
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Table 1.1: ES pairs with their underlying factors and their statistical properties
 Factors Statistical properties
E[A3] V(A3) ν(B3) κ(B3)
ES pair p z1 1− p z0 A B C D = E[B3] = V(B3) −ν(A3) −κ(A3) Rel. freq.
ES1 0.90 13.33 0.10 −120.00 40 160 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 1,200.00 2.30 −9.48 0.6806
ES2 0.10 120.00 0.90 −13.33 40 160 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 1,200.00 2.30 9.48 0.5972
ES3 0.80 12.00 0.20 −48.00 40 160 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 688.00 1.92 −3.50 0.6111
ES4 0.20 48.00 0.80 −12.00 40 160 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 688.00 1.92 3.50 0.7083
ES5 0.70 12.00 0.30 −28.00 40 80 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 568.00 1.48 −1.33 0.5972
ES6 0.30 28.00 0.70 −12.00 40 80 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 568.00 1.48 1.33 0.6944
ES7 0.60 8.00 0.40 −12.00 40 80 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 448.00 0.60 −0.15 0.7222
ES8 0.40 12.00 0.60 −8.00 40 80 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 448.00 0.60 0.15 0.6944
ES9 0.90 13.33 0.10 −120.00 −40 160 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 20.00 1,200.00 2.30 9.48 0.5000
ES10 0.10 120.00 0.90 −13.33 −40 160 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 20.00 1,200.00 2.30 −9.48 0.7500
ES11 0.80 12.00 0.20 −48.00 −40 160 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 20.00 688.00 1.92 3.50 0.6250
ES12 0.20 48.00 0.80 −12.00 −40 160 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 20.00 688.00 1.92 −3.50 0.7083
ES13 0.70 12.00 0.30 −28.00 −40 80 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 20.00 568.00 1.48 1.33 0.5139
ES14 0.30 28.00 0.70 −12.00 −40 80 add −k κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 20.00 568.00 1.48 −1.33 0.6944
ES15 0.60 8.00 0.40 −12.00 −40 80 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 20.00 448.00 0.60 0.15 0.5972
ES16 0.40 12.00 0.60 −8.00 −40 80 add  κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 20.00 448.00 0.60 −0.15 0.7222
This table describes the prudence lottery pairs ES1,ES2, . . . ,ES16 in stage ES.  is the zero-mean risk with its up-state z1, its down-state z0 and the respective
probabilities p and 1 − p shown in columns 2 to 5. The explicit arrangement of Factors A, B, C and D is given in columns 6 to 9. The columns 10 to 13
provide information of the difference in moments of the ES pairs and the last column shows the fraction of prudent choices observed for each lottery pair in
the experiment that will be discussed in Section 1.5.3.
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Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s definition of prudence and for framing issues. We can test
which factors have a severe impact on individuals’ decisions such that they should be ac-
counted for when testing for prudence. A complete overview of the 16 ES pairs, their
statistical properties and the arrangement of factors is provided in Table 1.1.
1.4.2 Stage MAO
In this stage, we investigate whether subjects are Mao-preferent in order to answer Re-
search Question 1. Applying Proposition 4, we obtain 8 different pairs of Mao lotteries,
between which subjects have to state their preference. There are only 8 pairs, as the change
in the kurtosis (Factor D) does not affect these lotteries (see Proposition 2). Thus lottery
pair MAO1 corresponds to both lottery pairs ES1 and ES2, lottery pair MAO2 corresponds
to ES3 and ES4, and so on. As the Mao lotteries imply negative outcomes, subjects are
endowed with a certain amount of money equal to the wealth level x in the corresponding
ES pairs. The Mao pairs are shown in Table 1.2.17
For the Mao lottery pairs we choose a graphical representation similar to the one pro-
posed by Camerer (1989). An example of a decision screen can be found in the instructions
to stage I in Appendix A.1.2.
1.4.3 Stage RIAV
In stage RIAV, we apply the well-known method of Holt and Laury (2002) to test for risk
aversion; see the original article for details. We include their test in order to investigate
the relationship between risk aversion and prudence.
1.4.4 Procedural details
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab. Overall 72 students of the University
of Bonn from various fields participated in 9 experimental sessions in December 2008, Jan-
uary and February 2009. The stage order was varied systematically across sessions. Each
session lasted for about 90 minutes. Subjects earned on average ¤18.50 (about $24.70).
The procedure of the experiment was as follows: firstly, experimenters extensively intro-
duced the decision task and the entire procedure of the experiment to subjects. Secondly,
before each experimental stage started, subjects were asked to answer control questions
testing their understanding of the decision task. In particular, they were familiarized with
the illustration of lotteries and their outcomes as well as probabilities. Only when subjects
17Analogous to stage ES, the order of subjects’ decision screens is randomly permutated in stage MAO
and the position of the Mao-preferent option is randomized.
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Table 1.2: Mao pairs and their statistical properties
MA MB Statistical properties
E[MA] V(MA) ν(MB)
Mao pair p x1 1− p x0 p y1 1− p y0 = E[MB ] = V(MB) = −ν(MA)
MAO1 0.75 0.00 0.25 −80.00 0.75 −40.00 0.25 40.00 −20.00 1200.00 1.15
MAO2 0.72 −3.48 0.28 −61.64 0.72 −36.52 0.28 21.64 −20.00 688.00 0.96
MAO3 0.67 −3.44 0.33 −54.30 0.67 −36.56 0.33 14.30 −20.00 568.00 0.74
MAO4 0.58 −1.81 0.42 −44.62 0.58 −38.19 0.42 4.62 −20.00 448.00 0.30
MAO5 0.75 40.00 0.25 −40.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 80.00 20.00 1200.00 1.15
MAO6 0.72 36.52 0.28 −21.64 0.72 3.48 0.28 61.64 20.00 688.00 0.96
MAO7 0.67 36.56 0.33 −14.30 0.67 3.44 0.33 54.30 20.00 568.00 0.74
MAO8 0.58 38.19 0.42 −4.62 0.58 1.81 0.42 44.62 20.00 448.00 0.30
This table shows the eight Mao pairs, i.e., MAO1,MAO2, . . . ,MAO8, employed in stage MAO. The final three columns provide
information of the difference in moments of the Mao pairs.
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had answered these questions correctly were they allowed to proceed to the decision stages
of the experiment. Then, thirdly, subjects made the decisions in the experimental stages.
Afterwards, subjects answered a questionnaire for which they received ¤4.00 ($5.34) in
addition to their earnings from the experiment (comparable to a show-up fee). Finally,
each subject’s payoff was determined by a random-choice payment technique. To this end,
for each subject one ball was chosen out of a set of balls numbered between 1 and 34
from a ballot box referring to a lottery pair from stage ES, MAO or RIAV. The subject’s
lottery choice in this randomly drawn lottery pair was then actually played out. In stages
MAO and ES, the outcome was allocated to the subjects’ wealth level in that decision,
i.e., subjects could charge the coupon they obtained in the beginning. The ES lotteries
were played out using ballot boxes resembling the lotteries displayed on subjects’ decision
screens (see the photograph in Figure 1.4). The binary lotteries in stages MAO and RIAV
were played out using a ballot box with 100 balls numbered from 1 to 100. If, e.g., the
up-state had a likelihood of 90%, a draw of the balls numbered 1, 2, . . . , 90 implied the
corresponding up-payoff.
1.5 Experimental results
In this section we present the results of the experiment. We first describe subjects’ choices
at an aggregate level. Moreover, we report results from analyzing factors, the test of
moment preferences and analysis of behavior at an individual level. Finally, we investigate
the relationship between prudence and risk aversion as well as demographic characteristics.
1.5.1 Preliminary analysis
There is evidence for both prudence and Mao-preferent behavior at an aggregate level.18
Figure 1.5 plots the relative frequencies of subjects’ prudent choices. Overall, 65.10% of
subjects’ responses are prudent. This fraction is slightly higher than the 61% of prudent
choices reported by Deck and Schlesinger (2010). In our sample, on average 10.42 of the
choices are prudent with a standard deviation of 3.65. The median (mode) of prudent
choices is 11 (13). The observed behavior in stage ES differs significantly from arbitrary
behavior. Formally, we can reject the null hypothesis that the median of subjects’ prudent
18To rule out possible stage order effects, we compare responses from sessions with stage order MAO-
ES with responses from sessions with stage order ES-MAO. The null hypothesis that both samples are
drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected (for ES-responses: p = 0.413 and for MAO-responses:
p = 1.000, two-sided two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of the number of prudent choices by subjects
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choices is equal to 8 as it would be for arbitrary choices (p = 0.0000, two-sided one-sample
Wilcoxon signed-rank test).19
In stage MAO, 77.08% of all questions are answered in a Mao-preferent way. Figure 1.6
Figure 1.6: Distribution of the number of Mao-preferent choices by subjects
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illustrates the relative frequencies of subjects’ Mao-preferent choices. Each subject has
been, on average, Mao-preferent in 6.16 out of 8 questions with a standard deviation of
2.01. The median (mode) of Mao-preferent choices is 7 (8). Also, this behavior differs
significantly from arbitrary choices (p = 0.0000, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
19In the following, all statistical tests are two-sided if not indicated differently. The Wilcoxon signed-
rank procedure assumes that, under the null hypothesis, the sample (of frequencies per individual) is
randomly taken from a population, with a symmetric frequency distribution. The symmetric assumption
does not assume normality. As an alternative, a two-sided one-sample sign-test, implying the same null
and alternative hypothesis (but without the symmetry assumption), would also lead us to reject the null
(p = 0.0004).
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1.5.2 Within subject analysis
Our preliminary analysis suggests substantial evidence for prudent and Mao-preferent be-
havior. This subsection is concerned with their relationship at an individual level (Research
Question 1). For starters, we observe a significant positive correlation (which is a sym-
metric measure of association) of ρ = 0.2844 between prudent and Mao-preferent choices
(p = 0.0155, Spearman rank correlation test).
We now show that the actual relationship is asymmetric. To this end, we categorize
subjects’ responses in stages ES and MAO according to the frequency of prudent and Mao-
preferent choices, respectively. These categorizations are somewhat arbitrary. However,
the qualitative conclusions stay the same when changing the categorizations by plus or
minus one. Subjects who answered 12 or more (4 or less) out of 16 questions prudently
are said to be prudent (imprudent). Those subjects who answered 5 to 11 questions pru-
dently are classified as indifferent. Similarly, subjects are classified as Mao-preferent (not
Mao-preferent) if they have answered 7 or 8 (0 or 1) out of 8 questions in favor of the
lottery with the positive (negative) skewness. When answering 2 to 6 questions in a Mao
preferent manner, subjects are allotted to the category indifferent.
Table 1.3 cross-tabulates the absolute frequencies of subjects according to the cate-
Table 1.3: Contingency table on categories
Not Mao-preferent Indifferent Mao-preferent Total
Imprudent 0 3 3 6
Indifferent 2 13 17 32
Prudent 1 10 23 34
Total 3 26 43 72
gories. Let us first analyze prudence and the Mao preference separately. 34 (47.22%) of all
72 subjects are prudent whereas only 6 (8.33%) are imprudent. Note again that this gives
a very different picture, as compared to looking at the aggregate responses only. Deck
and Schlesinger (2010) report that very few subjects always decided imprudently (2%) and
only 14% were always prudent in their six decision tasks. The Mao preference is more
widely observed than prudence, as 43 (59.72%) of all subjects exhibit it, whereas only 3
(4.17%) do not.20 This complies with our arguments made in Sections 1.2, as it shows that,
also empirically, the Mao preference is a weaker preference than prudence. The difference
in prudent and Mao-preferent observations immediately indicates that Mao lotteries are
20Tarazona-Gomez (2004) finds 63% of the subjects to be ‘prudent’ under the assumption of third-order
moment preferences.
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indeed not suitable to test for prudence.
The conditional frequency Prob(Mao-preferent |prudent) that a prudent individual ex-
hibits the Mao preference is 67.65%, whereas Prob(not Mao-preferent |prudent) is only
2.94%.21 The chance for a prudent individual to be Mao-preferent is thus about 23 times
higher than not being Mao-preferent. The analysis of the reverse statement does not pro-
vide such a clear-cut picture. The conditional frequency Prob(prudent |Mao-preferent) is
given by 53.49% whereas Prob(imprudent |Mao-preferent) equals 6.98%. Thus, the chance
of being prudent given that an individual is Mao-preferent is about 8 times higher for an
individual that is not Mao-preferent. This finding, however, is not very reliable as there
are only 3 subjects who were not Mao-preferent.
In short, we see that knowing about an individual’s preference towards the Mao lot-
teries gives some information about whether the individual is prudent. This finding also
hints in the ‘right’ direction, as being Mao-preferent increases the probability of being
prudent. It suggests that most prudent individuals exhibit the Mao preference, whereas
Mao-preferent individuals may not be prudent. This implies that the Mao preference may
not be sufficient to make conclusions whether an individual is prudent. Thus, there seems
to be more to prudence than skewness seeking. In particular, it would lead us to reject
third-order moment preferences. The finding can also be interpreted as a robustness check
for our method to test for prudence. Those subjects it diagnoses as prudent, consistently
with theory, are Mao-preferent.
1.5.3 Influences on prudent behavior
We now investigate what types of ES questions are more likely to be answered prudently.
In general, we find that the particular choice of the prudence lottery pair has a strong
impact on the 72 subjects’ decisions. Relative frequencies range from 50.00% to 75.00%
with a standard deviation of 8.11% from the reported mean of 65.10%. This is evidenced
by the relative frequencies shown in the last column of Table 1.1 in Subsection 1.4.1 which
also shows the factor levels for each question. In order to determine what particular
elements in the definition of prudence cause these differences we investigate Factors A, B,
C and D according to Research Questions 2 to 5.
As formulated in Research Question 2 we are interested whether the fixed amount k
being a gain or a loss (Factor A) influences subjects’ decisions. When k is a loss, 66.32%
21If we exclude subjects who were indifferent at least at one stage these numbers become 95.6% and
4.2%, respectively.
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of responses are prudent, whereas slightly less responses are prudent (63.89%) when k is a
gain. Test statistics of a Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates in Table 1.4
show that this difference is insignificant (p = 0.5253 and p = 0.5008, respectively). This
implicitly suggests that 0 as a focal point did not influence subjects’ behavior.
Considering Factor B, 64.76% of choices are prudent if the wealth level x is high
(x1 = 160) and 65.45% of choices are prudent if x is low (x2 = 80) what indicates an
insignificant difference (see the test results in Table 1.4).
Research Question 4 asks whether a framing of the decision task (Factor C) influences
subjects’ decisions. The level of Factor C influences prudent choices substantially, as
67.36% of the choices are prudent if the level is “add ” and 62.85% if the level is “add
−k”. Test statistics show that differences are significant below a 10% level.
Result 1. Framing of the decision task influences subjects’ decisions. Weakly significant
more subjects answer questions prudently if the zero-mean risk () has to be added to the
50/50 gamble compared to the fixed amount (k).
In essence, Result 1 shows that the decision task involving subjects’ conscious consid-
eration about another risky event leads to more prudent choices, whereas when asked to
add a fixed amount subjects make slightly more imprudent choices. When looking at the
interaction of Factors A and C weakly significantly more choices are prudent whenever i)
the fixed amount is a loss (k1 = 40) and subjects are asked to “add ” and ii) the fixed
amount is a gain (k2 = −40) and they are asked to “add −k” (p = 0.0690).
In short, we find that subjects’ decisions are neither significantly influenced by the
fixed amount being a gain or a loss nor by the wealth level. These findings are in line
with behavioral patterns reported by Deck and Schlesinger (2010). They report that the
relative size of the zero-mean risk is not influential. In contrast to their findings, our
behavioral data evidence that framing of the decision task weakly influences subjects’
choices.
Factor D considered in Research Question 5 is most significant (see Table 1.4). At its
low level (negative kurtosis difference), 68.58% of subjects’ choices are prudent. If Factor D
is at its high level (positive kurtosis difference), 61.63% of the choices are prudent. For
questions ES9 (largest positive kurtosis difference in the experiment) and ES10 (largest
negative kurtosis difference, other factors like in ES9), 50.00% and 75.00% of answers
are prudent, respectively. Note again that for the prudence lotteries a negative kurtosis
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Table 1.4: Analysis of prudent choices for different factor levels
Factor Level Relative frequency p
of prudent choices
A k1 = 40 0.6632 0.5008
k2 = −40 0.6389
B x1 = 160 0.6476 0.8362
x2 = 80 0.6545
C add −k 0.6285 0.0677
add  0.6736
D κ(B3)− κ(A3) < 0 0.6858 0.0121
κ(B3)− κ(A3) > 0 0.6163
This table shows relative frequencies of prudent choices for each
factor level. p values of a two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation
test are shown testing for differences between relative frequencies
of prudent choices for given levels of each factor.
difference is equivalent to  being left-skewed, i.e., the ballot box displayed on subjects’
screens contains more white balls (implying a small gain) than yellow balls (implying a
high loss).
Result 2. The particular choice of the zero-mean risk  strongly influences subjects’ deci-
sions. Significantly more subjects decide prudently if  is left-skewed.
One intuition supporting Result 2 is that a prudent individual may consider a nega-
tively skewed zero-mean risk as a “bigger” harm. Hence, there is a greater tendency for
disaggregating the harms of the sure loss and the zero-mean risk. In Section 1.2, we showed
that  being left-skewed implies a smaller kurtosis for the prudent choice. An interpreta-
tion is that in this case the prudent choice implies a smaller likelihood of extreme events
to occur. A prudent individual, however, would seek the higher skewness of the prudent
lottery choice irrespectively of its kurtosis. She must not deviate from her preference if the
additional risk is not too harmful to her. This was shown in the theoretical part of this
paper and was referred to as the kurtosis robustness feature of prudence. Thus, Result 2
is a major finding of our experiment as it confirms its relevance empirically. It emphasizes
the importance to use several lotteries to test for prudence in order to reflect the statistical
diversity which is implicit in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s definition of prudence. As the
kurtosis of the prudence lotteries matters, the significance of Factor D also shows that
there is more to prudence than skewness seeking.
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The above observations are generalized and detailed in Ebert (2010). He shows that a
mixed risk averse decision maker22 has higher utility from proper risk apportionment if 
is left-skewed. Thus our result also gives some support for mixed risk aversion.
1.5.4 Testing for moment preferences
In this section, we test directly for moment preferences. The Mao pairs were calibrated to
the ES pairs according to Proposition 4 in terms of the first three moments. Lottery pair
Mao 1 is calibrated to lottery pair ES1 and ES2, Mao 2 is calibrated to ES3 and ES4, and
so on. We investigate whether there is a stronger association between subjects’ decisions
over such corresponding lottery pairs than to those over the remaining ones.
For each ES question—paired with any Mao question—we set up 8 contingency ta-
bles. That equals 128 2 × 2-contingency tables, in total, among which are 16 tables for
corresponding Mao and ES pairs. As a measure of association we use the phi coefficient
(rφ). Each contingency table comprises the four categories i) prudent, Mao-preferent,
ii) prudent, not Mao-preferent, iii) imprudent, Mao-preferent and iv) imprudent, not
Mao-preferent.
The results shown in Table 1.5 are that, for 7 out of 16 comparisons, the degree
Table 1.5: Correlation (rφ) between Mao and ES pairs
MAO1 MAO2 MAO3 MAO4 MAO5 MAO6 MAO7 MAO8 p-value
ES1 0.1491 0.0087 0.0016 0.0888 0.0262 0.0940 0.1027 0.0170 0.0078
ES2 0.0028 0.0194 0.0007 0.0032 0.0045 0.0036 0.0032 0.0005 0.7031
ES3 0.2130 -0.0510 0.0400 -0.0041 0.0117 0.2050 0.2273 -0.1544 0.9688
ES4 0.1050 0.0410 0.1480 0.0960 -0.1035 0.1478 -0.1409 0.1011 0.5859
ES5 0.1315 0.0127 0.0974 -0.0174 -0.0029 0.1229 0.0769 0.0223 0.0547
ES6 0.2800 0.1888 0.1312 0.0806 -0.1176 -0.0075 0.1282 0.0133 0.1953
ES7 0.1272 0.0555 0.1654 0.1120 -0.0127 0.1692 0.1663 0.0508 0.3750
ES8 0.0836 0.1888 0.1312 0.0022 -0.1176 -0.0748 0.1282 0.1501 0.9297
ES9 0.1206 0.1491 -0.0702 0.0361 0.0342 0.0000 0.0327 -0.0945 0.3672
ES10 0.0348 0.0861 0.2026 0.0625 0.0987 0.0000 0.1322 0.0910 0.3125
ES11 0.1713 0.0385 0.0544 -0.0653 -0.2561 0.0320 -0.0253 -0.1383 0.1406
ES12 -0.0940 0.0410 0.1480 0.0166 0.1223 -0.0569 0.0030 0.0318 0.9922
ES13 0.2597 0.3107 0.2243 0.2659 0.2537 0.1413 0.3099 0.1112 0.0156
ES14 -0.1127 0.0270 -0.0212 0.0022 0.1050 -0.2094 0.1992 -0.0551 0.0078
ES15 0.1315 0.0887 0.1689 0.0562 0.0668 -0.0035 0.1435 -0.2989 1.0000
ES16 -0.0075 0.1387 0.1654 0.1120 0.1400 0.1000 0.0933 0.0508 0.9766
The values on the diagonal in bold face indicate rφ for the corresponding ES and Mao pairs. p-values
are shown for a one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates.
of association between the Mao and the corresponding ES pair is stronger compared to
22An expected utility maximizer is called mixed risk averse if she is nth-degree risk averse of all orders,
i.e., sgn(u(n)) = (−1)n+1 for all n. All of the commonly used utility functions exhibit mixed risk aversion.
In particular, such a decision maker is prudent.
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the remaining ones. For 4 out of these 7 associations the difference is weakly significant
at a 6% level as indicated by test results of a one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation
test (see last column of Table 1.5). The probability that the degree of association of a
corresponding lottery pair is largest by coincidence is one out of eight. For 7 successes out
of 16 observations, the null hypothesis (that the probability of a success on a single trial
is 1/8) has to be rejected (p = 0.0019 two-sided binomial-test).
Result 3. For a significant number of ES pairs, the number of prudent choices is ‘closest’
to the number of Mao-preferent choices for the corresponding Mao pair. This indicates that
the first three statistical moments have some predictive power for prudence.
The weak correlation between moments and preferences also supports the necessity of
appropriate lottery calibration. This way it can be ruled out that measured effects are
only due to different parameter ranges among lotteries. Further, the results are in line
with theoretical findings of Brockett and Garven (1998) that subjects’ decisions in the
experiment cannot be explained completely by the first three moments only. In particular,
prudence is not perfectly captured by skewness seeking.
1.5.5 Risk aversion and individual characteristics
According to Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), prudent individuals can be risk averse,
risk neutral or risk loving. This is confirmed by our data where a substantial proportion
of subjects is risk averse (87.50%). Among the prudent (non-prudent, i.e., imprudent
and indifferent) subjects 1 (3) are risk-neutral, 29 (34) are risk averse and 3 (1) are risk
loving. The degree of risk aversion of prudent and non-prudent individuals does not differ
significantly (p = 0.8106, Mann-Whitney U-test).
The age of the 72 participants is, on average, 24.25 years; the youngest individual is 19
the oldest 42 years of age. 41 were female and 31 were male. According to Mann-Whitney
U-tests, neither age nor gender had a significant influence on the number of prudent answers
observed in our experiment.
1.6 Conclusion
Currently, the share between theoretical and empirical literature on prudence is very un-
balanced. Numerous behavioral implications of prudence have been pointed out, but there
is very little empirical, i.e., experimental, research on prudence to support the relevance
and validity of these theories. To get there, in this study we propose, implement and check
33
for robustness a method testing for prudence in a laboratory setting.
We constructed a set of 16 prudence lottery pairs (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2006) that
not only reflect skewness seeking, but also the kurtosis robustness feature of prudence. As
shown, the latter is also a characteristic feature of prudence. Its origin lies in the skewness
of the zero-mean risks and we show how to implement such risks in the experiment. To this
end, we propose a new ballot box representation of compound lotteries for application in
experiments. It is very easy to understand and translates naturally from subjects’ decision
screens to the real-world draw of the lotteries.
In the experiment, indeed, the choice of the zero-mean risk significantly affects subjects’
decisions. Thus, we find that prudence does not boil down to skewness seeking. Prudence
is observed on the aggregate as well as at the individual level. 65% of responses are pru-
dent and we classify 47% of individuals as prudent and 8% as imprudent. The number
of prudent responses varies substantially from 50% to 75% for different prudence lottery
pairs. This should be taken into account when testing for prudence.
Moreover, this study contains a lottery calibration theorem that allows the researcher
to construct binary lotteries with desired first three moments. We illustrate how this the-
orem can be used to construct lotteries in the desired parameter range. We also present a
statistical characterization of the lotteries of Mao (1970) and show that preference between
such lotteries is purely determined by the difference in their skewness.
Given the observed presence of prudence, further experimental research could focus on
the empirical validation of prudent behavior. For example, the probably most famous pre-
diction that prudent people exhibit larger precautionary saving has received little attention
yet. Moreover, the proposed method could be easily adapted to test for temperance and
associated theories.
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Chapter 2
Joint measurement of risk aversion,
prudence and temperance
2.1 Introduction
The concept of risk aversion plays a key role in analyzing decision-making under un-
certainty. An established characterization is that an individual preferring a payoff with
certainty over a risky payoff with the same mean is said to be risk averse (Gollier 2001,
p.18). Alternatively, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) state that a risk averse individual dis-
likes any mean-preserving spread of the wealth distribution. Within an expected utility
(EU) setting, these two characterizations coincide and are equivalent to the utility function
being concave.
Unlike the term risk aversion suggests, it is not a concept to describe an individual’s risk
preferences exhaustively. It is just one piece in the puzzle, complemented by higher-order
risk preferences. Prudence (third-degree risk aversion) and temperance (fourth-degree risk
aversion) are lesser known traits affecting behavior towards risk. Although Kimball (1990)
coined the term ‘prudence’, its implications have been used in assessing a precautionary
demand for saving much earlier by Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970). In particular, they
show within an EU setting how a risky future income does not guarantee that a consumer
increases saving unless the individual exhibited prudence. The notion of ‘temperance’ was
also introduced by Kimball (1992). Temperance refers to the fact that the advent of an
unavoidable risk should lead an individual to reduce the exposure to another risk even if
the two risks are statistically independent.
Recently a large theoretical literature on the implications of higher-order risk preferences
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has emerged. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) analyze the impact of prudence on prevention,
i.e., the action undertaken to reduce the probability of an adverse effect to occur. This also
plays an important role in a medical decision-making context (see Courbagé and Rey 2006).
Esö and White (2004) show that there can be precautionary bidding in auctions when the
value of the object is uncertain and when bidders are prudent. Likewise, White (2008)
analyzes prudence in bargaining. Treich (forthcoming) shows that prudence can decrease
rent-seeking efforts in a symmetric contest model. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) show
that temperance is necessary and sufficient for an increase in downside risk of future labor
income to always increase the level of precautionary savings. Other examples are insurance
demand (e.g., Fei and Schlesinger 2008) or life-cycle investment behavior (e.g., Gomes and
Michaelides 2005). By necessity this is not a complete list of applications.
Prudence and temperance also play key roles in aversion to negative skewness and kur-
tosis, respectively. Prudence has been shown to be equivalent to aversion to increases in
downside risk as defined by Menezes et al. (1980). A downside risk increase does not change
mean and variance of a prospect, but does decrease its skewness. Likewise, an increase in
outer risk increases kurtosis but leaves the first three moments of a distribution unchanged.
Menezes and Wang (2005) show that temperance is equivalent to outer risk aversion.
More recently, both prudence and temperance have been characterized outside an EU
context by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) as preferences over 50/50 lottery pairs. Their
definition, which is shown to be equivalent to the ones mentioned, is particular appeal-
ing for experimental purposes. Prudence is defined as a preference for disaggregating a
zero-mean risk and a sure reduction in wealth across two equally likely states of nature.
Analogously, temperance is a preference for the disaggregation of two independent zero-
mean risks.
On the empirical side, there is an extensive literature on the measurement of risk aver-
sion in numerous empirical settings (e.g., Barsky et al. 1997) as well as in various experi-
ments. Focusing on experiments, almost as large as the number of experimental studies is
the diversity in procedures. Two well established methods based on binary lottery choices
are the multiple price list (e.g., Schubert et al. 1999, Holt and Laury 2002, Barr and
Packard 2002) and random lottery pairs technique (e.g., Grether and Plott 1979, Hey and
Orme 1994). An alternative approach comprises a selection task from an ordered set of
lotteries (e.g., Binswanger 1980, Eckel and Grossman 2008 a). Another prominent method
is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction where a certainty equivalent is elicited (Becker
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et al. 1964, Harrison 1986, Loomes 1988). Related to the latter method Wakker and
Deneffe (1996) propose a certainty equivalent technique with endogenous probabilities. In
Dohmen et al. (forthcoming a) subjects decide between safe and risky options in a variant
of the so-called switch multiple price list technique.1 Another experimental method based
on the proper risk apportionment model will be proposed in this paper.
In contrast, there are few empirical studies on higher-order risk attitudes. Dynan (1993),
Carrol (1994) and Carroll and Kimball (2008) trace prudence via the precautionary savings
motive. We are not aware of an empirical study testing for temperance.
Laboratory experiments could be used to investigate prudence and temperance as well
as the associated theories and behavioral traits in a more controlled environment. Re-
search in this direction has just started. The first attempt in this direction was made by
Tarazona-Gomez (2004) who finds weak evidence for prudence. Her experiment relies on
a certainty equivalent approach involving lotteries with several different outcomes. It is
based on strong assumptions within expected utility theory, in particular, a truncation of
the utility function. The only other papers testing for prudence are Deck and Schlesinger
(2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2009) which test for prudence using the lotteries of Eeck-
houdt and Schlesinger (2006). Both papers find significant support for prudence (61% and
65% of responses, respectively). Ebert and Wiesen (2009) motivate and show that the
choice of the zero-mean risk considered in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s proper risk appor-
tionment model significantly influences subjects’ decisions. Deck and Schlesinger (2010)
also test for temperance and find weak evidence for intemperate behavior.
These studies test for the direction of third- or fourth order risk preferences, but do not
measure their intensity. Subjects make several lottery choices and inference is made on
the count of prudent (temperate) choices. In particular, such a design makes it difficult to
compare the relative importance of prudence or temperance for a given individual.
Thus the aim of the present paper is, firstly, to present a method to measure the in-
tensity of risk aversion, prudence and temperance. Secondly, this is done jointly such
that we can compare their relative importance to a given individual. The approach is not
based on EU. We define higher-order risk premia á la Arrow-Pratt within the proper risk
apportionment model of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger. More specifically, we measure the
smallest amount that must be added to the lottery with more 2nd- (3rd-, 4th-) degree
risk that makes an individual prefer this lottery over the one with less 2nd- (3rd-, 4th-)
1See Harrison and Rutström (2008) for a comprehensive overview on different experimental methods to
elicit risk aversion.
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degree risk. This implies a clean tradeoff between nth degree risk and expected wealth.
The lotteries in the experiment are calibrated such that premia for different degrees of risk
are comparable. We also show how these premia are related to indices of higher-order risk
attitudes defined in the literature just recently (Jindapon and Neilson 2007 and Denuit
and Eeckhoudt forthcoming b).
Our experimental method is a combination of the compound lottery display introduced
in Ebert and Wiesen (2009) and a multiple price list technique which is popular from the
Holt and Laury (2002) experiment. A within-subject design is applied to measure risk
premia of different orders for all subjects. This design in turn is embedded in a between-
subject factorial design used to test our approach for robustness to typical manipulations
of the experimental setup.
We find substantial evidence for risk aversion, prudence and temperance. Most inter-
estingly, subjects demand a significantly higher downside risk premium compared to the
2nd-order risk premium. This highlights the importance of prudence and likewise questions
the excessive focus on risk aversion in the economics literature, both theoretical and em-
pirical. In particular, the literature contains numerous different experimental methods to
measure risk aversion, but this paper constitutes the first approach to measure prudence.
The outer risk premium is smallest and significantly different from both the downside and
outer risk premia. However, it is still significantly positive which indicates that most sub-
jects are temperate, contrary to the tendency observed in Deck and Schlesinger (2010).
For a given subject, we find a positive correlation between premia demanded, in particular
for prudence and temperance. Thus, given the assumption of EU, our experiment supports
the assumption of mixed risk aversion (Caballe and Pomansky 1996) which is exhibited by
all the commonly used utility functions (Brockett and Golden 1987).
Moreover, we controlled the number of male and female participants in order to check
for possible gender differences. Differences between women and men in risk attitudes are
well documented in the experimental economics literature. Most evidence suggests that
women perceive risks as greater, engage in less risky behavior, and choose alternatives
that involve less risk, see Eckel and Grossman (2008 b) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for
reviews of the relevant literature. We show that this is also the case for higher order risk
attitudes. Women are significantly more risk averse, more prudent and more temperate
than men.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2.2 we review the proper risk
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apportionment model and define risk premia of higher-orders. In Section 2.3 we explain
our experimental approach to elicit these premia. In Section 2.4 we give the results of the
experiment and in Section 2.5 we conclude.
2.2 Proper risk apportionment approach to elicit higher-
order risk premia
Within the expected utility (EU) framework, assuming differentiability of a utility function
u, risk aversion, prudence and temperance are defined as u′′ < 0, u′′′ > 0 and u(4) < 0, re-
spectively. However, our experimental methodology is not based on EU but on the proper
risk apportionment model of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). Therefore, risk aversion,
prudence and temperance are defined as a preference over lottery pairs.
We first define (2nd-degree) risk aversion. Let x be the individual’s wealth and k, r > 0
are fixed monetary amounts. With B2 = [x− r, x− k], for example, we denote the 50/50
gamble B2 that has equally likely payoffs x−r and x−k. An individual is called risk averse
if she prefers B2 to A2 = [x − r − k, x] for arbitrary parameter values x, r and k. The
lotteries are displayed in Figure 2.1. Thus, a risk averse individual prefers to disaggre-
Figure 2.1: Risk aversion lottery pair (A2, B2)
B2
x− r
1
2
x− k1
2
A2
x− r − k
1
2
x1
2
This figure shows lotteries of the type used to measure risk aversion in
the experiment. x is the subject’s endowment and −r and −k denote
sure reductions in wealth. To imagine a prudence lottery pair (A3, B3),
simply replace the −r with a zero-mean risk 1. To imagine a tem-
perance lottery pair (A4, B4), additionally replace −k with a second
independent zero-mean risk 2.
gate unavoidable losses −r and −k across states of nature. This preference is equivalent
under EU to u′′ < 0, as shown in Appendix A.2.1.2 The preference is also equivalent to a
preference for decreases in risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
In order to define prudence (3rd-degree risk aversion, downside risk aversion), the sure
reduction in wealth −r in the definition for risk aversion (also illustrated in Figure 2.1)
is replaced with a zero-mean risk . That is, an individual is called prudent if she prefers
2Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) originally considered the lotteries B˜2 ≡ 0 and A˜2 = [0, ], where  is
a zero-mean risk, and show that preferring B˜2 over A˜2 for all  is equivalent to u
′′ < 0. We use the lotteries
B2 and A2 instead because a certainty effect could distort experimental results when using B˜2 and A˜2.
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B3 = [x−k, x+ ] over A3 = [x, x−k+ ] for all wealth levels x, sure wealth reductions −k
and zero-mean risks . That is, a prudent individual prefers to disaggregate an unavoidable
risk and a loss across different states of nature. Equivalently, an unavoidable risk is pre-
ferred when wealth is higher. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show that this preference
is equivalent to u′′′ > 0 in EU or to a preference for decreases in downside risk as defined
by Menezes et al. (1980).
Finally, temperance (4th-degree risk aversion, outer risk aversion) is defined as a prefer-
ence of B4 = [x+ 1, x+ 2] over A4 = [x, x+ 1+ 2] where 1 and 2 are two independent
zero-mean risks. Under EU, this preference is equivalent to u(4) < 0 and it is also equiva-
lent to a preference for decreases in outer risk as defined by Menezes and Wang (2005).
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define a nesting process to construct lotteries Bn and
An from the lotteries Bn−2 and An−2. Then they show that the preference Bn over An
is equivalent to (−1)(n)u(n) < 0 under EU which was labeled nth-degree risk aversion by
Ekern (1980). An individual might be, for example, risk-loving and prudent (imprudent)
just as it might be risk averse and prudent (imprudent). If an individual prefers Bn over
An for all n she is called mixed risk averse, see Caballe and Pomansky (1996). Under EU
this means that her utility function is increasing with derivatives of alternating sign. It
is interesting to note that all the commonly used utility functions imply mixed risk aver-
sion, see Brockett and Golden (1987). Ebert (2010) showed that the utility of downside
risk diversification is maximal if and only if the EU decision maker is mixed risk averse.
By measuring three different degrees of risk aversion, we obtain a testable hypothesis for
mixed risk aversion.
Our experiment aims to elicit risk premia for nth-degree risk aversion for n = 2, 3, 4,,
i.e., a (2nd-degree) risk premium mRA, a downside risk (imprudence) premium mPR and
an outer risk (intemperance) premium mTE. For example, in the case of risk aversion, for
every individual we aim to elicit mRA where she is indifferent between B2 = [x− r, x− k]
and A2+m
RA = [x+mRA, x− r−k+mRA]. For a (2nd-degree) risk-loving individual, mRA
will be negative. Unlike in the experiments of Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and
Wiesen (2009) we, thus, obtain a measure of the intensity of the risk attitude rather than
only a test of preference direction.
Before we explain the procedure to implement our higher-order risk premia approach to
measure higher-order risk preferences in a laboratory experiment, it is interesting to relate
it to the very recent theoretical literature on higher-order intensity measures. Generally,
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this literature is concerned with generalizing the measures introduced in Arrow (1965),
Pratt (1964) and Ross (1981) to higher-orders. However, keep in mind that our approach
is not based on EU and, in particular, does not rely on any of the assumptions or approx-
imations frequently observed in that literature.
Kimball (1990, 1992) established a link between u
′′′
u′′ and the intensity of precautionary
savings. Chiu (2005) gave a choice-theoretic foundation of this measure paralleling that of
Arrow and Pratt being generalized to nth order by Denuit and Eeckhoudt (forthcoming
a). Modica and Scarsini (2005) show that u
′′′
u′ is a natural extension of the Ross measure of
risk aversion and suggest that it is also locally a good measure for the intensity of downside
risk aversion. In particular, the difference in risk premia of random variables with equal
mean and variance can approximately be written as the product of u
′′′
u′ and the difference
in their third moments. This holds locally at any wealth level x. Jindapon and Neilson
(2007) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (forthcoming b) generalize their results and conclude
that (−1)n+1 u
(n)
u′ is also locally an appropriate index of nth order risk attitude. For exam-
ple, −u
(4)
u′ is an appropriate measure for kurtosis aversion. Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008)
more specifically consider a premium for Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s prudence lotteries
and relate it to u
′′′
u′ . In derivations similar to theirs, in Appendix A.2.1 we show that for
the lotteries in our experiment we have
−
u′′(x)
u′(x)
≈
2mRA
r(k −mRA)
(2.1)
u′′′(x)
u′(x)
≈
4mPR
σ2(k −mPR)
(2.2)
−
u(4)(x)
u′(x)
≈
8mTE
σ21σ
2
2
(2.3)
where σ2 = E[2], σ21 = E[
2
1] and σ
2
2 = E[
2
2] denote the variances of the zero-mean risks.
Each intensity measure is increasing in the corresponding premium m•. If we further
assume that mRAr and mPRσ2 are small compared to rk and σ2k, respectively, we can
add some more interpretation. The difference in variance of the risk aversion lotteries is
−rk, the difference in the unstandardized central third moment of the prudence lotteries
is 0.75σ2k and the difference in the unstandardized central fourth moment is −1.5σ21σ
2
2.
3
Thus in this case, each premium of order n we measure is proportional to the corresponding
intensity measure of order n and to the difference in moments of order n. While we think
3Because of centralization this holds for the lotteries with or without premium. See, e.g., Ebert (2010)
for the computations.
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that these results provide valuable intuition it should be noted that the approximations of
the above formulas are rather strong. Again, our experimental procedure and results do
not rely on these approximations, and not even on EU theory at all.
2.3 Experimental design and procedure
In this section we first present the general set up of the experiment. Then we describe
the decision situation in-depth. We further discuss our experimental methodology and the
choice of parameters. Finally, we describe the experimental procedure.
2.3.1 General design
In our experiment, we present subjects with a menu of pairwise lottery choices that permits
us to identify subjects’ degree of risk aversion, prudence and temperance. Thereby we
extend the methodology of Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2009)
who test for higher-order risk attitudes in a yes-or-no fashion. Further, because we use a
within-subject design, we can compare the intensity of risk attitudes of orders 2,3 and 4 at
an individual level. That is, we can investigate their relative importance to subjects. The
main idea of the method is to combine a multiple price list format4 with the ballot box
representation of compound lotteries introduced in Ebert and Wiesen (2009).
Overall subjects make 120 decisions. After the experiment one decision is randomly
selected to determine that subject’s payoff.5 The 120 decisions are divided into 20 decisions
on each out of 6 different decision screens. One screen is for risk aversion (stage RA),
three screens are for prudence (stage PR, tasks PR1, PR2, PR3) and two screens are for
temperance (stage TE, tasks TE1, TE2). On each screen, subjects make 20 choices over
a lottery pair as introduced in Section 2.2, where each decision is for a different value of
the risk premium. For example, in stage RA subjects decide between B2 and A2 +m
RA
4Besides the studies mentioned in the Introduction prominent examples of studies employing a multiple
price list method to elicit risk attitudes are Murnighan et al. (1988) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999).
5It has become quite common in economic experiments to elicit a series of choices from participants
and then to pay for only one randomly selected choice; see Baltussen et al. (2010) for a fine overview. The
random choice payment technique enables the researcher to observe a large number of individual decisions
for a given research budget. However, the important question arises whether subjects behave as if each
of these choices involves the stated payoffs. This issue has been analyzed, among various other setups,
in experiments with pairwise lottery choice problems similar to our experiment. For example, Starmer
and Sugden (1991) found clear evidence that under random payment subjects isolate choices as if paid for
each task. Similar evidence was reported by Beattie and Loomes (1997) and Cubitt et al. (1998). In a
lottery experiment with a multiple price list format Laury (2005) reports no significant difference in choices
between paying for 1 or all 10 decision.
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for k = 5 and r = 10 where mRA takes the 20 values in EUR6
−2.50,−2.25, . . . ,−0.25, 0.00, 0.25, . . . , 2.00, 2.25.
The values for mPR and mTE follow the same grid within one experimental session.7 Fig-
ure 2.2 schematically illustrates the lottery pairs used in the stages of the experiment.
Because outcomes of lotteries could be negative subjects received an endowment per
Figure 2.2: Lottery pairs in the stages of the experiment
“Less risky” option (Bh) “More risky” option (Ah)
Stage RA
for wealth x = 25
B2
−10
1
2
−51
2
A2
−10− 5 +mRA
1
2
mRA1
2
Stage PR
for wealth x = 20
B3

1
2
−51
2
A3
−5 + +mPR
1
2
mPR1
2
with different  for tasks PR1, PR2, PR3, i.e., PR1:  = [0.5, 7; 0.5,−7], PR2:  = [0.8, 3.5; 0.2,−14]
PR3:  = [0.8,−3.5; 0.2, 14]
Stage TE
for wealth x = 17.5
B4
1
1
2
21
2
A4
1 + 2 +m
TE
1
2
mTE1
2
with different 1 and 2 for tasks TE1 and TE2, i.e., TE1: 1 = [0.5, 7; 0.5,−7], 2 = [0.5, 3.5; 0.5,−3.5]
TE2: 1 = [0.8,−2.8; 0.2, 11.1], 2 = [0.8, 2.8; 0.2,−11.1]
This figure illustrates the lotteries used in the experiment including the risk premia. For risk aver-
sion we measure on premiummRA, for prudence temperance we measure three premiamPR1,mPR2
and mPR3 and for temperance we measure two premia mTE1 and mTE2.
decision. Endowments vary across stages being 25.00 EUR in stage RA, 20.00 EUR in stage
6Notice that all monetary values in the experiment are indicated in EUR.
7In Subsection 2.3.4 we explain how we test for robustness to variations of the risk premia grid and to
sequencing effects.
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PR and 17.50 EUR in stage TE. The endowment is shown on subjects decision screens
and, additionally, subjects are handed coupons illustrating the endowment right before
each stage is started.
2.3.2 Decision screens
We use a computerized experiment programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) to make
use of appropriate randomization techniques explained later. While it is somewhat cum-
bersome to explain the decision screen in writing, it is conveniently explained to subjects
in a presentation prior to the experiment. In the following we will describe the decision
situation in the experimental stages in more detail. We begin with stage PR and after-
wards contrast it with stages RA and TE.
An example of a decision task in stage PR (task PR3) is given in Figure 2.3. It must
be understood as follows: On the upper left the number of the current decision is displayed
(‘Decision 35’). Below follows a statement indicating subjects’ endowment which is con-
stant for all decisions in that stage. By clicking the “OK” button on the lower right corner
the subject can leave the decision screen if all 20 decisions have been made. Otherwise the
subject is reminded through a pop-up window that she first has to complete all 20 decisions
on that screen. The rest of the screen is divided into three panels that are displayed in
darker greys than the background. From left to right, the first panel displays one possible
lottery choice (Option A), the second displays the alternative lottery choice (Option B)
and the far right, dark grey panel is the “decision panel.”
We start with explaining the representation of the lottery displayed in the first panel
(Option A). It consists of three items. Left is a ballot box containing two (blue) balls,
labeled “Up” and “Down”, respectively. Note that the panel itself is horizontally separated.
The upper part contains a second ballot box that contains eight (yellow) balls labeled
“−3.50” and two (white) balls labeled “14.00” and represents a gamble that yields −3.50
with probability 8/10 and 14.00 with probability 2/10. The lower part of the panel contains
the entry −5.00 which represents a fixed reduction in wealth of −5.00. In total, the lottery
displayed in Option A must be understood as follows. To determine its outcome, first, a
ball is drawn from the ballot box containing two balls. If “Up” is realized, this means that
the outcome will be determined as depicted in the upper part of the panel. That is, a
draw is made from the second ballot box. Recall that the individual’s endowment in this
stage is 20.00. If a ball labeled −3.50 is drawn, the outcome of the lottery in Option A
would be 20.00 − 3.50 = 16.50. If a ball labeled 14.00 is drawn, the outcome would be
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Figure 2.3: Sample decision screen in stage PR (task PR3)
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20.00 + 14.00 = 34.00. Now suppose, in the first gamble “Down” is drawn. Then the indi-
vidual faces a sure reduction in wealth of −5.00 and the outcome of the lottery in Option
A would be 20.00 − 5.00 = 15.00. The ballot boxes in the screen shot aim to mimic the
real world ballot boxes used to determine subjects’ payoffs that are depicted in Figure 2.4.
Now consider the second panel in Figure 2.3, i.e., Option B. Like the first panel it is
Figure 2.4: Real world ballot boxes to determine individual payoffs
horizontally separated and contains the same two ballot boxes and the same fixed reduction
in wealth −5.00. However, for Option B the −5.00 now occurs in the upper rather than in
the lower part of the panel. The second difference is that both parts of the panel contain
a bill labeled 1.00. To determine the outcome of the lottery in Option B, like in Option
A, first a ball is drawn from the first ballot box. If “Up” is drawn, a draw is made from
the second ballot box. If −3.50 is drawn, the outcome of the lottery in Option B would be
20.00− 5.00− 3.50+ 1.00 = 12.50. If 14.00 is drawn, the outcome of the lottery in Option
B would be 20.00− 5.00 + 14.00 + 1.00 = 30.00. If in the first draw “Down” is drawn, the
outcome of the lottery in Option B would be 20.00 + 1.00 = 21.00.
Before we explain the decision panel, note that Option A depicts a prudent lottery choice
of type B3 defined in Section 2.2 and depicted in Figure 2.2. The ballot box containing
the “Up” and “Down” balls represents the 50/50 gamble. The second ballot box containing
ten balls represents the zero-mean risk . Likewise, Option B depicts the corresponding
imprudent lottery A3. The bill labeled 1.00 is the downside risk premium m
PR for the
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current decision. Whether the prudent or imprudent Option is displayed as “Option A”,
i.e., in the first panel, is randomized for every subject individually, and so is the association
of payoffs with the “up” or “down”-state of the lottery.
We now explain how subjects actually indicate their decisions in the decision panel.
By clicking one of the 20 amounts of the mPR-grid that is displayed in the first column
(“Amount”), the amounts mPR displayed in the first panel adjust accordingly. Also the
decision number in the upper left of the screen will adjust. In Figure 2.3, the subject cur-
rently has selected to make her decision for mPR = 1.00, which is why the corresponding
row in the decision panel is framed in light green. To decide for Option A or Option B,
respectively, she can click either “A” in the second column of the decision panel or “B” in
the third column of the decision panel. The selected button then turns dark green. The
subject can continue to make another decision by clicking another fixed amount in column
“Amount” and click “A” or “B” in the corresponding row. In Figure 2.3, the subject chose
Option A for mPR = −2.50, . . . , 0.50, chose Option B for mPR = 0.75 and is about to make
her choice for mPR = 1.00. She can also make another choice by clicking another value of
mPR. This way, she can also go back to a previous decision and change it. Further, the
subject is free to answer the questions in a different order as suggested in the screenshot.
After having made all 20 decisions, she can leave the decision screen by clicking the “OK”
button. A pop-up window will appear, asking the subject to confirm or cancel. The subject
is reminded that if she confirms, her decisions in this task will be final.
The decision screens for tasks in stages RA and TE are analogous to the one just ex-
plained. A lottery of type A2 or B2 in stage RA is displayed like A3 or B3 in Figure 2.3,
except that the ballot box representing the zero-mean risk is replaced by the fixed amount
r = −10. Likewise, in stage TE, the fixed amount k = −5 is replaced by another ballot
box with ten balls that represents the other zero-mean risk in the definitions of A4 and
B4. See the instructions in the Appendix A.2.2 for explicit screenshots of these stages.
2.3.3 Discussion of experimental method and parameter choices
In a theoretical paper, Ebert (2010) analyzes the statistical properties of the proper risk
apportionment lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and shows that they are
mostly driven by the skewness of the zero-mean risks that have to be apportioned. As
a consequence, he shows that no binary lottery can capture the essential features of the
proper risk apportionment lotteries of 3rd-order and higher sufficiently well. This is also
observed in the experiment of Ebert and Wiesen (2009) who show that the skewness of the
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zero-mean risk indeed influences subjects’ decisions significantly. Thus, we need at least
trinomial lotteries. The temperance lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger with binary
zero-mean risks involve up to 5 states. Comparison between two such lotteries would pose
a significant challenge in comprehensiveness to subjects. Thus, we use the representation
as a compound lottery introduced in Ebert and Wiesen (2009) that they also test for
experimental robustness. This representation also fits well the intuition of proper risk
apportionment (disaggregation of harms across states of nature, ‘putting risk in its proper
place’) as defined by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
Probabilities do not vary within one decision screen and, generally, the only probabilities
used are 50/50 and 80/20. Unlike the probabilities the outcomes of the “more risky” option
of a lottery pair are varied in our procedure. That it is meaningful to vary outcomes rather
than probabilities to change the expected value of a risky prospect has recently been shown
by Bruner (2009). The probabilities of our lottery pairs are visualized using ballot boxes
similar to the ones actually used to determine subjects’ payoffs (see Figure 2.4). They were
shown to subjects prior to the experiment while explaining the decision screens.
The multiple price list procedure is one of the most established methods to measure
individual risk attitudes. As already described in Subsection 2.3.2 the variant applied
in our experiment confronts a subject with an array of ordered prices (here mRA, mPR
and mTE) and asks the subject to make a decision between Option A and Option B for
each price. In general, the procedure is very attractive as it easy to implement and the
task involved can be easily accessed by the subjects. Moreover, truthful revelation is in
subjects’ best interest. However, one frequently raised concern is that the multiple price
list method is prone to framing effects, as subjects are drawn to the middle row of the
ordered list irrespective of their true values; see Andersen et al. (2006) for a comprehensive
discussion. To account for this possible effect we devise a test by varying the cardinal scale
of the multiple price list as will be explained in Subsection 2.3.4. Notice however that our
qualitative results are unaffected by this framing issue.
Our approach is largely inspired by the theoretical paper of Crainich and Eeckhoudt
(2008). However, the downside risk premium mPR they define is added to A3 in the “good”
state only, while we define it as being added to both states of the 50/50 gamble. That is,
we consider Ah+mh (h = 2, 3, 4). A risk premium for sure seems to be more comprehensive
for experimental purposes than a risk premium ‘with probability’. Further, crucial to our
approach is that this simplifies the calibration of the lotteries significantly because Ah
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differs from Ah +mh only by its mean while all higher central moments are unaffected by
the size of the risk premium. This allows for a “clean” tradeoff between increased mean
and 2nd-degree risk, downside risk or outer risk, respectively. Furthermore, this is why
we will be able to reasonably compare the risk premia of various orders obtained in each
stage. Note that, although the risk premia are added for sure, there is no experimental
certainty effect because both Option A and Option B are always risky.
Moreover, our approach is not based on moments. It is, rather, insightful to look at the
Table 2.1: Statistical features of lottery pairs employed in the experiment
Stage RA Stage PR Stage TE
PR1 PR2 PR3 TE1 TE2
E[Bh]− (E[Ah] +m
·
h) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
V (Bh)− V (Ah) 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skew(Bh)− Skew(Ah) 0.00 2.16 2.16 2.16 0.00 0.00
Kurt(Bh)−Kurt(Ah) 0.00 0.00 -5.44 5.44 -1.92 -3.00
This table shows differences in the first four standardized central moments between
the lottery pairs in each of the six tasks of the experiment. The risk premia m•i only
influence expectation and thus do not distort higher-order risk features of the lotteries.
The risk averse lottery choice has a smaller variance than the risk-loving lottery choice.
The prudent lottery choice has a higher skewness than the imprudent choice but can
have a smaller or higher kurtosis, depending on the skewness of zero-mean risk that
has to be apportioned. The kurtosis is smaller if and only if the zero-mean risk is
left-skewed. The temperate lottery choice has a smaller kurtosis.
moments of the particular lotteries employed in our experiment to supplement our intuition
for the different orders of risk. Table 2.1 illustrates in what moments the lotteries to test
for different risk orders differ. For more on higher-order risk preferences, nth-degree risk
and moments see Ekern (1980), Roger (forthcoming) and Ebert (2010). The latter paper
shows that, for prudence and temperance, the intuition provided by considering the first
four moments only essentially generalizes to more general notions of skewness and kurtosis
as defined by all odd and even moments, respectively. For example, prudence is shown
to be a preference for high odd moments (skewness) irrespective of the even moments
(kurtosis). Ebert and Wiesen (2009) observe a significant effect of kurtosis on prudent
decision behavior and thus the present experiment comprises three tasks for prudence to
respect that effect.
To facilitate comparisons between the premia measured in each task, all lottery pairs
are calibrated according to their moments up to the third order. That is, for equal values
of the risk premium, the six lotteries with less (more) nth-degree risk have expectation
17.5 (17.5 + m•i ). Because we choose the risk premia to be added for sure, they do not
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distort higher-order moments of the lotteries. Naturally, the risk averse lotteries differ by
their variance. Independent of the value of mRA, for the lotteries in task RA we have
0.5 (V (B2) + V (A2)) = 31.25. The prudence and temperance lotteries in our experiment
are constructed such that V (A3) = V (B3) = V (A4) = V (B4) ≈ 31 with an error of
less than 0.25. Similarly the risk aversion and temperance lotteries have a skewness of
approximately 0 which is the average skewness of the six prudence lotteries used in tasks
PR1 to PR3. Thus we test for risk aversion, prudence and temperance not only in the
same “wealth region”, but also in the same “risk region” in terms of variance and skewness.
Together with the consistent decision framing as proper risk apportionment in all three
stages with the same type of decision screen, this should make the premia of different order
we elicit reasonably comparable.
2.3.4 Robustness tests and factorial design
To account for possible disadvantages associated with our method to elicit subjects risk
preferences, like order effects and framing, we employ a between subjects 24-factorial de-
sign, i.e., four factors (A, B, C, D) with two levels each. For all 24 = 16 possible com-
binations of factor levels 8 subjects make their choices in the experimental stages (see
Table 2.2). This explains why our experiment was outlined for 16 · 8 = 128 subjects in to-
tal in the experiment. The sequence of sessions (with their particular factor constellations)
was randomized. See Montgomery (2005) for an overview of the factorial design technique.
Within our factorial design we test for order effects (Factors A and B) that potentially
can distort results (see, e.g., Harrison et al. 2005, Andersen et al. 2006). As shown in
Table 2.2, Factor A implies that stage TE is either the first or last stage a subject enters
and Factor B is either “stage RA precedes stage PR” or “stage PR precedes stage RA”.
Thus, we consider four out of six possible stage sequences: TE-PR-RA, TE-RA-PR, PR-
RA-TE, RA-PR-TE. Note that the sequences of tasks in stages PR and TE is randomized
individually.
The multiple price list instrument might suggest a frame that encourages subjects to
select the middle row of the m-list to switch from one lottery to the other, contrary to their
unframed risk preferences; see, e.g., Andersen et al. (2006), Harrison et al. (2007). To
account for this potential problem we devise a shifted grid (Factor C) in which the middle
row implies different risk attitudes. More specifically, the levels of Factor C are either a
shift in the scale of the m-list (2.00 EUR are added to each value) or no shift. We also
deliberately changed the grid distances of them-list in order to detect behavioral influences
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Table 2.2: Factorial design
Level of Level of Level of Level of Number of subjects
Ses. Factor A Factor B Factor C Factor D (female, male)
1 TE last PR-RA no Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
2 TE last RA-PR no Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
3 TE last RA-PR no Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
4 TE last PR-RA no Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
5 TE first PR-RA Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
6 TE last RA-PR Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
7 TE first RA-PR Shift Grid 0.50 7 (4,3)
8 TE last RA-PR Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
9 TE first RA-PR no Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
10 TE first PR-RA no Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
11 TE first PR-RA Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
12 TE first RA-PR Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
13 TE first PR-RA no Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
14 TE last PR-RA Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
15 TE first RA-PR no Shift Grid 0.50 8 (4,4)
16 TE last PR-RA Shift Grid 0.25 8 (4,4)
This table illustrates the run-order of the sixteen sessions we conducted, the
factor constellation for every session and the number of participants and their
gender. In every session we collected responses of 4 men and 4 women, except
for session 7, where only 3 women (including the invited substitutes) showed
up.
of grid increments (Factor D), i.e., we used a fine and a coarser grid. Factor D considers
the distance between two values on the grid being either 0.25 EUR (such as described in
the previous subsections) or 0.50 EUR. Consequently, depending on the levels for Factors
C and D the m-list adapts four different ranges: (i) [−2.50, 2.25] and (ii) [−0.50, 4.25] both
with a gird of 0.25 EUR as well as (iii) [−5.00, 4.50] and (iv) [−3.00, 6.50] with a grid of
0.50 EUR.
Gender differences in risk preferences, i.e., risk aversion, is a well documented phe-
nomenon in the experimental economics literature (Croson and Gneezy 2009). To consider
possible gender effects in the decision tasks of our experiment the number of male and
female participants is well balanced for each session.
2.3.5 Experimental procedure
The experimental sessions were conducted at BonnEconLab in January and February 2010.
Overall 127 students from various disciplines, e.g., mathematics, economics, law, business
administration, history and linguistics, participated in our 16 experimental sessions. Sub-
jects were recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). As already
shown in Table 2.2 the number of male and female participants was well balanced in each
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session. The experimental sessions lasted for about 1.5 to 2 hours. Subjects earned on
average 24.00 EUR.
The procedure of the experiment was as follows: Firstly, experimenters extensively in-
troduced the decision task and the procedure of the experiment to the subjects. Before
each experimental stage started, subjects were asked to answer control questions testing
their understanding of the decision task. In particular, they were familiarized with the
illustration of lotteries and their outcomes as well as probabilities. Only when subjects
had answered the questions correctly they were allowed to proceed to the experimental
decisions. Then subjects made the decisions in the experimental stages. Fourthly, subjects
answered the questionnaire comprising demographic questions. For answering the ques-
tionnaire subjects received 4.00 EUR in addition to their earnings from the experiment.
Finally, each subject’s payoff was determined by a random-choice payment technique.
As already mentioned, subjects made a series of 120 choices, each with substantial mon-
etary consequences, and final payoff are based on just one of these choices selected at
random after all have been completed. The random choice was made by drawing one card
out of a set of cards numbered between 1 and 120 from a ballot box. The randomly drawn
choice could either be from stage RA, PR or TE. Moreover, the lottery of the randomly
chosen question determined by a subject’s choice is actually played out. Corresponding to
the question randomly chosen a coupon was allocated to the lottery outcome. Afterwards
the experimenters gave the resulting payoff to the subjects.
2.4 Behavioral results
In this section, we present the results from our experimental sessions. Firstly, we report risk
taking behavior on the aggregate for each risk type. Secondly, we explore the relationship
between the different risk types. Thirdly, the robustness of our experimental method is
checked and, finally, we analyze risk taking behavior across gender.
2.4.1 Premia for different risk types
In all questions, the vast majority of subjects chose the “less risky option” when compen-
sation was small, and then crossed over to the “more risky option” without ever going
back to the less risky option. Aggregated over six tasks, 85% of individuals switched once
and 8% did not switch. For 3% we observe two switches and in about 4% of responses
subjects switch back and forth more than two times. This latter fraction is slightly lower
than reported in other multiple price list experiments to elicit risk preferences, e.g., Holt
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and Laury (2002), who report between 5 to 6% of multiple switches. We included subjects
in our analysis with one switching point or no switch at all. Further, we include subjects
with two switching points. We dropped subjects from our analysis who had more than
two switching points for more than one out of the six decision screens. This was the case
for eight out of 127 subjects.
In the following, an individual’s response to a task refers to the first premium for
Figure 2.5: Average premium by risk type
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which an individual switched to the more risky lottery choice in that task. A subject’s
response to a stage is the average of the subject’s responses to the tasks of that stage.
Formally, let mˆRAi denote individual i’s response in stage RA (which consisted of one
task only). Further, let mˆPRi :=
1
3 (mˆ
PR1
i + mˆ
PR2
i + mˆ
PR3
i ) and mˆ
TE
i :=
1
2 (mˆ
TE1
i + mˆ
TE2
i )
denote individual i’s average response to the three prudence and two temperance tasks,
respectively. The corresponding averages over all individuals are denoted by mˆ
RA
, mˆ
PR
and mˆ
TE
, respectively. These overall averages are depicted in Figure 2.5. We clearly
observe that subjects desire more compensation to accept the imprudent compared to the
risk loving and intemperate choice.
In particular, as shown in Table 2.3 subjects desire on average a higher compensation
to accept an imprudent choice (mˆ
PR
= 1.6817; s.d. 1.3427) compared to the risk loving
(mˆ
RA
= 1.2290; s.d. 1.8012) and the intemperate choice (mˆ
TE
= 0.8929, s.d. 1.2175).8
8Analyzing the medians for mRAi , mˆ
PR
i and mˆ
TE
i clearly indicates a tendency towards risk averse,
prudent and temperate behavior, as subjects’ responses differ substantially from the risk neutral choice,
i.e., the choice of a premium of 0 (or put differently, crossing over from the less risky to the more risky
choice when the expected value of more risky choice is larger for the first time). The median premia for the
risk loving, imprudent and intemperate choice are 1.00, 1.50 and 0.50, respectively. Note that premia for
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This behavioral pattern implies that subjects attach, on average, more weight to third-
order risks than to second-order and fourth-order risks. We also observe this pattern for
subjects’ responses per task. Table 2.3 shows that a higher premium is desired for all three
tasks in stage PR compared to stage RA and the tasks in stage TE. Further, the average
compensation to accept the risk loving choice is larger than the desired compensation for
the two temperance items.
To test these differences for significance, we first conduct a Page-Test for ordered
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics on subjects’ desired premia
mˆRAi mˆ
PR1
i mˆ
PR2
i mˆ
PR3
i (mˆ
PR
i ) mˆ
TE1
i mˆ
TE1
i (mˆ
TE
i )
Mean 1.2290 1.8361 1.6940 1.5192 1.6817 0.9916 0.8098 0.8929
s.d. 1.8012 1.7837 1.6142 1.6325 1.3427 1.4287 1.4221 1.2175
Median 1.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
N 119 119 116 117 359 119 117 227
This table shows descriptive statistics on premia for each tasks and averages over tasks
for stages PR and TE.
alternatives. The null hypothesis is that on average subject’s responses were the same in
every stage and the alternative hypothesis is that they are ordered in a specific way.9 We
suppose mˆPRi ≥ mˆ
RA
i ≥ mˆ
TE
i to be the specific order. The null hypothesis of equality of
responses can be rejected and, thus, it follows that at least one of the differences is a strict
inequality (p = 0.0004, L = 1480, Page-test).10
Pairwise comparisons were conducted using a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank (WSR)
test and a t-test for paired samples (t). The normality assumption of the t-tests should
be well satisfied given our sample size. The null hypothesis that the premia for risk
aversion and prudence, mˆRAi and mˆ
PR
i , have the same mean, i.e., mˆ
RA
= mˆ
PR
is rejected
(p = 0.0057, t and p = 0.0101, WSR). Likewise, the average compensation to accept
the imprudent choice (mˆ
PR
) differs significantly from the average compensation for the
intemperate choice mˆ
TE
(p = 0.0000, t and WSR). The p-values for the null hypothesis
that the means of the 2nd-degree risk premia mˆ
RA
and the outer risk premia mˆ
TE
are
all risks differ significantly from the risk neutral choice (p < 0.0001, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided).
9To specify the null hypothesis and its alternative more explicitly, let θ(·) be the population median
of subjects’ responses. Then the null hypothesis that the medians are the same may be written as H0 :
θ(mˆRAi ) = θ(mˆ
i
PR) = θ(mˆ
TE
i ) and the alternative hypothesis may be written as H0 : θ(mˆ
TE
i ) ≤ θ(mˆ
RA
i ) ≤
θ(mˆPRi ) where at least one of the differences is a strict inequality. That is, the medians are ordered in
magnitude. Notice that, we corrected for ties.
10Notice that if we assume the ordering mˆRAi ≥ m
PR
i ≥ mˆ
TE
i the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
(p = 0.4364).
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p = 0.0527 (t) and p = 0.2024 (WSR). As application of the stronger t-test seems justified,
we conclude that there is weak evidence that 2nd-order risk premia are higher than outer
risk.
Result 1. On average, subjects desire significantly higher (third-order) downside risk pre-
mia than second-order and outer risk premia. We further find weak evidence that second-
order premia are higher than outer risk premia.
Result 1 is the main result of this paper. It shows that in a direct comparison, prudence
is relatively more important to subjects than risk aversion. This is meant in the sense that
they are willing to pay a larger premium to get a lottery with less downside risk compared
to getting a lottery with less 2nd-degree risk. This questions the extensive focus on risk
aversion in the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical (experimental), and
highlights the importance of prudence. In particular, the experimental economic literature
contains numerous different methods to measure risk aversion, but this paper constitutes
the first approach to measure prudence. When comparing two risks (rather than comparing
risk with certainty), risk aversion no more exhaustively specifies subjects’ risk preferences.
To do this, risk aversion must be complemented by higher-order risk preferences. As shown
here, a 2nd-order risk increase which is addressed by risk aversion is not the most important
one to subjects. A downside risk increase is more harmful and this will be reflected by an
individual’s preferences if and only if prudence is assumed.
The only significant difference for average premia within stages PR and TE, respectively,
is observed for PR1 and PR3 (p = 0.0269, t and p = 0.0561, WSR). This confirms that
subjects indeed should respond to several prudence tasks as the choice of the zero-mean
risk influences decision behavior (see also Ebert and Wiesen, 2009). In particular, if we
had only employed stage PR3 we would not have observed a significant difference in premia
to stage RA (0.1331, t and 0.3013, WSR). The observation that the imprudence premium
is smallest for a right-skewed zero-mean risk as employed in task PR3 seems reasonable as
such a risk constitutes less of a harm to a prudent individual. It can further be shown that
in this case prudence implies choosing higher kurtosis (as defined by all even moments being
higher) what might make the prudent option less attractive to a temperate individual, see
Ebert (2010). Further, according to that paper, a mixed risk averse decision maker should
demand premia that are increasing in the skewness of the zero-mean risk. We find some
significant support for this in the comparison of PR1 to PR3. Further, the premium in PR2
is higher than in PR3, but not significantly. Contradictory to mixed risk aversion is that
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the premium in PR1 is higher than in PR2 (but not significantly). Let us finally also note
that Maxmin preferences (e.g., Gilboa 2009, chapter 17) cannot explain our behavioral
result as the temperance lotteries involve the highest losses but the corresponding outer
risk premia are smallest.
2.4.2 Relationship between risk aversion, prudence and temperance
Theoretically, risk aversion, prudence and temperance are complementary in describing
individuals’ risk attitudes. But what is the relationship empirically? In the following
we explore this question by analyzing each individual’s demanded premium for the three
different risk types. Figure 2.6 shows three scatter plots contrasting individual premium
choices for risk types in a pairwise manner. For all three comparisons the plots suggest
a positive correlation. Test statistics of a Spearman rank correlation test confirm this
Figure 2.6: Pairwise comparison of premia for different risk types
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The left graph plots jointly the risk premia demanded for prudence (vertical axis) and risk aversion
(horizontal axis) by each of 119 individuals. The centered (right) graph plots the premia for temperance
and risk aversion (temperance and prudence).
tendency. There is a significant positive relationship between the second-order risk pre-
mium mˆRAi and the downside risk premium mˆ
PR
i (rs = 0.3896, p = 0.0000). Moreover,
the correlation between mˆRAi and mˆ
TE
i is also positive (rs = 0.2681) and significant
(p = 0.0032). The ‘strongest’ positive relationship can be observed between responses in
stage PR (mˆPRi ) and stage TE (mˆ
TE
i ), as rs = 0.5805 at a 1% significance level.
11 This
supports the assumption of mixed risk aversion which is common in the economic literature.
11The relationships are qualitatively the same when considering premia for the tasks in stages PR and
TE separately, i.e., mˆPR1i , mˆ
PR2
i , mˆ
PR3
i and mˆ
TE1
i , mˆ
TE2
i .
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Result 2. Behavioral data evidence a significantly positive relationship between individ-
uals’ demanded premia for second-order risk, downside risk and outer risk. This implies
that risk aversion, prudence and temperance often occur jointly (but with different inten-
sity, see Result 1). The highest positive correlation can be observed between prudence and
temperance.
2.4.3 Robustness analysis
In this section we analyze the factorial design described in Section 2.3.4. We test robustness
of our experiment towards stage order effects (Factors A and B) and manipulations of the
premia grid. For Factor C the levels are either “the premia grid is shifted by 2.00 EUR” or
“the premia grid is not shifted”. Depending on Factor D the grid size was either 0.25 EUR
or 0.50 EUR.
At first we analyze whether subjects’ average premia over all six tasks, mi :=
1
6(mˆ
RA
i +
mˆPR1i + mˆ
PR2
i + mˆ
PR3
i + mˆ
TE1
i + mˆ
TE2
i ), varies for different factor levels. Table 2.4 shows
descriptive statistics by factor levels and provides p-values of a two-sided Fisher-Pitman
permutation test.
The order in which stages occur does not significantly influence subjects’ responses (A:
p = 0.4126, B: p = 0.1271). However, shifting the scale of the premia by +2.00 EUR
does significantly influence subjects responses. When there is no shift subjects’ desired
premia are lower than when there is a shift. This difference is significant at a 1% level (C:
p = 0.0077). Although the average responses are slightly larger for a grid of 0.50 EUR on
the premium scale than for a grid of 0.25 EUR, the change in grid size did not exert a
significant influence on subjects’ decisions (D: p = 0.6104).12
Are the same factors still influential for subjects’ behavior when we distinguish between
responses for individual the stages RA, PR and TE, i.e., mˆRAi , mˆ
PR
i and mˆ
TE
i ? Different
levels of Factors A and D caused no significant influence on the premia for the three
different types of risk. For Factor B the intemperance premium is significantly larger when
stage RA precedes PR. Subjects desire a substantial higher premium for all types of risk
when there is a shift in the scale of premia (Factor C). This difference is significant for mˆPRi
and mˆTEi . However, for mˆ
RA
i the difference is substantial but not significant (p = 0.11263).
To sum up, as is typical for experiments employing a multiple price list format, shifts in
the premia grid can potentially distort measurements such that one should control for this
12p-values from a parametric t-test for unpaired samples are very similar; i.e., A: p = 0.4425, B: p =
0.1260, C: p = 0.0071 and D: p = 0.6081.
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Table 2.4: Analysis for different factor levels
Factor (level) mi m
RA
i mˆ
PR
i mˆ
TE
i
A (TE first) Mean 1.4244 1.4831 1.5367 0.7288
s.d. 1.1202 1.9208 1.3310 1.2834
A (TE last) Mean 1.2579 1.6534 1.8243 1.0542
s.d. 1.0834 0.9792 1.3499 1.1367
p 0.4126 0.1311 0.2439 0.1482
B (PR-RA) Mean 1.5004 1.1353 1.5731 0.6455
s.d. 0.9959 1.9146 1.4049 1.3410
B (RA-PR) Mean 1.1911 1.3276 1.7960 1.1530
s.d. 1.1802 1.6847 1.2761 1.0206
p 0.1271 0.5742 0.3672 0.0226
C (no Shift) Mean 1.0794 0.9713 1.3805 0.6742
s.d. 1.0207 1.6552 1.2604 1.2540
C (Shift) Mean 1.6180 1.5000 1.9987 1.1228
s.d. 1.0207 1.9200 1.3641 1.1439
p 0.0077 0.1126 0.0122 0.0443
D (Grid 0.25) Mean 1.3926 1.2629 1.5611 0.8966
s.d. 1.2170 1.3990 1.1441 0.9954
D (Grid 0.50) Mean 1.2885 1.1967 1.7965 0.8893
s.d. 0.9712 2.1258 1.5082 1.4050
p 0.6104 0.8538 0.3437 0.9828
This table shows descriptive statistics on premia averaged over
risk types mi and on premia per risk type for each factor level.
Further it shows p-values of a two-sided Fisher-Pitman permu-
tation test for independent samples.
effect.
The more important point with respect to the application of the factorial design is the
following. The factorial design introduced a lot of variation into our measurements, but
still we obtain significance for our results. That is, these results are robust towards caveats
of the experimental method.
Result 3. The order of stages does not influence subjects’ average premium choice signif-
icantly. Also the grid increments do not influence subjects’ choices. A shift in the premia
grid influences subjects’ behavior for all orders of risk significantly. It is important to note
that the other results of the experiment are significant despite of being challenged by the
factorial design.
2.4.4 Is there a male-female difference?
Differences between women and men in risk attitudes are well documented in the experi-
mental economics literature. Most evidence suggests that women perceive risks as greater,
engage in less risky behavior, and choose alternatives that involve less risk. In their
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literature reviews Eckel and Grossman (2008 b) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude
that it is a robust finding from (economic) experiments that women are more risk averse
than men. In this section we show that this observation also applies to the higher-order
risk preferences prudence and temperance.
Figure 2.7 illustrates average demanded compensations for the different types of risk
for 58 women and 61 men. The finding that a higher premium is desired for the imprudent
choice than for the risk loving and intemperate choice is robust for both males and females.
In line with the literature on gender differences in risk taking behavior we find that
Figure 2.7: Average compensation by gender
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female (F ) subjects are more risk averse than male (M) subjects. To accept the risk
loving choice women demand, on average, a higher premium than men (mˆ
RA-F
= 1.5690;
mˆ
RA-M
= 0.9057). This difference is significant (p = 0.04474, two-sided Fisher-Pitman
permutation test).13
Moreover, our data show that women are both more prudent and temperate than men.
That is, women demand a higher compensation to accept the imprudent (mˆ
PR-F
= 1.8829;
mˆ
PR-M
= 1.4904) and the intemperate choices (mˆ
TE-F
= 1.1504; mˆ
TE-M
= 0.7350). Both
differences are significant at a 5% level (p = 0.0448; p = 0.0432). This puts the robust
finding that “men are more risk prone than women” (Croson and Gneezy, 2009, p.449) on
13Notice that we employ a permutation test for paired samples as session averages are compared by
gender.
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a broader basis.
Result 4. Women not only are more risk averse than men, but also are more prudent and
more temperate.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose an experimental method to measure risk aversion, prudence and
temperance at an individual level. Within the scarce empirical literature on higher-order
risk preferences, this constitutes the first attempt to measure the intensity of risk pref-
erences rather than only their direction. Further, it is the first attempt to compare the
intensity of the preferences within subjects.
The theoretical fundament of our experimental method is the proper risk apportion-
ment model of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger. Within this model we define risk premia of
higher-orders and show that they are related to higher-order intensity measures in the
spirit of Arrow-Pratt. By definition, the premia imply a clean tradeoff between mean and
2nd-degree risk (downside risk and outer risk, respectively) for the lottery choices in the
experiment. Lotteries are calibrated such that these premia are comparable not only be-
tween but also within subjects.
In the experiment we measure these risk premia using a multiple price list technique.
The lotteries employed in the experiment are presented as compound rather than trinomial
(quadri- or pentanomial) and match the intuition of proper risk apportionment. The only
probabilities used are 50/50 and 80/20. These probabilities are visualized using ballot
boxes similar to the ones actually used to determine subjects’ payoffs. This experimental
design is tested for robustness to typical manipulations using a between subject factorial
design.
Our main result is that the downside risk premium demanded is significantly higher than
the second-order risk premium. This highlights the importance of prudence and questions
the extensive focus in the economics literature on risk aversion. In particular, the literature
contains numerous different experimental methods to measure risk aversion, but this paper
constitutes the first approach to measure prudence.
Behavioral data implies that the outer risk premium is smallest. It is smaller than the
second degree premium with weak significance and smaller than the downside risk premium
with strong significance. We also observe that the stylized fact that women are more risk
averse than men extends to risks of higher orders. That means, women are significantly
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more prudent and more temperate than men.
Further research on the measurement of higher-order risk preferences seems to be de-
sirable in order to close the significant gap to the experimental literature on risk aversion.
Given the observation that the intensity of downside risk aversion is higher than for risk
aversion, this seems to be even more justified. Moreover, our method could find appli-
cation in further experiments to test the predictions of numerous theoretical papers on
higher-order risk preferences.
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Chapter 3
How payment incentives affect
physicians’ provision behavior
3.1 Introduction
A central concern in health economics is to understand the influence of institutions on the
behavior of actors on health care markets. In practice, effects from changing institutions
like the payment system during a health care reform are ex ante not necessarily known
to policy makers and may influence behavior in an undesired way. Main addressees of
reforms are health care providers (physicians) whose behavior is likely to be influenced
by the payment system. Theoretical health-economic literature has highlighted the differ-
ent incentives of commonly used payment systems like fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation
(CAP). Under FFS physicians are paid for each medical procedure or service dispensed to
a patient whereas under CAP, physicians receive a fixed payment for each patient irrespec-
tive of the quantity of medical services provided. FFS inherits an incentive to ‘overserve’
patients whereas CAP may lead to underprovision of medical services (Ellis and McGuire
1986, Newhouse 2002).
Field studies show that different payment systems do affect physicians’ behavior. Yet,
the results are often not comparable because of country-specific institutional differences.1
In some studies, more than one component of the payment system is varied simultaneously
making causal inferences difficult or even impossible. According to Gosden et al. (2001)
the results are too contradictory to draw a definite conclusion on the direction of an effect.
1See for example the studies by Stearns et al. (1992) and Davidson et al. (1992) in the US, Krasnik et al.
(1990) in Denmark, Iversen and Lurås (2000) and Grytten and Sørensen (2001) in Norway, Hutchinson
et al. (1996), Devlina and Sarma (2008) and Dumont et al. (2008) in Canada.
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Another empirical method is called for that complements field studies and overcomes
(some of) the problems mentioned above. Fuchs (2000) in his article on the future of health
economics argues that incorporating methods of experimental economics into health eco-
nomic research may lead to great benefits for the latter. In a similar vein, Frank (2007)
argues in favor of applying behavioral economics methods in health economics.
Our study contributes to the research agendas suggested by Fuchs and Frank. We use a
controlled laboratory experiment to improve the understanding of the institutional param-
eter ‘payment system’ by implementing the specific features of FFS and CAP. The main
focus of our study is on how the two payment systems influence a physician’s provision of
medical services, and we abstract from factors other than the payment system. Our study
is one of the very first ones tackling a health economic topic by methods of experimental
economics.2
In our experiment, medical students in the role of physicians decide on the quantity
of medical services under the two payment systems. Patients gain a benefit from these
services—the patient benefit measured in monetary terms. Only abstract patients ‘partici-
pate’ in our experiment. To provide the physicians in the experiment with an incentive for
favorable behavior towards the patients, however, the money corresponding to the benefits
of all abstract patients is transferred to a charity caring for real patients.
Our main finding is that physicians are influenced by the payment system. In line with
theoretical considerations, patients are overserved under FFS and underserved under CAP.
Financial incentives are not the only motivation for physicians’ quantity decisions. The
patient benefit is of rather considerable importance as well. Patients are affected differently
by the two payment systems. Those in need of a low level of medical services are better
off under CAP, whereas patients in need of a high level of medical services gain a higher
health benefit when physicians are paid by FFS.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sketches the theoretical and empirical
literature on physician payment and incentives most relevant to our research topic. Sec-
tion 3.3 states our research questions. Experimental design and procedure are described
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides a statistical analysis of subjects’ behavior within and
across payment systems. Section 3.6 concludes.
2The only other studies we are aware of are Fan et al. (1998), Ahlert et al. (2008) and our related own
study Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2010); for the latter see Chapter 4.
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3.2 Related literature
In the health economics literature, several authors have highlighted the different incentives
in commonly used payment systems like fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). In
their seminal article, Ellis and McGuire (1986) let the physician (she) decide on the quan-
tity of medical services as an agent of the patient (he) and the hospital. The physician’s
utility derives from two elements—the hospital’s profit and the patient’s benefit. Accord-
ing to Newhouse (2002), Ellis and McGuire’s model is also applicable to a primary care
setting rather resembling the setup we are interested in. This implies that the physician
is assumed to be concerned about her own profit pi and the patient benefit B, both de-
pending on the quantity of medical services q. A major argument for including B into
the physician’s utility function is the professional code of medical ethics the physician is
obliged to (Hippocratic Oath).3 Ellis and McGuire find that FFS provides an incentive to
overserve patients whereas CAP may lead to underprovision of medical services. Moreover,
capitation payments can cause underprovision of necessary services (Blomqvist, 1991) and
may lead to cream-skimming of patients (Newhouse, 1996 and Barros, 2003).
A rich empirical literature has studied various aspects of the relationship between the
method of physician remuneration and physician behavior. Some empirical evidence sug-
gests that physicians do respond to financial incentives. Krasnik et al. (1990) in a before-
and-after study, analyze behavior of general practitioners in Denmark when the system is
varied from a (pure) lump-sum payment to CAP supplemented by a FFS component. They
find diagnostic and curative services to increase and the number of referrals to secondary
care and hospitals to decrease. Concerning referral rates, Iversen and Lurås (2000) arrive
at a similar result. They analyze referrals from primary to secondary care revealed by
Norwegian general practitioners when the payment system was changed from a practice
allowance component4 complemented by a FFS-payment to a CAP-system with a lower
FFS-component. The authors find referrals to be larger under CAP (with FFS-component)
compared to FFS (with practice-allowance component). The increase in referrals may, how-
ever, not only be attributable to CAP but rather to the lower FFS-component.
In a randomized controlled study, Davidson et al. (1992) investigate behavior of office-
based primary care physicians under a FFS system with high and low fees and a CAP
3See also Arrow (1963) who emphasized the importance of professional ethics; treatment should be
determined by objective needs and not be limited by financial considerations.
4A practice allowance is a fixed sum of money Norwegian physicians are paid when contracting with
the regional government.
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system. Patients were children enrolled in the US-Medicaid program. Here, the frequency
of primary care visits in the high FFS group was higher than in the CAP group. Appar-
ently, CAP physicians constrain the quantity of medical services in order to reduce their
costs. The fundholding regulation5 in CAP may explain the lower referrals to secondary
care as the responsibility for children’s medical cost seems to outweigh the incentive to
minimize cost in CAP.
In a more recent study, Dumont et al. (2008) analyze data on physician services from
the Canadian province Quebec before and after a variation from FFS to a mixed system
with a base wage, independent of services provided, and a reduced FFS payment. Their
results suggest that physicians did react to payment incentives by reducing the volume of
(billable) services under the mixed remuneration system. Moreover, these physicians in-
creased the time spent per service and per non-clinical service. The latter is important to
insure the quality of health care but is not remunerated under FFS. The results of Dumont
et al. suggest a quantity-quality substitution in health care provision.
One of the most important if not the only controlled field experiment in health economics
is the RAND health insurance study (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group
1993). The main goal of this experiment was to investigate the influence of the insurance
system (patients’ co-payment vs. free care) on patients’ health care service use and their
health status. It was found that all types of services analyzed in the study fell with cost
sharing but the reduced service use had nearly no adverse effect on health for the average
person. Health among the sick poor was adversely affected, however. A smaller part of
the study was devoted to analyzing the influence of the payment system. To this end,
the authors compared the use of services under fee-for-service remuneration with that in
a capitated staff model HMO (Health Maintenance Organization).6 Cost savings were
found to be noticeable, in particular due to lower hospital admission and lower estimated
expenditure.
Not all studies support the strong link between physicians’ payment systems and their
behavior, however. For example, Hutchinson et al. (1996) do not find differences when
comparing hospital utilization rates in Ontario (Canada) under FFS and CAP. For data
from Norwegian physicians, Grytten and Sørensen (2001) find that after controlling for
characteristics of patients and general practitioners the effects of physicians’ payment sys-
5Such a fundholding system has the following characteristics: i) the financial resources for each patient
are held in a fund and ii) the general practitioner is usually the decision-maker for allocating the funds.
6In a staff model HMO physicians typically work on a salary basis.
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tems is rather small.
What can be concluded from the empirical literature? Based on their meta-study, Gos-
den et al. (2001) acknowledge some empirical evidence that the payment system affects
physician behavior. They stress, however, that field studies face various difficulties like
multiple and unobservable influences on physicians’ decisions, context and country-specific
payment system variations that make the generalization of results difficult. In addition,
several field studies suffer from methodological problems when for instance more than one
component of the payment system is varied simultaneously. We will return to these issues
in the next section.
3.3 Research questions
Our main research goal is to improve the understanding on how the institutional parameter
‘payment system’ influences physicians’ behavior. To this end, we make use of experimen-
tal economics methods by running a controlled laboratory experiment.
Experimental economics is a valid research technique that can successfully complement
field and survey studies. It has a variety of advantages compared to the latter meth-
ods (see Davis and Holt 1993, Falk and Fehr 2003). Experimental data is created under
controlled conditions. It is gathered in experimental sessions in which human subjects
supplied with monetary incentives7 make real decisions in economically relevant decision
situations. Experimental conditions and variables of interest can be varied in a controlled
manner. Exogenous ceteris paribus variations (e.g., of the payment system) can be easily
implemented. Therefore, changes in behavior can be attributed to these modifications.
Different experimenters can repeat the same experiment under comparable conditions to
test for the robustness of the results.
Contrary to laboratory data, field data are collected from a natural environment where
many factors influence the variable(s) of interest in a way the researcher usually cannot
control.8 These are for instance institutional parameters, physicians’ characteristics, un-
certainty about the impact of medical services provided as well as patient characteristics
like health status or type of insurance. Constant patient populations during a transition
of payment systems is important for the validity of results but can most often not be
7Participants are paid because they are likely to behave differently when monetary consequences are
involved as compared to hypothetical choices (see Camerer and Hogarth 1999 and Hertwig and Ortmann
2001).
8See, however, the RAND health insurance experiment (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group
1993)
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guaranteed. Also, the methodological deficiencies mentioned in the section above should
not be neglected (see Gosden et al. 2001). This being said, laboratory experimentation
apparently is a suitable research method to successfully complement theoretical and other
methods of empirical investigation.
Despite the advantages of experimental economics, objections like non-representative
student subject pools, low incentives, a small number of observations and the simple envi-
ronment should be taken seriously. Yet, careful experimentation can avoid many of these
problems (see Falk and Fehr 2003).
We are aware that our experiment is very simplistic; in reality, a physician’s decision
situation is much more complex. Yet, as the goal of the present study is to highlight fun-
damental consequences of the payment system for physicians’ behavior we think simplicity
to be an advantage rather than a deficiency. The focus of our study is on how the pure
payment systems FFS and CAP influence an experimental physician’s provision of medical
services. We incorporate the two major determinants that according to the theoretical
literature influence a physician’s behavior, the own profit and the patient’s benefit. We
also include patients with different health status, so-called patient types, to account for
heterogeneity in the patient population.
Our first research question is concerned with behavior in FFS. Given our experimental
parameters, do experimental physicians tend to behave according to what theory predicts
in that they choose a quantity of medical services qFFS larger than the patient’s optimal
quantity q∗ if the profit-maximal quantity qˆ exceeds q∗? Taking q∗ as the benchmark for
the right (best) medical treatment, we conjecture patients to be overserved under FFS.
Second, we are interested in behavior under CAP. According to predictions from theo-
retical models we expect patients to be underserved in that physicians choose qCAP lower
than q∗.
Third, we are concerned with research questions related to the consequences of both
payment systems. How does provision behavior under CAP compare to behavior under
FFS? Based on our previous conjectures, we expect experimental physicians in FFS to
choose more medical services than in CAP. Moreover, does the mode of payment have
an impact on whether and how experimental physicians besides their own profit take the
patient benefit into account? Given the professional code of medical ethics physicians are
obliged to, we expect them not to behave in a completely self-interested manner.
We also analyze previous questions with regard to patient types. Does the payment sys-
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tem affect patients with different health status differently as to physicians’ treatment? If
so, are there differences between FFS and CAP? We expect this to be the case. The RAND
health insurance experiment (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993), for
instance, showed certain albeit small adverse health consequences concentrated among sick
people from the lowest income group.
The last research question concerns the tradeoff between own profit and patient benefit
the experimental physicians are faced with. In our experiment, several Pareto-efficient
quantity decisions exist for each patient. Here, physicians can neither make the patient
better off without foregoing own profit nor make themselves better off without inducing a
benefit loss to the patient. We are specifically interested in the following questions: Does
behavior with regard to Pareto efficiency and tradeoffs vary in the two payment systems?
Can a classification of behavior help us to get deeper insights into decision-making like it
has helped to explain behavior in other experimental settings (e.g., Selten and Ockenfels
1998 and Fischbacher et al. 2001)?
3.4 Experimental design and procedure
3.4.1 Design and parameters
We analyze physicians’ provision behavior under the two payment systems FFS and CAP.
No other experimental parameter is varied. The experimental design allows for a controlled
ceteris paribus variation and a between-subject comparison.
Each subject taking part in our experiment is allocated to a physician’s role deciding
on the quantity of medical services to be provided for given patients. Participants are
medical students expected to become physicians in the future. We deliberately choose
medical students as they most likely will identify with the decision task in our experiment.
And we used a context-specific framing (see the instructions in Appendix A.3.2). Both
features are important as we are interested in how subjects decide in a medical context,
and identification as well as framing seems to matter for behavior.
The experiment comprises two treatments. In FFS, physicians receive a fee for each
unit of medical service provided. In CAP, they are paid a lump-sum payment (capitation)
per patient independent of the number of medical services they dispense. All monetary
amounts are measured in Taler, our experimental currency, the exchange rate being 1 Taler
= 0.05 EUR (about $0.07).
The physicians’ task is to treat patients by providing them with medical services. Pa-
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tients gain a benefit from these services. The patient benefit is measured in monetary
terms. Three types of patients exist. These types differ in the ‘benefit functions’ that
relate the benefit a patient receives to the number of services a physician provides. In par-
ticular, patients differ in the number of medical services rendering the optimal treatment,
i.e., maximum benefit. Patients in our experiment are abstract in that no real persons par-
ticipate. Yet, to provide experimental physicians with an incentive for favorable behavior
towards the patients, the money corresponding to the benefits of all abstract patients is
transferred to a charity caring for real patients.
Patients are further characterized by illnesses. In FFS, it has an impact on physicians’
remuneration, however, as the ‘remuneration function’ that relates a physician’s remuner-
ation to the number of services a physician provides is determined by the respective illness.
In particular, maximum remunerations differ across the five existing illnesses. The same
holds for maximum profits because the costs a physician has to bear are kept constant for
all decisions and across treatments. Recall that in CAP, physicians are paid a lump-sum
per patient. Therefore, neither illnesses nor the number of medical services they dispense
have an impact on their remuneration.
In the remainder of this subsection we describe the experimental design in more de-
tail. Physicians decide on the quantity q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} of medical services to be
provided to their patients.9 They decide for five abstract illnesses A,B,C,D,E10 of
three patient types 1, 2, 3. Patient types differ in their benefit from medical services
(B1(q), B2(q), B3(q)). Each combination of patient type and illness represents a specific
patient 1A, 1B, 1C, . . . , 3D, 3E (Table 3.1). By each decision (j = 1, . . . , 15), physicians
simultaneously determine their own profit and the benefit of a given patient. The patient
is assumed to be passive and fully insured accepting each medical service chosen by a
physician.
Table 3.1: Order of decisions
Decision (j) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Patient type 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Illness A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Patient 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Physicians’ remuneration. In FFS, physicians receive a fee for each unit of medical
9The range of services physicians can choose from may be interpreted as those eligible for a patient
contracting with a certain health plan.
10We did not specify real illnesses because this turned out not to be feasible in the experimental setup.
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service provided. Fees differ across services and illnesses. As points of reference for our
experimental fees we used tariffs for ophthalmologist services (like the treatment of glau-
coma or cataract) taken from the German scale of charges and fees for physician services
(EBM).11 Remuneration R(q) increases in the quantity of medical services chosen (see Ta-
ble 3.2).
In CAP, physicians are paid a lump-sum payment R per patient independent of their
Table 3.2: Physicians’ remuneration R(q)
Quantity (q)
Illness 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F
F
S
A 0.00 1.70 3.40 5.10 5.80 10.50 11.00 12.10 13.50 14.90 16.60
B 0.00 1.00 2.40 3.50 8.00 8.40 9.40 16.00 18.00 20.00 22.50
C 0.00 1.80 3.60 5.40 7.20 9.00 10.80 12.60 14.40 16.20 18.30
D 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.20 15.00 16.90 18.90 21.30 23.60
E 0.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 6.70 7.60 11.00 12.30 18.00 20.50 23.00
C
A
P
12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
This table shows physicians remuneration in both treatments FFS and CAP. The payment varies
for different illnesses in FFS. In CAP the lump-sum payment is 12 Taler. Notice that due to a
display error on subjects’ screens, physicians’ remuneration for illness A at qj = 4 was specified
at 8.40 instead of 5.80. Physician’s profits were displayed correctly, however. See the paragraph
on physician’s profit below.
quantity decision. To make treatments comparable, R was specified at 12 Taler in CAP
which is slightly above the average maximum profit per patient a physician could achieve
in FFS.
Patient benefit. Patients gain a benefit from medical services, the patient benefit B(q)
measured in monetary terms. Patient benefits vary across patient types. This reflects the
heterogeneity of the patient population treated by a physician in the real world, e.g., with
regard to a patient’s health status or different severities of illness. Table 3.3 shows patient
benefits B(q) given the quantity of medical services provided. A common characteristic of
B(q) is a global optimum q∗ ∈ [0, 10]. The patient optimal quantity (q∗) yields the highest
benefit B(q∗j ) from medical services to the patient. The patient’s optimal quantity is q
∗
j = 5
for patient type 1 (j = 1, . . . , 5), q∗j = 3 for patient type 2 (j = 6, . . . , 10) and q
∗
j = 7 for
patient type 3 (j = 11, . . . , 15). After having reached the optimum, B(q) declines because
providing more medical services than q∗ contributes negatively to a patient’s benefit at
the margin. Taking q∗ as the benchmark for the right (best) medical treatment, we can
identify overprovision and underprovision, respectively.
11The German EBM lists medical services and the respective fees.
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It is crucial that the experimental physicians have an incentive to take the patient
Table 3.3: Patient benefit B(q)
Quantity (q)
Patient type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.00 0.75 1.50 2.00 7.00 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 7.50
2 0.00 1.00 1.50 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.50
3 0.00 0.75 2.20 4.05 6.00 7.75 9.00 9.45 8.80 6.75 3.00
This table shows the benefit patients of type 1, 2 and 3 receive depending on quantity of
medical services. The patient optimal quantity q∗j yielding the maximum benefit B(q
∗
j ) is 5 for
patients of type 1, 3 for patients of type 2 and 7 for patients of type 3.
benefit into account. Therefore, the money corresponding to the benefits of all abstract
patients aggregated over all decisions of all physicians was transferred to the Christoffel
Blindenmission—a charity caring for real patients. To verify that the money was actually
transferred we applied a procedure similar to the one used in Eckel and Grossman (1996).
In each session, a monitor randomly selected from the participants verify, by a signed
statement, that a check for the total patient benefit is written and sealed in an envelope
addressed to the charity.
Physicians’ profit. Further parameters relevant for physicians’ decisions are costs and
profit. Like real doctors, the experimental physicians have to bear costs depending on the
quantity of medical services they choose. We use a convex cost function as assumed in
several theoretical models (e.g., Ma 1994, 2007 and Choné and Ma 2010). c(qj) = 0.1q
2
j
∀q ∈ [0, 10], j = 1, 2, . . . , 15 is applied in both treatments.
Profit (remuneration minus costs) varies across illnesses in FFS because fees differ for
Table 3.4: Physicians’ profit pi(q)
Quantity (q)
Illness 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F
F
S
A 0.00 1.60 3.00 4.20 4.20 8.00‡ 7.40 7.20 7.10 6.80 6.60
B 0.00 0.90 2.00 2.60 6.40 5.90 5.80 11.10 11.60 11.90 12.50‡
C 0.00 1.70 3.20 4.50 5.60 6.50 7.20 7.70 8.00 8.10 8.30‡
D 0.00 1.90 3.60 5.10 6.40 5.50 11.40 12.00 12.50 13.20 13.60‡
E 0.00 0.90 1.60 5.10 5.10 5.10 7.40 7.40 11.60 12.40 13.00‡
C
A
P
12.00‡ 11.90 11.60 11.10 10.40 9.50 8.40 7.10 5.60 3.90 2.00
‡ Physicians’ maximum profit pi(qˆj) according to the profit-maximizing quantity of medical ser-
vices qˆj .
illnesses, and costs are the same for all patients. In CAP, profit does not vary with illnesses
and patient types (see Table 3.4).
For all patients in FFS, except for patient 1A (j = 1), the physician encounters a
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tradeoff between patient optimum and own profit maximization in that q∗j differs from the
profit maximizing quantity (qˆj). At j = 1 (patient 1A), qˆj = q
∗
j = 5. For patient 3A
(j = 11), 5 = qˆj < q
∗
j = 7. Except for illness A (j = 1, 6, 11) where qˆj = 5, the maximal
profit is achieved at qj = 10 (see left panel of Figure 3.1 for j = 5). In CAP, qˆj = 0 for
Figure 3.1: Patient benefit and physician’s profit for patient 1E
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This figure illustrates the patient’s benefit and the physician’s profit depending on the quantity of medical
services for patient 1E (decision j = 5) in both payment systems FFS and CAP.
each decision j = 1, . . . , 15. A higher patient benefit can only be achieved by a physician’s
deviating from her own maximal profit (see right panel of Figure 3.1 for j = 5).
3.4.2 Procedure
The computerized experiment was conducted in BonnEconLab, the Laboratory for Exper-
imental Economics at the University of Bonn. 42 medical students participated, 20 in FFS
(one session) and 22 in CAP (two sessions). We thus base our analysis on 42 independent
observations. Subjects were recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner
2004) promising a monetary reward for participation in a decision-making task. The ex-
periment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
Upon arrival, participants were randomly allocated to cubicles where they took their
decisions in complete anonymity. Then, subjects were provided with the instructions that
were read out aloud by the experimenter. Subjects was given plenty of time for clarifying
questions which were asked and answered in private. To check for subjects’ understanding
of the experiment we asked them to answer three test questions structured like the actual
experiment but with different parameter values. The experiment was not started unless
all participants had answered the test questions correctly.
The physicians in the experiment then made their 15 quantity decisions the sequence of
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which was predetermined, as shown in see Table 3.1, and kept across treatments. Finally,
the monitor was assigned randomly. After the experiment, subjects were paid in private
according to their choices. At last, the monitor verified that a check on the benefits of all
patients was written and sealed in an envelope addressed to the Christoffel Blindenmission.
The monitor and experimenter then walked together to the nearest mailbox and deposited
the envelope. The monitor was paid an additional 4 EUR.
Sessions lasted for about 40 minutes. The exchange rate per Taler was 0.05 EUR. On
average subjects earned 6.88 EUR in FFS and 7.42 EUR in CAP.12 In total, 273.68 EUR
were transferred to the Christoffel Blindenmission, 6.62 EUR per participant in FFS and
6.42 EUR in CAP. The money supported surgical treatments of cataract patients in a
hospital in Masvingo (Zimbabwe) staffed by ophthalmologists of the Christoffel Blinden-
mission. Average costs for such an operation amounted to 30 EUR. Thus, the money from
our experiment allowed to treat nine patients. Note that subjects were not informed about
the money being assigned to a developing country (see the instructions in Appendix A.3.2).
3.5 Results
In this section we investigate physicians’ behavior, both from the physician’s and from the
patient’s perspective for FFS as well as for CAP. Moreover, we analyze the influence of
physicians’ profits and the patient benefit, and we study the impact of the payment system
on patients’ health status. We compare behavior across treatments and, finally, we analyze
whether physicians’ behavior is Pareto-efficient.
3.5.1 Physicians’ behavior in FFS
Our first research question is related to behavior under FFS. Remember that qˆj = q
∗
j
for j = 1 (patient 1A), and qˆj < q
∗
j for j = 11 (patient 3A). Figure 3.2 shows absolute
frequencies of of physicians’ quantity choices for all patients. On average, 6.60 medical
services are provided (median 7.00, s.d. 1.85). To study how patients are treated we
analyze the quantity of medical services provided for each patient averaged over all
physicians qj =
1
20
∑20
i=1 qij/20.
Result 1. In FFS, patients are overserved.
Support: qj > q
∗
j for the 13 patients where qˆj > q
∗
j . Patient 1A (j = 1) is treated
12Average payoffs correspond to the hourly wage of a student helper at the University of Bonn (8.32 EUR).
A lunch at the student cafeteria is around 2.50 EUR.
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Figure 3.2: Frequencies of quantity choices per patient in FFS
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This sun flower plot illustrates the absolute frequency of physi-
cians’ quantity choices per decision (patient) in treatment FFS.
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each decision are based on 20 observations.
optimally by all physicians i, whereas patient 3A (j = 11) is underserved. Testing over
all patients, qj is highly significantly larger than q
∗
j (p = 0.002, Wilcoxon signed ranks
test, two-sided). Individual physicians largely deviate from choosing the patient optimal
quantities. The mean deviation from q∗j , µi =
∑15
j=1(qij − q
∗
j )/15, is positive for 17 of
the 20 physicians, and zero for the remainder (see Table A.3.1 in the Appendix). Thus,
significantly more physicians provide medical services that are larger than q∗j (p = 0.003,
binomial test, two-sided). Next we investigate the impact of patient types on physicians’
provision behavior.
Result 2. Overprovision in FFS depends on patient types.
Support: Support is provided by test statistics of an order test (see Selten 1967 and Kuon
1994) comparing the given order of average services per patient type with the perfect order
(2, 1, 3) that accounts for q∗ of each patient type.13 There are six different possibilities to
13The logic behind the order test is the following. When a physician’s quantity choice is influenced by
the optimal quantity per patient types, patients in need of a large (low) quantity of medical services should
on average receive a large (low) amount of medical treatment. If a physician behaves accordingly the ranks
assigned to the mean quantities provided per patient type should follow a “perfect order”, namely 2, 1, 3. A
measure for the difference between the actual order and the perfect order is the number of inversions, i.e.,
the number of pairwise changes necessary to transform the given order into the perfect order. We calculate
the average quantity per patient type for each of those 16 physicians whose observed order comprises three
different values and rank them according to their magnitude (see Table A.3.2). For each physician, we
then calculate the number of inversions necessary to achieve the perfect order of ranks.
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assign three ranks. The null hypothesis of the order test is that for each subject the order
of observed values is arbitrary implying the mean inversion (standard deviation) being
µ = 1.5 (σ = 0.9574). As we observe 0.563 average inversions only, the null hypothesis can
be rejected at the 1% level.
A more in-depth analysis shows all patients of type 1 and 2 to be overserved (except for
patient 1A) in that the number of physicians choosing qij > q
∗
j is larger than the number
of physicians choosing qij ≤ q
∗
j . This is significant for four patients of type 1 and type 2
each (p ≤ 0.041 binomial test, two-sided; see line I/FFS of Table A.3.3 in Appendix A.3.1).
Patients of type 3 are treated in a less consistent way. Patient 3A (3E) is underprovided
(overprovided) and the remaining patients are treated optimally by at least half of the
physicians.
A physician’s quantity decision determines her own profit. According to our research
questions we are interested in whether profit maximizing is a main objective in general.
As only 12% of the overall choices coincide with qˆj this is rather not the case. Choosing qˆj
for all j would have yielded an average payoff of 11.08 Taler. Physicians’ actual quantity
decisions resulted in an average overall profit of 9.17 Taler (median 8.00 Taler, s.d. 2.69
Taler), i.e., 17% lower than pi(qˆj). Average profits for each physician i vary between 6.53
and 10.93 Taler (see Table A.3.5).14 Testing over all patients, pi(qj) is highly significantly
lower than pi(qˆj) (p = 0.001, Wilcoxon signed ranks test, two-sided).
We are also interested in whether profits are affected by patient types. To this end,
we study the deviation of each individual physician’s profit from her profit maximum, i.e.,
pˆij−piij , for patient types separately. For the sake of comparability between FFS and CAP
data, we compute for each patient the relative deviation ∆piij = (pˆij−piij)/pˆij . Table A.3.4
shows ∆piij averaged over all physicians. Highest deviations of up to 29% are found for
patients 2B and 2E, whereas lowest deviations of less than 10% occur for patients 3A and
3C. There is no deviation for patient 1A because here all physicians choose their profit
maximum that coincides with the patient benefit optimum. Average profit deviation is
14.66% for patients of type 121.92% for those of type 2 and 11.98% for patients of type 3.
A physician’s decision also determines the patient benefit. In FFS and CAP the benefit
maximum for patients of type 3 (B3(q
∗
j )) is 9.45 Taler. B1(q
∗
j ) = B2(q
∗
j ) = 10 Taler (see
Table 3.3). If physicians always chose the patient optimal quantity, patients would have
received an average benefit B(q∗j ) of 9.82 Taler. Actual average patient benefit is 8.83 Taler
14For average profit per patient see Table A.3.4.
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(median 9.00 Taler, s.d. 1.10 Taler), i.e., 10% lower than B(q∗j ). Further, average patient
benefits determined by physician i vary between 7.52 and 9.82 Taler (see Table A.3.5).
In short, under FFS patients are overserved in that subjects on average choose quantities
of medical services larger than the patient’s optimal quantity. Provision is dependent
on patient types as is the deviation of profits from the profit maximum. The levels of
overprovision and of profit deviations tend to decrease with increasing needs of services.
Physicians do not go for the maximal profit. This behavior resulted in patients receiving
a substantial benefit, only 10% on average less than the maximal amount.
3.5.2 Physicians’ behavior in CAP
Our second research question deals with behavior under CAP. Recall that 0 = qˆj < q
∗
j
for all patients (decisions j). Figure 3.3 shows absolute frequencies of physicians’ quantity
choices for all patients. On average, physicians chose 4.40 medical services (median 5.00,
s.d. 1.64).
Figure 3.3: Frequencies of quantity choices per patient in CAP
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This sun flower plot illustrates the absolute frequency of physi-
cians’ quantity choices per decision (patient) in treatment CAP.
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Result 3. In CAP, patients are underserved.
Support: qj ≤ q
∗
j for 11 patients. Three patients (2A, 2B, 2C) are slightly overserved
on average. Only patient 2E receives an optimal treatment on average. Testing over
all patients, qj is significantly smaller than q
∗
j (p=0.0105, Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
two-sided). Individual physicians largely deviate from the patient optimal quantity; but
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in contrast to FFS, they underserve in CAP. µi is negative for 16 of the 22 physicians;
µi ≥ 0 for the remainder (Table A.3.1). Thus, weakly significanly more physicians choose
quantities smaller than q∗j (p = 0.052, binomial test, two-sided). Next we investigate
whether underprovision is related to patient types.
Result 4. Underprovision in CAP depends on patient types.
Support: We again apply an order test and include those 19 subjects whose observed or-
der comprises three different values (see Table A.3.2). Also in CAP, the order test reveals
choices to be heavily dependent on patient types. We observe 0.158 average inversions.
Thus the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level. Analyzing the data in more detail
shows that although patients are underserved on average, the number of physicians choos-
ing q∗j is larger than the number of physicians not choosing q
∗
j for all patients of type 1 and
2. This is significant for four patients of type 2 (binomial test two-sided; see line I/CAP of
Table A.3.3).Patients of type 3 are underserved in that the number of physicians choosing
qj < q
∗
j is larger than the number of physicians choosing q
∗
j .This is weakly significant for
one patient of type 3 (binomial test two-sided; see line I/CAP in Table A.3.3). Moreover,
the level of underprovision νj is highest for patient type 3 and lowest for patient type 2
(see Table A.3.4).
The maximum profit pi(qˆj) a physician can achieve in CAP is 12.00 Taler for all ill-
nesses. Physicians’ actual quantity decisions resulted in an average profit pi(qj) of 9.79
Taler (median 9.50 Taler, s.d. 1.52 Taler), i.e., 18% lower than pi(qˆj). Average profits for
each physician i vary between 7.84 and 11.48 Taler (see Table A.3.5). Testing over all
patients, pi(qj) is highly significantly lower than pi(qˆj) (p = 0.000, Wilcoxon signed ranks
test, two-sided). How are profits affected by patient types in CAP? Table A.3.4 shows
∆piij averaged over all physicians. Highest deviations of 25 to 30% are found for patients
of type 3 whereas lowest deviations of 7 to 11% occur for patients of type 2. Average profit
deviations are 18.75% (8.71%) for patients of type 1 (2) and 27.67% for those of type 3.
The maximal average benefit a patient could gain in CAP, like in FFS, is 9.82 Taler if
physicians always provided the patient optimal quantity. Actual average patient benefit
is 8.56 Taler (median 9.75 Taler, s.d. 2.46 Taler), i.e., 13% lower than B(q∗j ). Further,
average patient benefits determined by physician i vary between 2.73 and 9.82 Taler (see
Table A.3.5).
To sum up, under CAP patients are underprovided in that physicians on average choose
78
quantities of medical services smaller than the patient’s optimal quantity. Provision of ser-
vices and the deviation of profits from the profit maximum are strongly influenced by
patient types, i.e., with increasing needs for services the levels of underprovision and profit
deviations tend to increase. Also in CAP, physicians do not strive for the maximal profit.
Patients received a benefit being on average 13% lower than the maximum benefit.
3.5.3 Comparison of behavior between FFS and CAP
Our third research question is related to the consequences of both payment systems. We
investigate differences in physicians’ quantity choices across treatments and how patient
types are affected. We compare physicians’ profits, the provision of medical services,
deviations from q∗j , and patient benefit losses across payment systems for all patients and
for patient types separately. The results above have already shown that physicians choose
more medical services in FFS than in CAP. Thus, our next result implicitly follows from
Results FFS1 and CAP1.
Result 5. Patients are provided with more medical services in FFS than in CAP.
Support: Evidence is provided by Figure 3.4 showing the average quantity of medical
services per decision (patient) in both treatments. Not only do physicians in FFS on
average provide 50% more services than in CAP (6.60 vs. 4.40; median: 7.00 vs. 5.00;
s.d.: 1.85 vs. 1.64) but for each decision j, qFFSj > q
CAP
j . This is highly significant
(p = 0.0000, Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided). The picture is similar when comparing
individual decisions across treatments for each patient. Except for patients 1A and 3A,
qFFSij is significantly larger than q
CAP
ij (p ≤ 0.0010, Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided; see
line II of Table A.3.3). Thus, in FFS a significantly higher number of patients is provided
with significantly more medical services compared to CAP (p = 0.007, binomial test, two-
sided).
Physician’s own profit pi(qij) certainly is an important behavioral determinant in both
treatments. As already mentioned, choosing qˆj for all j in FFS would have yielded an
average payoff pi(qˆj) of 11.08 Taler. In CAP, the maximal profit is 12.00 Taler for all
illnesses. They provided quantities of medical services such that their average profits are
very similar in both treatments but about 17% lower than pi(qˆj) (FFS: 9.17 Taler, CAP:
9.79 Taler). Average profits for each physician i vary between 6.53 and 10.93 Taler in
FFS and between 7.84 and 11.48 Taler in CAP. In both payment systems, the average
physician does not aim at the maximal achievable profit even though single physicians
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Figure 3.4: Average quantity of medical services per patient
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come very close to pi(qˆj) (see Table A.3.5). To answer the question how profits are affected
by patient types, we compare ∆piij across treatments. Except for patients 1C, 1E, 2C, and
3E, we find (weakly) significant differences between treatments.15 For patients of type 2,
∆piFFSij > ∆pi
CAP
ij , for patients of type 3 the reverse holds.
We next compare the two payment systems with regard to how patients’ health status
is affected by physicians’ choices. To this end, we first focus on the optimal treatment and
deviations thereof. We then concentrate on the benefit losses patients suffer on average
when some or all of them are not treated optimally.
Result 6. Patient optimal quantities exert a stronger influence on physicians’ behavior in
CAP than in FFS.
Support: Support comes from analyzing physicians’ choices with regard to the patient
optimal quantity. In CAP, the percentage of physicians choosing q∗j per patient is signif-
icantly higher than in FFS (p = 0.014, Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided). If physicians
deviate they tend towards opposite directions; a significantly larger share provides services
larger than q∗j in FFS compared to CAP (p = 0.000, Fisher exact test, two-sided). In FFS,
µi > 0 except for physicians i = 3, 4, 17; in CAP, µi ≤ 0 except for physicians i = 4, 19 (see
Table A.3.1). Analyzing patient types separately, we find all patients of type 2 in CAP to
get a better treatment in that significantly more physicians per patient choose q∗j compared
to FFS (p ≤ 0.011, Fisher exact test; see line III in Table A.3.3). The same applies to
15For type 1: p ≤ 0.059; for type 2: p ≤ 0.018; for type 3: p = 0.000, all Mann-Whitney U test,
two-sided; see line IV of Table A.3.3.
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all patients of type 1 except for patient 1A16 (p ≤ 0.009, Fisher exact test). Evidence is
mixed for patients of type 3. We find no significant difference for patients 3A, 3C, 3E. For
patients 3B and 3D physicians choose q∗j significantly more often in FFS than in CAP (see
line III of Table A.3.3). In both treatments, the benefit maximum for patients of type 3
(B3(q
∗
j )) is 9.45 Taler. B1(q
∗
j ) = B2(q
∗
j ) = 10 Taler resulting in B(q
∗
j ) = 9.82 in FFS and
in CAP. Our experimental physicians actually provide quantities of medical services such
that the average patient benefit B(qj) was slightly larger in FFS (8.83 Taler) than in CAP
(8.56 Taler) and around 10% smaller than B(q∗j ). These numbers seem to suggest that
nearly no differences between payment systems exist. Yet, the picture is different when
having a closer look at the data. Focusing on single patients and their health status we,
like Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group (1993), find patients to be affected
differently by the mode of payment. Moreover, average patient benefits vary between 7.52
and 9.82 Taler in FFS and between 2.73 and 9.82 Taler in CAP (see Table A.3.5).
Whenever a physician i deviates from choosing q∗j—when patients are either under- or
overprovided—patients suffer a benefit loss, as they do not obtain the treatment rendering
the maximum benefit. Let ψ(qji) := |B(qij)−B(q
∗
j )|.
Figure 3.5: Average benefit loss per patient
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Result 7. Benefit losses per patient depend on patient types and differ across treatments.
Support: Figure 3.5 contrasts the average benefit loss per patient across treatments. For
10 of the 15 patients, ψ(qj)
CAP > ψ(qj)
FFS . The benefits loss in FFS is larger for the
16Here, physicians in FFS make significantly more q∗j -choices (p = 0.006, Fisher exact test; see line III
in Table A.3.3).
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remaining patients (see also Table A.3.4). Benefit losses differ significantly for all patients
of type 2 (p ≤ 0.027, Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided, see line IV of Table A.3.3). Losses
are larger in FFS for patients 2B, . . . , 2E; the reverse holds for patient 2A. For 9 of the 10
patients of types 1 and 3, benefit losses in CAP are larger than in FFS. Differences are
only significant for two patients of type 1 and 3 each.17
Result 7 suggests that for patients in need of a small quantity of medical services like
patients of type 2, a smaller benefit loss results when physicians are paid by CAP. Patients
in need of a larger quantity of medical services, like patients of types 1 and 3, incur a
smaller loss under FFS.
In short, the cross-treatment comparison indicates that physicians’ choices of medical
services are influenced by incentives embeded in FFS and CAP payment systems. Physi-
cians under FFS choose significantly more medical services than those under CAP. Con-
sequently, the mode of payment does affect patients’ health status. In particular, patients
of type 1 and 2 are treated more optimally under CAP than under FFS and the patient
benefit loss is significantly smaller in the former payment system for all but one of patients
of type 2.
3.5.4 Tradeoffs and Pareto efficiency
In this section, we are concerned with the tradeoff between own profit and patient benefit
a physician encounters when making a quantity decision. In particular, we investigate the
Pareto efficiency of physician’s choices.
In general, Pareto efficiency means that an allocation X is Pareto preferred to another
allocation Y if at least one person is better off and no one is worse off with X than with
Y . Besides its importance in general economic theory, the concept of Pareto efficiency also
plays a prominent role in health economics (e.g., Iversen 1993, De Jaegher and Jegers 2000
and Olivella and Vera-Hernandez 2007). In the context of our experiment a situation is
said to be Pareto efficient, if no unanimous move to another allocation of profit and patient
benefit is possible. That means, a Pareto-efficient (PE) choice involves that changing q
can neither make the physician better off without inducing a benefit loss to the patient nor
make the patient better off without foregoing own profit. Pareto-inefficient (PIE) choices
do not involve a benefit/profit tradeoff as changing q can increase both a physician’s own
profit and the patient benefit; they are dominated by Pareto-efficient choices.
171A (where no losses occur in FFS): p = 0.009; 1E: p = 0.062; 3B: p = 0.002; 3C: p = 0.050, all
Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided, see line IV of Table A.3.3.
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Pareto-efficient decision options exist for each patient in both treatments. The number
of PE benefit/profit pairs differs according to illnesses (in FFS only) and patient types.
In FFS, physicians can choose between one and eight PE decisions per patient. In CAP,
there are either four (patient type 2), six (patient type 1) or eight (patient type 3) PE
pairs. PE choices are positioned on the upper right line in Figures A.3.1 and A.3.2, the
Pareto frontier, whereas PIE decisions are those below the Pareto frontier.
It is remarkable that 597 of the 660 choices are Pareto-efficient. Thus, 95% of all physi-
cians’ actual choices both in FFS and CAP involve a tradeoff between physician’s own
profit and patient benefit. Pareto efficiency guides all the decisions by 13 of the 20 physi-
cians (65%) in FFS and by 15 of the 22 physicians (68%) in CAP. The remaining choices
entail up to 4 (9) PIE decisions per physician in FFS (CAP). Hence, not only has the ma-
jority of physicians Pareto efficiency as their only target but also the remaining physicians
behave accordingly with the vast majority of their quantity decisions.
To further characterize physicians’ choices we subdivide the set of PE decisions into
categories capturing variables of economic importance and medical ethics: own profit max-
imum, patient benefit optimum, social optimum.
• PROMAX comprises choosing qˆj , the profit-maximizing quantity of medical services.
The corresponding benefit/profit pair is (B(qˆj), pi(qˆj)).
• PATMAX consists of q∗j -choices maximizing the patient’s benefit. (B(q
∗
j ), pi(q
∗
j )) is
the resultant benefit/profit pair.
PROMAX and PATMAX are the two boundary points of the Pareto frontier (see
Figures A.3.1 and A.3.2).
• SOCOPT is suggested by a welfare economics perspective and contains the socially
optimal choices, i.e., decisions where (pi(qj) +B(qj)) is maximal.
Note that patients exist where SOCOPT coincides with PROMAX and/or PATMAX
(Table A.3.1). Only those decisions are assigned to SOCOPT that are not yet covered
by the two previous categories.18
• PAROTH is a residual category comprising the remaining benefit/profit pairs on the
Pareto frontier not included in any of the other three categories.
18We decided on this assignment as subjects choices may not be motivated by the social optimum in
the first place for the following reason. Finding qsoc seems not straightforward as participants first have
to calculate pi(qj) +B(qj) and then they have to determine the maximum. Selecting qˆ or q
∗ is much more
obvious given the information on the decision screens (see the instructions in Appendix).
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In FFS, 16% of all physician’s Pareto-efficient choices are assigned to PROMAX, 34% to
PATMAX, 16% to SOCOPT and 34% to PAROTH.19 In CAP, only 2% of physicians’
choices are attributed to PROMAX, 66% to PATMAX, 6% to SOCOPT and 26% are
covered by PAROTH. 20
Comparing both payment systems, a much lower percentage of decisions in CAP is
motivated by pi(qˆj) probably because choosing qˆj
CAP entails no provision of services to
the patient. Such behavior would be a severe violation of the professional code of medical
ethics. Noticeably, two thirds of all Pareto-efficient decisions in CAP involve B(q∗j ) versus
only one third in FFS. This may be due to the fact that choosing q∗CAP implies a lower
own-profit reduction than in FFS where the physician on average forgoes 39.6% of her
maximally achievable profit vs. only 23.3% in CAP. The social optimum plays no role in
CAP possibly because qsoc coincides with q∗ for all 10 patients of types 1 and 2.
In short, our analysis provided compelling results. First, nearly all physicians’ decisions
are Pareto efficient. Second, the vast majority of these choices (66% in FFS and 74% in
CAP) can be explained by motives based on variables of economic and ethical importance.
3.6 Conclusion
The paper introduces a controlled laboratory experiment to test for the influence of pay-
ment systems on physicians’ provision behavior. By assigning the monetary equivalent of
the patient benefit to treating actual patients we substituted the ‘abstract’ patients in our
experiment with real ones.
Our results are in line with the theoretical literature (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986)
and add further evidence to previous findings in the field. Patients are overserved in FFS
in that experimental physicians on average choose quantities of medical services larger
than the patient’s optimal quantity. Provision is dependent on patient types as is the
deviation of profits from the profit maximum. The cross-treatment comparison indicates
that physicians’ choices are influenced by incentives ebedded in the two payment systems.
Physicians in FFS provide more medical services than those in CAP do. Like Newhouse
and the Insurance Experiment Group (1993), we found the mode of payment to affect
patients’ health status. Patients in need of a low level of medical services are better off
under CAP, whereas patients with a high need of medical services gain more health benefit
19When calculating the percentages, j = 1 is neglected because here categories PROMAX, PATMAX
and SOCOPT coincide and we cannot even distinguish whether q = 5 was motivated by qˆj or by q
∗
j .
20A detailed overview on relative frequencies per category is provided in Table A.3.1.
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when physicians are paid by FFS. How these gains and losses are to be weighed against
each other is a matter of political decision, however.
In both remuneration systems, financial incentives are not the only motivation for physi-
cians’ quantity decisions, though. As the patient benefit is of considerable importance,
patients received a substantial benefit the financial equivalent of which allowed to treat
nine real patients by ophthalmic surgery.
Experiments in health economics might serve as a ’wind tunnel’ or ’test bed’ before
institutional changes are implemented during a health care reform. Even though an ex-
periment always simplifies a physician’s decision task when caring for a patient it, at the
same time, allows to separating behavioral determinants. While simplifications give rise to
caution when extrapolating the results, they also suggest the lines for further experimental
research like introducing uncertainty about the impact of medical treatments and patients’
health status, patients’ demand effects and monitoring mechanisms.
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Chapter 4
Do prospective physicians behave
differently?
4.1 Introduction
Other-regarding motivations are a fundamental determinant of public service provision and
are, thus, of considerable importance when designing robust incentives structures in the
public sector (Le Grand 2003). Most public service providers, Le Grand argues, derive
a great personal satisfaction from helping other people. In this respect, public service
providers behave like ‘act-relevant knights’ who help needful people, e.g., physicians pro-
viding medical services to their patients.1 At the same time their motivation to act knightly
(altruistically) also seems to depend upon the degree of personal sacrifice associated with
the act.
One easily agrees with Le Grand who states that payment incentives in the public
sector—and in particular in the health care sector—need to be such that ‘knightly’ be-
havior is fostered. An incentive scheme designed to motivate the ‘standard neoclassical
worker’ (assumed to be without an other-regarding motivation) might be unsuitable for
this purpose. Indeed, recent theoretical literature departs from the assumption of the neo-
classical worker by acknowledging the importance of motivations of public service providers
(e.g., Francois 2000, Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008).
Despite the acknowledged importance of other-regarding motivations in the theoretical lit-
erature, little is known about their relationship to payment incentives empirically.
In our study we explicitly explore this relationship with the help of a controlled lab-
1Notice that in several theoretical models describing physician-patient interaction an ‘ethical’ argument
is used to represent the physician’s regard not only for professional codes of conduct but also for a ‘knightly’
or altruistic motivation to care for patients’ welfare (see, e.g., Woodward and Warren-Boulton 1984, Ellis
and McGuire, 1986 and McGuire, 2000).
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oratory experiment in a medical decision-making context (equivalent to Hennig-Schmidt
et al., 2009). In particular, we compare behavior of prospective physicians, i.e., medical
students (Meds), assumed to exhibit other-regarding motivations and a ‘standard’ sub-
ject pool in economic experiments, i.e., students from various fields of study other than
medicine (Non-Meds) assumed to be without such motivations. Decisions are incentivized
by fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP)—the two prevalent payment methods for
physicians in the public health care sector (Newhouse 2002). The experimental economic
method allows us to clearly identify possible knightly behavior and to quantify individual
sacrifices. A questionnaire succeeding the experiment collects information about subjects’
motivations.
Our study also contributes to the experimental economic literature investigating be-
havioral influences of subject pools. Differences in behavior across various subject pools
have already been highlighted in several experiments; for summaries see Ball and Cech
(1996) and Croson and Gneezy (2009). For example, substantial evidence suggests that
economics students are less cooperative, altruistic or trusting than other students in a
variety of experimental contexts such as public goods (Marwell and Ames 1981, Cadsby
and Maynes 1998) and bargaining (Carter and Irons 1991, Kahneman et al. 1986). To
control for possible effects due to more selfish behavior of economics students the number
of economics students among the Non-Meds is well balanced in our experiment.
Recent laboratory experiments in health economics indicate the increasing importance
of the experimental method in this area. Fan et al. (1998) study alternative methods
for controlling the cost of physician services under global budgeting. The experiment of
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2009) analyzes incentives from different payment systems on physi-
cians’ provision behavior. Ahlert et al. (2008) find less selfishness of medical students
compared to economics students in a medically framed decision task. The experimental
studies by Schram and Sonnemans (2008) and Lévy-Garboua et al. (2008) analyze is-
sues dealing with health care funding and health insurance choice. Recent experimental
literature on the economics of credence goods is also related to our study, in the sense,
that a physician-patient setting might be regarded as a special case of a expert-laymen
relationship (Dulleck et al. forthcoming).2 For experimental investigations in a medical
decision-making context it is thus of considerable importance to know whether there are
differences in behavior across Meds and Non-Meds, as the choice of the subject pool could
2For a comprehensive overview about the economics of credence goods see Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2006).
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drive experimental results.
Our main finding is that Meds and Non-Meds differs substantially in their provision of
medical services. Meds’ decisions are more strongly directed towards the patients’ benefit
leading to a lower tendency to overprovide (underprovide) patients under FFS (CAP) than
observed for Non-Meds. Le Grand (2003) assumes that subjects’ motivation to behave like
‘act-relevant knights’ seems to depend positively upon the degree of personal sacrifice as-
sociated with the decision. Our experimental results provide evidence for this assumption
as the behavioral differences can be explained by Meds’ higher willingness to sacrifice own
profit to increase a patient’s benefit compared to Non-Meds. Economists are less willing to
sacrifice own profit than non-economists when paid by CAP and, thus, drive behavioral dif-
ferences between Meds and Non-Meds under this payment method. Under FFS, however,
proportional sacrifices between economists and non-economists do not differ significantly.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes the exper-
imental design and procedure. The results on subjects’ behavior, willingness to sacrifice
and stated motivations are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Experimental design and procedure
4.2.1 Design and parameters
In our experiment we study behavior of prospective physicians (Meds), i.e., medical stu-
dents expected to become physicians in the future, and non-medical students (Non-Meds)
in a medical decision-making context. Subjects decide in the role of physicians on the pro-
vision of medical services either incentivized by fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP)
payments analogous to the study by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2009). When paid by fee-
for-service (treatments Med-FFS, Non-Med-FFS), subjects receive a monetary reward for
each unit of medical services provided. Under capitation (treatments Med-CAP, Non-
Med-CAP) subjects receive a lump-sum payment per patient independent of the number
of medical services. Table 4.1 provides an overview of our 2×2 design.
Non-Meds are recruited from various fields of study. The number of economists is well
balanced as 10 economists participate in treatments Non-Med-FFS and Non-Med-CAP.
Any subject participates in only one treatment. Each subject i makes 15 individual deci-
sions j on the quantity of medical services, i.e., q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10}, for three patient types
(1, 2, 3) with five abstract illnesses A,B, C, D, E. Patient types differ in benefits gained
from medical services (B1(q), B2(q), B3(q)). The patient benefit is measured in monetary
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Table 4.1: Experimental treatments
Payment Number of
Treatment Subject pool condition subjects
Med-FFS Medical students Fee-for-service 20
Med-CAP Medical students Capitation 22
Non-med-FFS Non-medical students Fee-for-service 22
Non-med-CAP Non-medical students Capitation 22
terms. The combination of patient type and illness characterizes a single patient, i.e.,
1A, 1B, 1C, . . . , 3D, 3E. By choosing a quantity for each patient subjects simultaneously
determine their own profit (pi(q)) and the patient benefit. The patient is assumed to be
passive and fully insured accepting each level of medical service provided by the physician.
As only abstract patients occur in our experiment, we provided the experimental physi-
cians with an incentive to care for real patients outside the lab. Subjects are informed
that the aggregated patient benefit resulting from their decisions is transferred to a char-
ity caring for real patients. To verify that the money is actually transferred we apply a
procedure similar to Eckel and Grossman (1996).
An example of a decision situation in treatments Med-FFS and Non-Med-FFS is pro-
vided in Figure 4.1. Subjects determine the quantity of medical services they desire to
provide for patient 1E (j = 5). They are informed about their payment, costs and profit
as well as the patient’s benefit for each quantity from 0 to 10. All monetary amounts
are depicted in Taler, our experimental currency (1 Taler = EUR 0.05). The first two
columns show abstract descriptions of medical services and the corresponding quantities.
The third column indicates subjects’ payment increasing in the quantity of medical ser-
vices. Notice that in treatments Med-CAP and Non-Med-CAP the payment remains the
same for all quantities as subjects receive a lump-sum payment. Costs of medical services,
being constant across all treatments, are shown in the fourth column. Physician’s profit
(payment minus costs) is given in the fifth column and the patient’s benefit in the final
column. There is a tradeoff between ‘own’ maximum profit and patient optimal benefit.
In this example, a quantity of 5 medical services renders the patient benefit to be optimal
(B(5) = 10.00, pi(5) = 5.10) whereas the profit maximizing quantity is 10 (B(10) = 7.50,
pi(10) = 13.00). Quantity choices between 5 and 10 are Pareto optimal, in that, subjects
cannot increase the patient’s benefit without foregoing own profit and vice versa.3
3For example, choosing 8 rather than 7 medical services would provide patient 1E with a slightly larger
benefit (8.50 instead of 9.00) while the physician’s profit would increase substantially from 7.40 to 11.60.
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Figure 4.1: Example of a decision screen in Med-FFS and Non-Med-FFS
Next we briefly describe the experimental parameters. Under FFS (treatments Med-
FFS and Non-Med-FFS) subjects receive a fee for each unit of medical services provided.
The payment differs across illnesses, i.e., RA(q), RB(q), . . . , RE(q). In treatments Med-
CAP and Non-Med-CAP, subjects are paid a lump-sum of 12 Taler per patient (see panel I
of Table 4.2).
To take a heterogeneous patient population into account being observed in the real
world, e.g., with regard to a patient’s health status or severity of illness, we consider three
patient types differing in their benefit gained from medical services. A common charac-
teristic of all patient types is a global optimum on the quantity interval from 0 to 10 (see
panel IV of Table 4.2). Intuitively, it might be interpreted as the medically agreed best
number of medical services. Taking the patient optimal quantity q∗ as the benchmark, we
can identify overprovision and underprovision of medical services. Patient types vary with
respect to the optimal quantity: q∗j = 5 for patient type 1 (j ∈ [1, 5]), q
∗
j = 3 for patient
type 2 (j ∈ [6, 10]) and q∗j = 7 for patient type 3 (j ∈ [11, 15]).
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Further parameters relevant for physicians’ decisions are costs c(q) and profit pi(q)
shown in panels II and III of Table 4.2. Like real doctors, physicians in the experiment
have to bear costs depending on the quantity of medical services they choose. Costs are
assumed to be c(q) = 110 · q
2 in all treatments. Profit varies across illnesses in treatments
Med-FFS and Non-Med-FFS because remuneration differs for illnesses, and costs are con-
stant. In Med-CAP and Non-Med-CAP, profit does not vary with illnesses. In FFS, the
profit maximizing quantity qˆj is 10 for all patients, except for patients 1A, 2A and 3A
where qˆj = 5. Notice that for patient 1A patient optimal and profit maximizing quantity
coincide, as qˆ1 = q
∗
1 = 5. Under CAP, a profit maximizing subject would not provide any
medical service at all, i.e., qˆj = 0 ∀j ∈ [1, 15].
4.2.2 Experimental protocol
The computerized experiment programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) was conducted
at BonnEconLab, the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Bonn.
Overall 86 students recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004) par-
ticipated in the experimental sessions: 20 (22) Meds in FFS (CAP) and 22 Non-Meds in
both FFS and CAP.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated to the cubicles. Then, the experimenter
read the instructions aloud. Subjects was given plenty of time for clarifying questions
which were asked and answered in private. To check for subjects’ understanding of the
decision task they had to answer three test questions. The experiment did not start unless
all participants had answered the test questions correctly.
The subjects then made their 15 individual quantity choices in complete anonymity. The
order of decision screens was predetermined and kept constant across treatments. Having
made their choices, subjects were asked to fill in a computerized questionnaire explaining
their motivations and the factors having influenced their decisions. Finally, the monitor
was assigned randomly. After the experiment, subjects were paid in private according to
their choices. At last, a randomly selected monitor verified that a check on the benefits
of all patients was written and sealed in an envelope addressed to the Christoffel Blin-
denmission. The monitor and experimenter then walked together to the nearest mailbox
and deposited the envelope. The monitor was paid an additional 4.00 EUR (see also the
instructions in Appendix A.3.2).
Sessions lasted for about 30 to 40 minutes. Meds (Non-Meds), on average, earned
6.88 EUR (7.71 EUR) in FFS and 7.42 EUR (7.80 EUR) in CAP. In treatments with Meds
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Table 4.2: Experimental parameters
Quantity (q)
Payment Var. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I FFS RA(q) 0.00 1.70 3.40 5.10 5.80 10.50 11.00 12.10 13.50 14.90 16.60
RB(q) 0.00 1.00 2.40 3.50 8.00 8.40 9.40 16.00 18.00 20.00 22.50
RC(q) 0.00 1.80 3.60 5.40 7.20 9.00 10.80 12.60 14.40 16.20 18.30
RD(q) 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.20 15.00 16.90 18.90 21.30 23.60
RE(q) 0.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 6.70 7.60 11.00 12.30 18.00 20.50 23.00
CAP R(q) 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
II FFS, CAP c(q) 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.90 1.60 2.50 3.60 4.90 6.40 8.10 10.00
III FFS piA(q) 0.00 1.60 3.00 4.20 4.20 8.00 7.40 7.20 7.10 6.80 6.60
piB(q) 0.00 0.90 2.00 2.60 6.40 5.90 5.80 11.10 11.60 11.90 12.50
piC(q) 0.00 1.70 3.20 4.50 5.60 6.50 7.20 7.70 8.00 8.10 8.30
piD(q) 0.00 1.90 3.60 5.10 6.40 5.50 11.40 12.00 12.50 13.20 13.60
piE(q) 0.00 0.90 1.60 5.10 5.10 5.10 7.40 7.40 11.60 12.40 13.00
CAP pi(q) 12.00 11.90 11.60 11.10 10.40 9.50 8.40 7.10 5.60 3.90 2.00
IV FFS, CAP B1(q) 0.00 0.75 1.50 2.00 7.00 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 7.50
B2(q) 0.00 1.00 1.50 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.50
B3(q) 0.00 0.75 2.20 4.05 6.00 7.75 9.00 9.45 8.80 6.75 3.00
This table shows all experimental parameters. R(q) denotes physicians’ remuneration. Under FFS, R(q) varies with
illnesses A, . . . ,E and increases in q, whereas, under CAP, R(q) remains constant. The costs for providing medical
services c(q) increase in q and are equivalent under FFS and CAP. Physicians’ profit pi(q) is equal to remuneration
R(q) minus costs c(q). B1(q), B3(q), B3(q) denote the patient benefit for the three patient types being equivalent in
FFS and CAP.
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(Non-Meds) a total of 273.68 EUR (241.80 EUR) was transferred to the charity, 6.62 EUR
(6.05 EUR) per participant in FFS and 6.42 EUR (4.94 EUR) in CAP. The money was
assigned to support surgical treatments of cataract patients in a hospital in Masvingo
(Zimbabwe) staffed by ophthalmologists of the Christoffel Blindenmission. Subjects were
not informed about the money being assigned to a developing country (see instructions in
Appendix A.3.2) because we wanted to exclude motives of compassion. Average costs for
a cataract surgery is about 30.00 EUR. Thus, the aggregated patient benefit from Meds
(Non-Meds) allowed to treat nine (eight) patients.
4.3 Results
We report the results in three parts. First, we explore the behavioral data for potential
differences across subject pools. Second, we analyze subjects’ willingness to sacrifice own
profit to increase the patient benefit. Here, we also investigate behavior of economists and
non-economists among the Non-Meds separately. Finally, we compare our findings with
questionnaire data on subjects’ motivations.
4.3.1 Provision behavior
When comparing subjects’ aggregate behavior we observe substantial differences across
subject pools in both payment conditions.4 Under FFS, Non-Meds choose substantially
larger quantities of medical services than Meds. The average quantity provided by Non-
Meds (7.74, s.d. 1.90) is about 15% larger than for Meds (6.60, s.d. 1.85). The difference
in CAP is even more pronounced as the average quantity provided by Non-Meds is 20%
lower than for Meds (3.52, s.d. 1.89, versus 4.40, s.d. 1.64).
What do observed behavioral differences across Meds and Non-Meds imply for
patients? A comparison of subjects’ average quantities per patient in FFS yields the
tendency to overserve patients to be larger for Non-Meds than Meds (see Figure 4.2). The
difference across subject pools is highly significant (p = 0.0034, Mann-Whitney U-Test,
two-sided).5 Moreover, Figure 4.2 shows a stronger tendency towards underprovision of
patients for Non-Meds compared to Meds in CAP. The average quantities provided in
Med-CAP and Non-Med-CAP differ significantly (p = 0.0144).
We find that subjects’ decisions are quite substantially influenced by the patient’s
optimal benefit, yet Meds significantly more so than Non-Meds. In 36.67% (61.52%) of
4Notice that data for treatments Med-FFS and Med-CAP are taken from Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2009).
5In the following all tests are two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Tests if not indicated differently.
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Figure 4.2: Average quantities per decision across treatments
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This figure shows average quantities of medical services for each decision
(patient) for all treatments. Moreover, it shows the patient optimal quan-
tity q∗ and the profit maximizing quantity qˆ for both payment conditions.
their choices Meds opt for the patient optimal quantity q∗ under FFS (CAP). The average
frequency Meds choose q∗ is 5.50 (9.22) in FFS (CAP). Further, 10% (14%) of Meds in
treatments Med-FFS (Med-CAP) always choose q∗ no Med has always chosen the profit
maximizing quantity qˆ. Data for Non-Meds reveal a different picture, as the tendency
towards treating a patient optimally is less pronounced among Non-Meds. Here, 21.21%
(38.18%) of choices are q∗ in treatment Non-Med-FFS (Non-Med-CAP). Non-Meds choose,
on average, only about 3 (6) times q∗ under FFS (CAP). In Non-Med-FFS, even 9% of the
subjects always choose qˆ. More concisely, comparing the number of individual q∗-choices
reveals significant differences across subject pools under both payment conditions (FFS:
p = 0.0209, CAP: p = 0.0213). In short, we state the following result.
Result 1. Non-Meds provide significantly more (less) medical services under FFS (CAP)
than Meds, thus Non-Meds overserve (underserve) patients to a higher extent than Meds.
Moreover, Non-Meds choose the patient optimal quantity significantly less often than Meds.
4.3.2 Willingness to sacrifice own profit
We now turn to the analysis of subjects’ willingness to sacrifice own profit in order to
increase a patient’s benefit. Our approach is similar to Selten and Ockenfels (1998) who
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analyze proportional sacrifices in the the solidarity game, a variant of the dictator game.
In the context of public service provision, Le Grand (2003) describes a personal sacrifice
as a prerequisite for act-knightly behavior.
Our experimental design allows to analyze subjects’ individual sacrifices. Recall
that increasing the patient’s benefit comes at the cost of sacrificing own profit for the
subjects. In particular, subject i faces a tradeoff between achieving his/her maximum
profit pˆij and the patient’s optimal benefit simultaneously for each decision j.
6 By
ρij = (piij − pˆij)/(pi
∗
j − pˆij), where pi
∗
j ≡ pi(q
∗
j ), we measure actual sacrifices proportional
to the maximal possible sacrifice. In particular, ρij normalizes subjects’ willingness to
sacrifice on a 0-to-1 scale. When ρij = 1, subject i chooses the patient optimal quantity
q∗j in decision j and is, thus, willing to sacrifice the profit necessary to provide the best
medical treatment from a patient’s perspective. On the contrary, when ρij = 0 subject i
chooses her own profit maximizing quantity qˆj and is not willing to forego own profit to
increase the patient’s benefit. At ρij =
1
2 , for example, pi
∗
j − pˆij is twice as big as the actual
made sacrifice. We say the higher ρij the more a physician in the experiment is caring for
a patient. See Figures A.4.1 to A.4.4 for ρij in each of the four treatments. We restrict
our analysis to the 94% of choices that are Pareto efficient.
Overall the proportional sacrifices of Meds are 36.22% higher than of Non-Meds
(ρMed = 0.6664, s.d. 0.3824; ρNon−Med = 0.4250, s.d. 0.4036). This difference is highly
significant (p = 0.0018).
When differentiating between payment systems we also find significant differences
across subject pools. As Figure 4.3 shows, Meds are more willing to sacrifice own profit
than Non-Meds in both payment conditions. The proportional sacrifice under FFS is, on
average, higher for Meds (0.5008, s.d. 0.4058) than for Non-Meds (0.2466, s.d. 0.3367).
Under CAP we observe the same behavioral tendency. Here, the average proportional
sacrifice of Meds is 0.8107 (s.d. 0.2934) and of Non-Meds 0.5949 (s.d. 0.3891), respectively.
Both differences are significant (FFS: p = 0.0095, CAP: p = 0.0218). Comparing subjects’
proportional sacrifices across payment systems yields that both Meds and Non-Meds are
willing to forego, although at different levels, substantially more profit in CAP than in
FFS (p = 0.0000). In short, the result is as follows.
Result 2. Meds are less driven by profit maximizing objectives compared to Non-Meds as
they exhibit a higher willingness to sacrifice own profit to increase patients’ welfare. Put
6We exclude decision j = 1 under FFS as no tradeoff is involved.
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Figure 4.3: Average proportional sacrifices by subject pool and payment system
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differently, Meds can be said to be more caring for their patients than Non-Meds.
In the following we investigate whether economists are less willing to sacrifice own profit
and, thus, drive the lower willingness to sacrifice own profit of Non-Meds. Substantial
evidence suggests that economics students are more selfish in a variety of experimental
tasks and contexts (see Ball and Cech 1996). In a medically framed allocation task Ahlert
et al. (2008) observe economists to behave more selfish than medical students. Do we
also find evidence for a more selfish behavior of economists compared to Non-economists
and Meds in the medical decision-making context of our experiment? Aggregated over
both payment systems, we find that economics students are, on average, less caring for
their patients (ρEcon = 0.3618, s.d. 0.2037) than non-economist (ρNon−Econ = 0.4822, s.d.
0.3779). This indicates a strong tendency towards a more selfish behavior by economists
(see last row of Table 4.3).
This simple comparison of sample means for economists and non-economists, however,
Table 4.3: Proportional sacrifices for economists and non-economists
Economists Non-economists
Treatment ρ s.d obs. ρ s.d. obs.
Non-med-FFS 0.2790 0.1135 10 0.2333 0.2746 12
Non-med-CAP 0.4470 0.2441 10 0.7316 0.2961 12
Overall 0.3630 0.2044 20 0.4824 0.3778 24
could be quite misleading. Thus, we investigate proportional sacrifices of Non-Meds
grouped by economics and non-economics students for both payment conditions. Here, we
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find economists to be, on average, somewhat more caring for their patients, although not
significant (p = 0.1557), than non-economists in treatment Non-Med-FFS (see Table 4.3).
Further, Table 4.3 shows that economists’ willingness to sacrifice own profit is lower than
for non-economists under CAP. This difference is highly significant (p = 0.0083).
Thus, different proportional sacrifices between economists and non-economists under
CAP indicate that behavioral differences between Meds and Non-Meds are driven by a
more selfish behavior of economists among the Non-Meds. This finding is somewhat in line
with Ahlert et al. (2008), although they employed a different experimental setup. More-
over, average proportional sacrifices of non-economists and Meds do not differ significantly
under CAP (p = 0.4362, Fisher Pitman permutation test). In treatment Non-med-FFS
we observed no behavioral differences between economists and non-economists. However,
average sacrifices of Meds differ significantly from sacrifices of non-economists (p = 0.0089,
Fisher Pitman permutation test).
Result 3. Economists are significantly less willing to sacrifice own profit than non-
economists in treatment Non-Med-CAP. This indicates that the more selfish behavior,
observed under CAP, by Non-Meds compared to Meds is mainly driven by economists.
However, proportional sacrifices between economists and non-economists do not differ sig-
nificantly under FFS.
4.3.3 Motivation
The education of medical students is supposed to be guided by the principles of respect
for individuals, beneficence, and justice (Jagsi and Lehmann, 2004). Due to their medical
education we hypothesized that Meds are more inclined to be motivated by the patient’s
welfare. The behavioral data of our experiment corroborated this conjecture. Moreover,
we are able to check for further evidence on Meds patient-oriented motivations by the final
questionnaire where we asked Meds and Non-Meds to state reasons and motivations for
their choices in the following open question: “Please recall the decision setting of the exper-
iment. What influenced and motivated your decision? Why did you decide as you did? ”.
Indeed, the patient benefit seems to decisively motivate Meds’ decisions as it is men-
tioned by about 95% (40 out of 42) Meds. For the Non-Meds 77% (34 out of 44) mention
the patient benefit. This difference is significant (p = 0.0270 Fisher exact test). As another
determinant for their decisions 70 of the 86 subjects mention their own profit, i.e., about
71% of Meds and 92% Non-Meds. This implies that profit is mentioned significantly more
98
often by Non-Meds than by meds (p = 0.0270 Fisher exact test). Further evidence for a
more patient-oriented motivation of Meds is provided by only one medical student stating
to be exclusively motivated by own profit. All other 41 Meds state to be motivated by the
patient benefit only or both, profit and patient benefit. Of the Non-Meds, however, eight
participants disclose to be only motivated by own profit.
In short, we find that Meds’ decisions are substantially motivated by the patient’s wel-
fare. Non-Meds are, rather, motivated by their own profit.
4.4 Concluding remarks
The present study systematically analyzes behavior of prospective physicians (Meds) and
non-medical students (Non-Meds) in a medical decision-making context. Our vehicle is a
controlled laboratory experiment introduced by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2009). Incentives
from payment systems fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP) influence both, Meds
and Non-Meds, in their decisions to provide medical services. In particular, we observe
overprovision when subjects are paid by FFS and underprovision under CAP.
However, the extent to which subjects’ quantity choices are influenced by payment in-
centives varies significantly across Meds and Non-Meds. Meds’ choices are substantially
influenced by the patient’s benefit. This is reflected in a higher willingness to sacrifice
own profit to increase the patient’s benefit. Meds are less driven by profit maximizing
objectives compared to Non-Meds. Put differently, Meds behave more altruisticaly than
Non-Meds. In line with their behavior 95% of Meds state to be decisively influenced and
motivated by the patients’ benefit, in a questionnaire suceeding the experiment.
Behavioral data suggest that financial incentives work for Meds only in an alleviated
way, as their behavior is mostly driven by patient-regarding (altrustic) concerns. Quantity
choices maximizing the patient’s welfare occur more frequently in CAP than in FFS for
both Meds and Non-Meds. This indicates that more altruistic behavior can be observed
under CAP.
More selfishness of economists in a medically framed experiment observed by Ahlert
et al. (2008) can only partially be found in our behavioral data. In particular, economists
are significantly less willing to sacrifice own profit than non-economists when paid by
CAP and, thus, drive the behavioral differences across Meds and Non-Meds. Under FFS,
however, proportional sacrifices between economists and non-economists do not differ sig-
nificantly.
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The findings from our study are not only relevant for the theoretical literature on opti-
mal incentive structures in the public sector, but also suggest important policy implications
for the health care sector. Incentives from payment systems negative for the patient’s wel-
fare are mitigated by the altruistic motivation of prospective physicians. Secondly, from
a policy maker’s point of view it is important to attract individuals with other-regarding
motivations to work in the health care sector. If, however, the average participant from
our Non-Med population would opt to work as a provider in this sector this would induce a
substantial negative effect on patients’ welfare. The possibility and significance of such ef-
fects must be considered carefully when designing robust incentive structures in the health
care sector.
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Appendices
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Let n ∈ N be arbitrary. It is well known that the µn(·)-operator
is homogeneous of degree n and translation invariant. The assumption pX = 1 − pY is
equivalent to X = 1 − Y such that µn(X) = (−1)
nµn(Y ) which for n = 2 just implies
V(X) = V(Y ). Note that we can write LX = X · x1 + (1−X) · x0 = (x1 − x0)X + x0 and
thus V(LX) = (x1 − x0)
2
V(X). Analogously, we have V(LY ) = (y1 − y0)
2
V(Y ). Since the
Mao lotteries have equal variance we obtain (x1 − x0)
2 = (y1 − y0)
2 and because of the
unique representation of binary lotteries (see Definition 1) this is equivalent to
x1 − x0 = y1 − y0. (1)
Using once more homogeneity and translation invariance of the µn(·)-operator and plugging
in yields
µn(LX) = (x1 − x0)
nµn(X) = ((y1 − y0))
n(−1)nµn(Y ) = (−1)
nµn(LY ).
Because of the assumed variance equality the claim for µSn(·) follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof can be done by statistical standard calculations and
thus is omitted. A more general version of the proposition is proven as Proposition 1 in
Ebert (2010). 
Proof of Theorem 1. After calculating expectation, variance and skewness of a binary
lottery as in Definition 1 we find that LX = LX(p, x1, x0) has to suffice the following
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system of equations
E = px1 + (1− p)x0 (2)
V = (x1 − x0)
2p(1− p) (3)
S =
1− 2p√
p(1− p)
(4)
with x1 > x0 and 0 < p < 1. It is natural to start with solving equation (4) for p. After
squaring and some rearrangement one obtains
p2(−S2 − 4) + p(4 + S2)− 1 = 0.
Setting S˜ := 4 + S2 the solutions to this quadratic equation are given by
p1/2 =
S˜
+
−
√
S˜2 − 4S˜
2S˜
, (5)
where p1 is the solution associated with the addition. It is easy to see that the expression
under the square root is always positive. If S = 0 there is one solution, namely p =
1
2 . Otherwise there are two solutions. Both these solutions are strictly positive since√
S˜2 − 4S˜ + 4− 4 =
√
(S˜ − 2)2 − 4) ≤ S˜ − 2 and thus
p1/2 ≥ p2 ≥
S˜ − (S˜ − 2)
2S˜
=
1
S˜
> 0.
All solutions are smaller than 1 since
p1 < 1⇐⇒
√
S˜2 − 4S˜ < S˜
what can be shown to be true for all S˜ (and thus for all S) by doing the quadratic expansion
as in the previous calculation. Note that equation (4) is a square root equation and thus
we have to verify the solutions. Obviously, if S = 0 then p = 0.5 is the unique solution.
Otherwise, from equation (5) it follows that p1 > p2 and p1 + p2 = 1, i.e., p1 > 0.5 and
p2 < 0.5. If S < 0 then p2 does not solve equation (4) because 1 − 2p2 > 0, but p1 does.
Similarly, if S > 0 only p2 solves equation (4). Thus in any case equation (4) has a unique
solution in (0, 1) (such that it is a probability) that will be denoted by p in the following.7
7We can see now how skewness is reflected in a binary lottery. It has zero skewness if and only if both
states have equal probability. Otherwise, it is positively (negatively) skewed if the high payoff is associated
with the low (high) probability.
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The remainder of the proof is straightforward. For any p obtained from equation (4)
the system of equations (2) and (3) can be solved for a unique solution to obtain the
expressions stated in the claim from which finally also x1 > x0 is evident. 
Proof of Proposition 4. By Theorem 1 there exists exactly one binary lottery LX ≡MA
with E[MA] = E[A], V[MA] = V[A] and ν[MA] = −S. By Theorem 1 there also exists
exactly one lottery LY ≡ MB whose expectation and variance equal that of MA and
further ν[MB] = +S. From equation (4) one immediately obtains pX = 1− pY such that
by Definition 2 (MA,MB) constitutes a Mao lottery pair that fulfills the requested moment
conditions.
For the second part, note that by taking derivatives
∆ = (ν[B]− S)2 + (ν[A]− (−S))2
indeed achieves its maximum at S = ν[B]−ν[A]2 . The difference in skewness of the Mao
pair is 2S and as can be seen from the previous equation this indeed equals the skewness
difference ν[B]− ν[A] of the prudence pair. 
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A.1.2 Instructions
[translated from German for session order MAO-ES-RIAV ]
Thank you very much for participating in this decision experiment!
General Information
In the following experiment, you will make a couple of decisions. Following the instructions
and depending on your decisions, you can earn money. It is therefore very important that
you read the instructions carefully.
You will make your decisions anonymously on your computer screen in your cubicle. During
the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants. Whenever you have a
question, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your question in private in
your cubicle. If you disregard these rules you can be excluded from the experiment. Then
you receive no payment.
During the experiment all amounts are stated in Taler, the experimental currency. At the
end of the experiment, your achieved earnings will be converted into Euro at an exchange
rate of 1 Taler = ¤ 0.15 and paid to you in cash.
Structure of the Experiment and Your Decisions
In total, you will make 34 decisions throughout the experiment. In each decision you
will decide upon which of two different risky events—either Option A or Option
B—you prefer. An example of Option A could be as follows: With 50% chance you will
lose 10 Taler or with 50% chance you will receive 20 Taler. Option B could be: With 20%
chance you will receive 0 Taler and with 80% chance you will receive 10 Taler.
The experiment consists of three stages that will be explained in detail in the following.
To determine your payoff in the experiment, one of your decisions will be randomly chosen.
This takes place after you have completed all your decisions. To this end, the experimenter
picks one of 34 balls, marked with numbers from 1 to 34, out of a ballot box. Each number
occurs only once in the ballot box, whereby the draw of a particular number is equally
likely. The outcome of the risky event, that you have opted for, at the randomly chosen
decision will afterwards be determined by another random draw. This procedure will be
explained extensively when the stages of the experiment are described.
Keep in mind that only one of your 34 decisions determines your payoff in the
experiment. Therefore each of your single decisions can determine your entire
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payoff in the experiment.
You make your decisions at the computer screen in the computer lab. For each decision
you have a maximum of 3 minutes. After the experiment, the decision relevant for every
participants’s payoff and the outcome of the risky event will be determined by random
draws for each participant in the seminar room. For this the experimenter will call upon
participants one by one.
Note that some risky events comprise negative outcomes. For these questions you re-
ceive coupons indicating an endowment (in Taler). You can charge the coupons when the
outcome of the risky event is determined.
Stage I
In the first stage of the experiment you are asked to make eight decisions. On each of the
8 sequent decision screens you decide which of the two risky events—Option A or Option
B—you prefer.
For your decisions you receive an endowment in Taler, because outcomes of risky events in
this stage can comprise losses. Accordingly, your payoff in this stage is:
Endowment and Outcome of the chosen risky event
How is the outcome of the (chosen) risky event determined in Stage I? To this end, there
is another ballot box. This ballot box contains 100 balls with numbers from 1 to 100.
Each number occurs only once, thus the draw of a particular number is equally likely. An
example of a decision screen provides the following screen:
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In Option A you will lose 40 Taler with 75% chance (balls 1 to 75) or with 25% chance
you will receive 40 Taler (balls 76 to 100). In Option B you receive 0 Taler with 75%
chance (balls 1 to 75) or you will lose 80 Taler with 25% chance (balls 76 to 100). Your
endowment is 160 Taler in this example.
Now suppose that this decision was randomly drawn to determine your payoff.
• Suppose you have chosen Option A and assume that a ball is drawn from the ballot
box with a number between 1 and 75. That means, you lose 40 Taler. Your resulting
payoff, after allocating the endowment of 160 Taler for this decision to the lottery
outcome, is 120 Taler. If a ball with a number between 76 and 100 is drawn, you
receive 40 Taler. Under consideration of your endowment your payoff is 200 Taler.
• Suppose you have chosen Option B and assume that a ball is drawn from the ballot
box with a number between 1 and 75. That means, you receive 0 Taler. Your resulting
payoff after allocating the endowment of 160 Taler for this decision to the lottery
outcome is 160 Taler. If a ball with a number between 76 and 100 is drawn, you lose
80 Taler. Under consideration of your endowment your payoff is 80 Taler.
Stage II
In the second stage of the experiment you make 16 decisions. Again, on each of the 16
sequent decision screens you decide which of the two risky events—either Option A or
Option B—you prefer. In this stage risky events (may) comprise two random draws.
For each decision one random draw is given. This draw is as follows: With 50% chance
the situation “Up” occurs or with 50% chance the situation “Down” occurs.
For your decisions you receive an endowment in Taler, because outcomes of risky events in
this stage can also comprise losses. Accordingly, your payoff in this stage consists of two
components:
Endowment and Outcome of the chosen risky event
How is the outcome of the (chosen) risky event determined in Stage II? For the first random
draw there are two balls in a ballot box—one marked with “Up” and the other with “Down”.
The draw of a particular ball is equally likely.
To determine your payoff in this stage two random draws may be necessary. At the second
random draw one ball is drawn from another ballot box with 10 balls. The balls are either
yellow or white. Note that the composition of yellow and white balls may change for
different decisions in this stage. But within one decision, i.e., for Option A and Option B,
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the composition of yellow and white balls remains the same.
Decision type 1
For 8 out of 16 decisions you are asked the following: Given what situation of the first
random draw—either “Up” or “Down”—do you prefer a second random draw? An
example is provided by the following screen:
In Option A you lose 40 Taler, if situation “Up” occurs in the first random draw. If
situation “Down” occurs, you receive 0 Taler and a second random draw succeeds. This
second random draw is as follows: With 20% chance you lose 48 Taler and with 80%
chance you receive 12 Taler. In Option B, you lose 40 Taler if in the first random draw
the situation “Up” occurs and a second random draw succeeds (The second random draw is
the same as in Option A). When situation “Down” occurs, you receive 0 Taler. For this
decision you are endowed with 160 Taler.
Now suppose the decision from the example above is randomly drawn to determine your
payoff.
Suppose you have chosen Option A.
• If in the first random draw the ball “Up” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler. After allocating
your endowment of 160 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome, your payoff is
120 Taler.
• If in the first random draw the ball “Down” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler and a second
random draw succeeds.
– If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 48 Taler and your
payoff after allocating your endowment is 112 Taler.
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– If in the second random draw a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and
your payoff after allocating your endowment is 172 Taler.
Suppose you have chosen Option B.
• If in the first random draw ball “Up” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler and a second random
draw succeeds.
– If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 48 Taler and your
payoff after allocating your endowment is 72 Taler.
– If in the second random draw a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and
your payoff after allocating your endowment is 132 Taler.
• If in the first random draw “Down” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler. After allocating
your endowment of 160 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome your payoff is
160 Taler.
Decision type 2
For the remaining 8 out of 16 decisions in stage II you are asked the following: To what
situation do you prefer to add a (fixed) amount—either to situation “Up” where a second
random draw succeeds or to situation “Down”, where no second random draw succeeds.
Note that the fixed amount can either be positive or negative. An example is provided by
the following screen:
In Option A, when situation “Up” occurs in the first random draw you receive 0 Taler and
a second random draw succeeds. The second random draw is as follows: With 30% chance
you lose 28 Taler and with 70% chance you receive 12 Taler. When situation “Down” occurs
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in the first random draw, you lose 40 Taler and no second random draw succeeds. In Option
B if situation “Up” occurs in the first random draw you lose 40 Taler and a second random
draw succeeds (The second random draw is the same as in Option A). When situation
“Down” occurs, you receive 0 Taler and no second random draw succeeds. For this decision
you are endowed with 80 Taler.
Now suppose the decision from the example above is randomly drawn to determine your
payoff. Suppose you have chosen Option A.
• If in the first random draw the ball “Up” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler and a second
random draw succeeds.
– If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 28 Taler and your
payoff after allocating your endowment is 52 Taler.
– If in the second random draw a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and
your payoff after allocating your endowment is 92 Taler.
• If in the first random draw the ball “Down” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler. After allocat-
ing your endowment of 80 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome your payoff
is 40 Taler.
Suppose you have chosen Option B.
• If in the first random draw the ball “Up” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler and a second
random draw succeeds.
– If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 28 Taler and your
payoff after allocating your endowment is 12 Taler.
– If in this second a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and your payoff after
allocating your endowment is 52 Taler.
• If in the first random draw the ball “Down” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler. After
allocating your endowment of 80 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome your
payoff is 80 Taler.
Stage III
In stage III you are asked to make 10 decisions on a single decision screen. The risky events
between you have to decide in this stage are displayed in a table format. In each row of
the table you make one decision. For an illustration see the following figure:
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Each risky event comprises two possible outcomes and two corresponding probabilities.
You make your decision at the end of each row by indicating the risky event you prefer
(either Option A or Option B). When making your decisions you do not have to follow
a particular order and you can change your decisions as often as desired within the time
permitted.
The outcomes of the risky events in this stage do not comprise losses. Thus, for the
decisions in this stage you do not receive an endowment. Accordingly, your payoff is as
follows:
Outcome of the risky event
How is the outcome of the chosen risky event determined in Stage III? To determine
the outcome there is a ballot box with 100 balls marked with numbers from 1 to 100
(analogously to stage I). Each number occurs exactly once in the ballot box, i.e., the draw
of a particular number is equally likely.
Before the experiment will start now, please note: You are asked comprehension
questions before each stage starts. These questions should familiarize you with the decision
task in each stage.
After the experiment, you are asked to answer a questionnaire. For answering the ques-
tionnaire you receive independently from your earnings during the experiment ¤4.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2.1 Derivations
We first show that our lottery preference B2 over A2 implies risk aversion in the differ-
entiable EU framework, i.e., u′′ < 0. B2 is preferred to A2 by an EU maximizer implies
that
1
2
u(x− k) +
1
2
u(x− r) >
1
2
u(x− r − k) +
1
2
u(x)
⇐⇒ u(x)− u(x− k) < u(x− r)− u(x− r − k).
Now we divide by k and since the preference holds for all positive k we can let k go to zero
to obtain
u′(x) < u′(x− r).
Since this holds for all r (and for all x) the latter equation implies that u′(x) is strictly
decreasing, i.e., u′′(x) < 0 what we wanted to show. That the preferences B3 over A3 and
B4 over A4, respectively, are equivalent to prudence and temperance within the differen-
tiable EU framework is proven by use of similar arguments in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006).
We now present the approximations that relate individuals’ indices of absolute risk attitude
to the risk premia measured in our experiment.8 The 2nd-degree risk premium that makes
the individual indifferent between the risk loving and risk averse lottery choice is defined
as
1
2
u(x− k) +
1
2
u(x− r) =
1
2
u(x+mRA) +
1
2
u(x− r − k +mRA). (6)
We approximate
u(x− k − r +mRA) ≈ u(x− r) + (mRA − k)u′(x− r)
≈ u(x− r) + (mRA − k)
(
u′(x)− ru′′(x)
)
8These approximations are similar to those in Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) who note that they are
à la Arrow-Pratt.
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such that equation (6) approximately becomes
u(x)− kU ′(x) + u(x− r) = u(x) +mRAu′(x) + U(x− r) + (mRA − k)
(
u′(x)− ru′′(x)
)
⇐⇒ 0 = mRAu′(x) +mRA
(
u′(x)− ru′′(x)
)
+ rku′′(x)
⇐⇒ 0 = 2mRAu′(x) + u′′(x) ((r(k −mRA))
⇐⇒ −
u′′(x)
u′(x)
=
2mRA
r(k −mRA)
.
For prudence, consider
1
2
u(x− k) +
1
2
u(x+ ) =
1
2
u(x+mPR) +
1
2
u(x− k + +mPR). (7)
We approximate
u(x− k + +mPR) ≈ u(x− k +mPR) +
1
2
u′′(x− k +mPR)σ2
≈ u(x) + (mPR − k)u′(x) +
σ2
2
(u′′(x) + (mPR − k)u′′′(x))
such that equation (7) approximately becomes
2u(x)− ku′(x) +
1
2
σ2u′′(x) = 2u(x) +mPRu′(x) + (mPR − k)u′(x)
+
σ2
2
(
u′′(x) + (mPR − k)u′′′(x)
)
⇐⇒ 0 = 2mPRu′(x) +
σ2
2
(mPR − k)u′′′(x)
⇐⇒
u′′′(x)
u′(x)
=
4mPR
σ2(k −mPR)
.
Finally, for temperance first consider
u(x+mTE + 1 + 2)
which is approximated as
u(x+ 1 + 2) +m
TEu′(x+ 1 + 2)
= u(x+ 1 + 2) +m
TE(u′(x) + u′′(x)E[(1 + 2)]
= u(x+ 1 + 2) +m
TEu′(x)
= u(x+ 1) +
1
2
u′′(x+ 1)σ22
= u(x) +
1
2
u′′(x)σ21 +
σ22
2
(
u′′(x) +
1
2
u(4)(x)σ21
)
= u(x) +
1
2
u′′(x)σ21 +
1
2
u′′(x)σ22 +
1
4
u(4)(x)σ21σ
2
2
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Thus we can approximate
u(x+ 1) + u(x+ 2) = u(x+m
TE) + u(x+mTE + 1 + 2) (8)
as
u(x)+u′′(x)σ21+u(x)+u
′′(x)σ22 = u(x)+m
TEu′(x)+u(x)+
1
2
u′′(x)σ21+
1
2
u′′(x)σ22+
1
4
u(4)(x)σ21σ
2
2.
Collecting terms and rearranging yields
0 = 2mTEu′(x) +
1
4
u(4)(x)σ21σ
2
2
⇐⇒ mTE = −
u(4)(x)
u′(x)
·
(
1
8
σ21σ
2
2
)
.
A.2.2 Instructions
[translated from German]
Thank you very much for participating in this decision experiment!
General Information
In the following experiment, you will make a couple of decisions. Following the instructions
and depending on your decisions, you can earn money. It is therefore very important that
you read the instructions carefully.
You will make your decisions anonymously on your computer screen in your cubicle. During
the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants. Whenever you have a
question, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your question in private in
your cubicle. If you disregard these rules you can be excluded from the experiment. Then
you receive no payment.
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During the experiment all amounts are stated in Euro. At the end of the experiment,
your achieved earnings will be paid to you in cash.
Structure of the Experiment
The experiment can be divided into three stages. All stages are equally relevant for your
payoff. The three stages comprise decision problems, where risky events play a role. In a
risky event it is unsure, which outcome occurs.
You decide, which of two risky events you prefer. The form of the risky events will be
described when explaining the stages in-depth.
Overall you will make 120 individual decisions in the three sections of the experiment.
Payoff in the experiment
To determine your payoff of the experiment, one of your 120 decisions from the three
sections will be selected randomly. This takes place after you have made all your decisions.
For this the experimenter will draw one out of 120 cards, labeled with numbers from 1
to 120, from a ballot-box. Every number occurs only once in the ballot-box whereby the
draw of a particular number is equally likely. The outcome of the risky event, that you
have chosen will actually be determined afterwards. These random draws will be explained
in-depth when describing the sections of the experiments.
Note that only one of your 120 decisions determines your earnings of the exper-
iment and that each of your 120 decisions can determine your entire earnings
of the experiment.
Also note that the risky events can comprise negative outcomes. You receive an endowment
in form of a coupon. The coupons are allocated to the outcome of the risky event. Hence
your payoff is made up of the two components
Endowment and Outcome of the chosen risky event .
After the experiment, the decision relevant for payoff and the outcome of the risky event
will be randomly will be determined for each participant in the seminar room. For this
participants will be called on successively.
Decision situation
The risky events displayed in following figure describe the decision situation, you face in
the three stages of the experiment, in an abstract way. In decision situation you decide
which of the two risky events (here: “Option left” and “Option right”) you prefer.
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“Option left” “Option right”
Both the risky event “Option left” and “Option right” comprise one random draw (Random
draw 1), that is depicted by the balls “Up” and “Down”. Random draw 1 is: With 50%
chance you are in state “Up” or with 50% chance in state “Down”.
We now look at the risky event “Option left”: If the ball “Up” will be drawn, the outcome
is X. X can either be a fixed amount or another random draw (Random draw X). If
ball “Down” is drawn, the outcome is Y. Also Y can either be a fixed amount or another
random draw (Random draw Y).
In risky event “Option right” X and Y follow, if Ball “Up” is drawn. In addition a Amount
(blue bank note) is added to both state “Up” and state “Down”. If ball “Down” is drawn,
you receive the amount indicated on the bank note. If ball “Up” is drawn, X and Y follow
and the Amount (blue bank note) is added.
The Amount on the blue bank note can take the following values
−2.50,−2.25,−2.00, . . . ,−0.25,0.00,0.25, . . . ,2.00,2.25.
Hence, for each of these 20 Amounts follows one decision situation with two risky events.
The Amount on the blue bank note is always added to the states “Up” and “Down” of
that risky event, where both X and Y occur in state “Up” (here: “Option right”).
Note that, on your decision screen on the computer the risky event, where the Amount
(blue bank note) is added can either be the right or the left option.
First stage
In the first stage of the experiment you make 20 decisions. You choose on one decision
screen at a time, which of the two different risky events—Option A or Option B—you
prefer.
The risky events can comprise negative outcomes. For each decision in the first stage you
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receive an endowment of 25.00. An example of a decision situation in the first stage is
provided in the following figure.
In the example above the Amount (blue bank note) is added to Option B. The size of
the added Amount can be found in the column “Amount” on the right-hand side of the
screen. For each Amount you decide whether you prefer Option A or Option B.
After activating an Amount in the column “Amount” you decide for this Amount by
clicking on “A” or “B” whether you prefer Option A or Option B. A green frame marks the
chosen option. You do not need to stick to a certain order of your decisions.
How is the outcome of the risky event (you have chosen) determined in the
first stage? For Random draw 1 there are two balls in a ballot-box—one with the label
“Up” another with the label “Down”. Both balls can be drawn with the same chance.
Please look at the example of this stage again!
Suppose, this decision has been randomly chosen to determine your payoff. In Option A
the outcome is −5.00, if in Random draw 1 the ball “Up” is drawn. If the ball “Down”
is drawn the outcome is −10.00. Considering your Endowment of 25.00 in Option A
results “Up” 20.00 and in stage “Down” 15.00.
In Option B the outcome is −10.00 and −5.00 and 1.00 (Amount on the blue bank
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note), if in Random draw 1 “Up” is drawn; overall −14.00. If ball “Down” is drawn,
the outcome is 1.00 (Amount on the blue bank note). Considering your Endowment of
25.00 in Option B results in stage “Up” 11.00 and in stage “Down” 26.00 for your payoff.
Second stage
In the second stage of the experiment you make 60 decisions. You choose on three decision
screens each with 20 decision situtations, which of the two different risky events—Option A
or Option B—you prefer.
The outcomes of the risky events can be negative. You receive an Endowment of 20.00.
An example of a decision situation in the second stage is provided in the following figure.
In the example above the Amount (blue bank note) is added to Option A. The size of
the added Amount can be found in the column “Amount” on the right-hand side of the
screen. For each Amount you decide whether you prefer Option A or Option B.
After activating an Amount in the column “Amount” you decide for this Amount by
clicking on “A” or “B” whether you prefer Option A or Option B. A green frame marks the
chosen option. You do not need to stick to a certain order of your decisions.
How is the outcome of the risky event (you have chosen) determined in the
second stage? For Random draw 1 there are two balls in a ballot-box—one with the
129
label “Up” another with the label “Down”. Both balls can be drawn with the same chance
(analogous to the first stage). As shown in the example above, in the second stage a second
random draw (Random draw X) can be necessary to determine your payoff. In Random
draw X a ball is drawn from a ballot-box containing 10 balls. This ball can either be
white or yellow. Note that, the composition of white and yellow balls can change in the
three decision screens in this stage. This ballot-box always contains 10 balls and within a
decision screen (for 20 decisions) the composition of white and yellow balls are identical.
Please look at the example of this stage again!
Suppose, this decision situation has been randomly chosen to determine your payoff. If in
Option A in Random draw 1 the ball “Up” is drawn, the outcome is −5.00, Random
draw X follows and 1.00 (Amount on the blue bank note).
• If in Random draw X a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 3.50. Considering your
Endowment of 20.00 you receive 12.50 (= 20.00− 5.00− 3.50 + 1.00).
• If in Random draw X a white ball is drawn, you receive 14.00. Considering your
Endowment you receive 30.00 (= 20.00− 5.00 + 14.00 + 1.00).
If in Option A in Random Draw 1 “Down” is drawn, the outcome is 1.00 (Amount
on the blue bank note). Considering your Endowment 21.00 result.
If in Option B in Random draw 1 “Up” is drawn, Random draw X follows.
• If in Random draw X a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 3.50. Considering your
Endowment of 20.00 you receive 16.50.
• If in Random draw X a white ball is drawn, you receive 14.00. Considering your
Endowment you receive 34.00.
If in Option B in Random draw 1 “Down” is drawn, the outcome is −5.00. Considering
your Endowment 15.00 result.
Third stage
In the second stage of the experiment you make 40 decisions. You choose on two decision
screens each with 20 decision situations, which of the two different risky events—Option A
or Option B—you prefer.
The outcomes of the risky events can be negative. You receive an Endowment of 17.50.
An example of a decision situation in the third stage is provided in the following figure.
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In the example above the Amount (blue bank note) is added to Option B. The size of
the added Amount can be found in the column “Amount” on the right-hand side of the
screen. For each Amount you decide whether you prefer Option A or Option B.
After activating an Amount in the column “Amount” you decide for this Amount by
clicking on “A” or “B” whether you prefer Option A or Option B. A green frame marks the
chosen option. You do not need to stick to a certain order of your decisions.
How is the outcome of the risky event (you have chosen) determined in the
third stage? For Random draw 1 there are two balls in a ballot-box—one with the
label “Up” another with the label “Down”. Both balls can be drawn with the same chance
(analogous to the first and second stage).
As shown in the example above, in the second stage a second random draw (Random
draw X) and/or a third random draw (Random draw Y) can be necessary to determine
your payoff.
In Random draw X a ball is drawn from a ballot-box containing 10 balls. This ball
can either be white or yellow. Note that, the composition of white and yellow balls can
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change in the three decision screens in this stage. This ballot-box always contains 10 balls
and within a decision screen (for 20 decisions) the composition of white and yellow balls
are identical. Analogously, this is true for Random draw Y. Notice that the composition
of yellow and white balls across Random draw X and Random draw Y can differ (see
the example above).
Please look at the example of this stage again!
Suppose, this decision situation has been randomly chosen to determine your payoff.
If in Option A in Random draw 1 the ball “Up” is drawn, Random draw X follows.
• If in Random draw X a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 2.80. Considering your
Endowment of 17.50 you receive 14.70.
• If in Random draw X a white ball is drawn, you receive 11.10. Considering your
Endowment you receive 28.60.
If in Random draw 1 the ball “Down” is drawn, Random draw Y follows.
• If in Random draw Y a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 11.10. Considering your
Endowment of 17.50 you receive 6.40.
• If in Random draw Y a white ball is drawn, you receive 2.80. Considering your
Endowment you receive 20.30.
If in Option B in Random draw 1 “Up” is drawn Random draw Y and Random
draw X follow and the Amount of 1.00 (blue bank note) is added.
• If in Random draw X and in Random draw Y a yellow ball is drawn, you lose
2.80 (from Random draw X ) and 11.10 (from Random draw Y). Considering
your Endowment of 17.50 you receive 4.60 (= 17.50− 11.10− 2.80 + 1.00).
• If in Random draw X and in Random draw Y a white ball is drawn, you receive
11.10 (from Random draw X) and 2.80 (from Random draw Y). Considering
your Endowment of 17.50 you receive 32.40 (= 17.50 + 11.10 + 2.80 + 1.00).
• If in Random draw X a white ball and in Random draw Y a yellow ball is drawn,
you receive 11.10 (from Random draw X) and you lose 11.10 (from Random
draw Y). Considering your Endowment you receive 18.50 (= 17.50 + 11.10 −
11.10 + 1.00).
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• If in Random draw X a yellow ball and in Random draw Y a white ball is
drawn, you lose 2.80 (from Random draw X) and you receive 2.80 (from Random
draw Y). Considering your Endowment you receive 18.50 (= 17.50−2.80+2.80+
1.00).
If in Option B in Random draw 1 “Down” is drawn, the outcome is 1.00 (Amount on
the blue bank note). Considering your Endowment 18.50 result.
Before the experiment will start now, please note: You are asked comprehension
questions before each stage starts. These questions should familiarize you with the decision
task in each stage.
After the experiment, you are asked to answer a questionnaire. For answering the ques-
tionnaire you receive independently from your earnings during the experiment ¤ 4.
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A.3 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.3.1 Tables and figures
Table A.3.1: Quantities and differences to patient optimal quantity by physician
qij µij
Physician i Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d.
F
F
S
1 6.40 7.00 1.12 1.40 1.00 1.35
2 7.73 8.00 1.87 2.73 2.00 2.94
3 5.00 5.00 1.46 0.00 0.00 0.65
4 5.00 5.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 7.27 8.00 1.16 2.27 2.00 1.49
6 6.40 6.00 1.12 1.40 1.00 1.80
7 7.13 7.00 1.06 2.13 2.00 1.77
8 8.27 9.00 1.94 3.27 3.00 2.69
9 6.07 7.00 1.39 1.07 1.00 1.28
10 7.67 7.00 1.76 2.67 2.00 2.55
11 7.47 8.00 2.00 2.47 2.00 2.61
12 6.93 7.00 1.75 1.93 2.00 2.05
13 6.13 6.00 1.92 1.13 1.00 1.92
14 6.27 7.00 1.33 1.27 1.00 1.62
15 8.53 9.00 1.96 3.53 3.00 2.85
16 6.67 6.00 1.54 1.67 1.00 2.47
17 5.00 5.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 5.73 6.00 1.49 0.73 1.00 1.03
19 7.00 7.00 1.25 2.00 2.00 1.96
20 5.33 5.00 1.45 0.33 0.00 1.11
C
A
P
1 4.20 5.00 1.52 -0.80 -1.00 1.61
2 4.27 5.00 0.88 -0.73 0.00 1.28
3 4.80 5.00 1.47 -0.20 0.00 0.41
4 5.13 5.00 1.60 0.13 0.00 0.52
5 2.13 2.00 0.83 -2.87 -4.00 1.46
6 5.00 5.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 4.07 4.00 0.96 -0.93 -1.00 1.10
8 4.33 5.00 0.98 -0.67 0.00 0.98
9 4.07 4.00 0.80 -0.93 -1.00 1.22
10 5.00 5.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 4.93 5.00 1.62 -0.07 0.00 0.26
12 4.93 5.00 1.62 -0.07 0.00 0.26
13 2.40 2.00 1.18 -2.60 -2.00 2.38
14 5.00 5.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 4.00 4.00 0.85 -1.00 -1.00 0.85
16 4.47 5.00 1.85 -0.53 0.00 2.00
17 3.40 4.00 1.68 -1.60 -3.00 1.99
18 4.53 5.00 1.19 -0.47 0.00 0.74
19 6.00 6.00 2.45 1.00 2.00 2.56
20 4.67 5.00 1.29 -0.33 0.00 0.49
21 5.00 5.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 4.47 5.00 1.13 -0.53 0.00 0.83
This table shows descriptive statistics of quantities for each individual
physician (columns 2-4). Further, it shows descriptive statistics about
the differences of the actual quantity to the patient optimal quantity,
i.e., µij = qij − q∗j (columns 5-7).
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Table A.3.2: Average quantities and ranks by patient type
Average quantity Number of
Physician i Pat. type 1 Pat. type 2 Pat. type 3 Order of ranks inversions
F
F
S
1 6.4 5.6 7.2 2 1 3 0
2 8.0 8.4 6.8 2 3 1 1
3 5.0 3.4 6.6 2 1 3 0
4 5.0 3.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
5 7.2 6.6 8.0 2 1 3 0
6 5.8 6.4 7.0 1 2 3 1
7 7.2 6.8 7.4 2 1 3 0
8 8.4 8.4 8.0 2 2 1 .
9 6.8 4.6 6.8 2 1 2 .
10 8.2 7.6 7.2 3 2 1 2
11 6.8 7.8 7.8 1 2 2 .
12 7.6 6.0 7.2 3 1 2 3
13 6.4 5.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
14 5.8 5.8 7.2 1 1 2 .
15 8.6 9.0 8.0 2 3 1 1
16 6.6 7.0 6.4 2 3 1 1
17 5.0 3.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
18 6.0 4.2 7.0 2 1 3 0
19 7.0 6.8 7.2 2 1 3 0
20 5.8 3.8 6.4 2 1 3 0
C
A
P
1 3.6 3.6 5.4 2 2 1 .
2 4.6 3.4 4.8 2 1 3 0
3 5.0 3.0 6.4 2 1 3 0
4 5.0 3.4 7.0 2 1 3 0
5 1.4 2.0 3.0 1 2 3 1
6 5.0 3.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
7 4.4 3.0 4.8 2 1 3 0
8 5.0 3.0 5.0 2 1 2 .
9 4.4 3.2 4.6 2 1 3 0
10 5.0 3.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
11 5.0 3.0 6.8 2 1 3 0
12 5.0 3.0 6.8 2 1 3 0
13 3.0 2.6 1.6 3 2 1 2
14 5.0 3.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
15 4.0 3.0 5.0 2 1 3 0
16 5.0 3.4 5.0 2 1 2 .
17 3.4 2.8 4.0 2 1 3 0
18 5.0 3.0 5.6 2 1 3 0
19 6.4 5.0 6.6 2 1 3 0
20 5.0 3.0 6.0 2 1 3 0
21 5.0 3.0 7.0 2 1 3 0
22 5.0 3.0 5.4 2 1 3 0
This table shows physicians’ average quantity choices by patient type (columns 2-4) and the
corresponding ranks (5-7). The final column shows the number of inversions necessary to reach
the ‘perfect order of ranks’, i.e., 2,1,3, starting from the observed order of ranks.
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Table A.3.3: Test statistics of two-sided non-parametric tests per patient
Decision j (Patient)
Test; Variable(s); Scope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(1A) (1B) (1C) (1D) (1E) (2A) (2B) (2C) (2D) (2E) (3A) (3B) (3C) (3D) (3E)
I Binomial; num. q∗j , num. not
q∗j ;
FFS
0.0000 0.0414 0.1153 0.0118 0.0025 0.0414 0.0004 0.0414 0.0025 0.5034 0.5034 0.0414 1.0000 0.5034 0.0118
Binomial; num. q∗j , num not.
q∗j ;
CAP
0.1338 0.1338 0.1338 0.5235 0.1338 0.2863 0.0043 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.5235 0.1338 0.2863 0.2863 0.0524
II Mann Whitney U; qij ;
across treatments
0.2440 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.2339 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000
III Fisher exact; q∗ij ;
across treatments
0.0063 0.0051 0.0000 0.0095 0.0005 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.2461 0.0051 0.1670 0.0784 0.2457
IV Mann Whitney U; ψ(qij);
across treatments
0.0066 0.1539 0.3047 0.4630 0.0617 0.0271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.3972 0.0028 0.0507 0.1206 0.5991
V MannWhitney U;∆piij ; across
treatments
0.0000 0.0195 0.8055 0.0590 0.2046 0.0183 0.0008 0.2092 0.0119 0.0203 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.4219
This table shows test statistics by decision j (patient). Row I provides p-values of a two-sided binomial test comparing the number of patient optimal quantity choices with the
number of patient non-optimal quantity choices for FFS and CAP. In row II, p-values of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test are shown comparing physicians’ quantity choices across
treatments. Row III gives p-values of a Fischer exact test about the number of patient optimal quantity choices, i.e., q∗ij , across treatments. p-values of a two-sided Mann-Whitney
U test comparing benefit losses ψ(qij) and relative deviations from the physician optimal profit ∆piij are shown in rows IV and V, respectively.
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Table A.3.4: Descriptive statistics on variables per patient
Decision j (Patient)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(1A) (1B) (1C) (1D) (1E) (2A) (2B) (2C) (2D) (2E) (3A) (3B) (3C) (3D) (3E)
F
F
S
qij Mean (qj) 5.00 7.30 6.40 6.80 7.90 4.70 6.20 5.85 6.60 6.45 6.30 7.10 7.35 7.35 7.70
Median 5.00 7.00 6.50 6.80 8.00 5.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 8.00
νij Mean (νj) 0.00 2.30 1.40 1.80 2.90 1.70 3.20 2.85 3.60 3.45 -0.70 0.10 0.35 0.35 0.70
Median 0.00 2.00 1.50 1.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
s.d. 0.00 1.84 1.50 1.67 1.86 1.22 2.24 2.21 2.23 3.05 0.86 0.64 0.75 0.88 1.03
pi(qij) Mean 8.00 10.18 7.21 10.79 10.29 6.98 9.03 6.68 10.88 9.18 7.43 10.66 7.78 12.20 10.28
Median 8.00 11.10 7.45 11.40 11.60 8.00 11.10 7.20 11.40 11.60 7.40 11.10 7.70 12.00 11.60
s.d. 0.00 2.60 0.90 2.82 3.04 1.66 3.26 1.41 2.92 3.62 0.31 1.68 0.25 0.51 2.20
∆piij Mean 0.00 0.19 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.21
Median 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.11
s.d. 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.17
B(qij) Mean 10.00 8.85 8.85 9.10 8.55 9.15 8.40 8.58 8.20 8.28 8.92 9.21 9.04 8.90 8.47
Median 10.00 9.00 9.00 9.50 8.50 9.00 8.00 8.50 8.50 7.50 9.00 9.45 9.23 9.45 8.80
ψ(qij) Mean (ψj) 0.00 1.15 1.15 0.90 1.45 0.85 1.60 1.43 1.80 1.73 0.53 0.25 0.41 0.55 0.98
Median 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.50 1.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.50 0.45 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.65
s.d. 0.00 0.92 1.73 0.84 0.93 0.61 1.12 1.10 1.12 1.53 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.96 1.48
obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
C
A
P
qij Mean (qj) 4.73 4.59 4.27 4.64 4.55 3.45 3.18 3.05 2.86 3.00 5.59 5.50 5.77 5.64 5.18
Median 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 5.50 5.50 6.00 5.50
νij Mean (νj) -0.27 -0.41 -0.73 -0.36 -0.45 0.45 0.18 0.05 -0.14 0.00 -1.41 -1.50 -1.23 -1.36 -1.82
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.50 -1.50 -1.00 -1.50
s.d. 0.98 1.18 1.28 1.81 1.34 1.37 0.85 0.49 0.47 0.93 1.74 1.41 1.69 1.43 1.82
piij Mean 9.67 9.76 10.02 9.54 9.76 10.63 10.92 11.05 11.16 11.02 8.59 8.79 8.40 8.63 9.00
Median 9.50 9.50 9.50 9.50 9.50 11.10 11.10 11.10 11.10 11.10 8.40 8.95 8.95 8.40 8.95
s.d. 0.72 0.92 0.86 1.87 0.93 1.29 0.60 0.36 0.20 0.62 1.52 1.42 2.02 1.45 1.55
∆piij Mean 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.25
Median 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.25
s.d. 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.13
B(qij) Mean 8.99 8.60 8.01 8.31 8.57 8.91 9.45 9.57 9.20 9.48 7.99 7.94 7.77 8.07 7.49
Median 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.00 8.38 7.75 9.00 8.38
ψ(qij) Mean (ψj) 1.01 1.40 1.99 1.69 1.43 1.09 0.55 0.43 0.80 0.52 1.46 1.51 1.68 1.38 1.96
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 1.08 1.70 0.45 1.08
s.d. 2.18 2.69 3.40 2.88 2.80 2.55 1.92 1.81 2.58 2.14 2.30 1.91 2.14 1.94 2.56
obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
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Table A.3.5: Descriptive statistics on patient benefit and profit by physician
FFS CAP
Patient benefit B(qij) Profit pi(qij) Patient benefit B(qij) Profit pi(qij)
Physician i Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d.
1 9.11 9.45 0.55 8.83 8.00 1.93 8.25 9.00 2.54 10.02 9.50 1.03
2 8.19 8.50 1.08 10.09 11.60 2.79 8.67 9.00 1.43 10.11 9.50 0.71
3 9.69 10.00 0.42 6.73 5.90 2.27 9.73 10.00 0.42 9.49 9.50 1.41
4 9.82 10.00 0.27 6.53 5.90 2.51 9.75 10.00 0.34 9.13 9.50 1.62
5 8.63 8.80 0.59 10.15 11.10 2.11 2.73 1.50 2.45 11.48 11.60 0.34
6 9.04 9.00 0.75 9.50 11.10 2.26 9.82 10.00 0.27 10.26 10.40 0.82
7 8.66 8.80 0.63 10.15 11.10 1.98 8.50 9.00 1.61 11.48 11.60 0.34
8 7.54 7.75 1.63 10.81 12.00 2.38 9.25 10.00 1.10 9.23 9.50 1.70
9 9.22 9.00 0.45 8.88 8.00 2.37 8.38 7.75 1.59 10.03 9.50 0.78
10 8.47 8.80 1.10 10.46 11.10 2.50 9.82 10.00 0.27 10.29 10.40 0.64
11 7.68 7.50 1.90 10.24 11.10 2.76 9.79 10.00 0.33 9.23 9.50 1.70
12 8.84 9.00 0.89 9.81 11.10 2.64 9.79 10.00 0.33 9.32 9.50 1.62
13 9.18 9.45 0.86 8.99 8.00 2.90 4.87 2.20 3.91 11.29 11.60 0.55
14 9.17 9.45 0.73 9.37 11.10 2.41 9.82 10.00 0.27 9.23 9.50 1.70
15 7.52 7.50 1.10 10.93 12.40 2.48 8.25 7.75 1.32 10.33 10.40 0.68
16 8.79 9.00 0.95 9.70 11.10 2.30 8.74 9.50 2.58 9.69 9.50 1.48
17 9.82 10.00 0.27 6.53 5.90 2.51 6.47 6.00 3.54 10.58 10.40 0.97
18 9.38 9.45 0.44 8.69 8.00 2.52 9.50 10.00 0.82 9.81 9.50 1.03
19 8.51 8.50 0.88 10.11 11.10 1.79 7.23 8.50 2.90 7.84 8.40 2.90
20 9.39 9.00 0.49 6.87 6.50 1.68 9.67 10.00 0.49 9.67 9.50 1.15
21 . . . . . . 9.82 10.00 0.27 9.23 9.50 1.70
22 . . . . . . 9.42 10.00 0.93 9.89 9.50 0.96
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Table A.3.6: Relative frequencies of choices on the Pareto frontier sorted by categories
Decision j (Patient)
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(1A) (1B) (1C) (1D) (1E) (2A) (2B) (2C) (2D) (2E) (3A) (3B) (3C) (3D) (3E)
F
F
S
PROMAX 1.00‡ 0.25 0.00 0.15 0.32‡ 0.72‡ 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
PATMAX 1.00‡ 0.25 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.25 0.15 0.40 0.42‡ 0.83‡ 0.56‡ 0.67‡ 0.24
SOCOPT 1.00‡ 0.50 0.32 0.05 0.32‡ 0.72‡ 0.47 0.35 0.20 0.25 0.42‡ 0.83‡ 0.56‡ 0.00‡ 0.59
PAROTH 1.00‡ 0.00 0.37 0.60 0.53 0.00 0.26 0.30 0.55 0.10 0.37 0.17 0.44 0.33 0.71
C
A
P
PROMAX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
PATMAX 0.75‡ 0.71‡ 0.68‡ 0.65‡ 0.71‡ 0.88‡ 0.95‡ 0.95‡ 0.91‡ 0.95‡ 0.41 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.27
SOCOPT 0.75‡ 0.71‡ 0.68‡ 0.65‡ 0.71‡ 0.88‡ 0.95‡ 0.95‡ 0.91‡ 0.95‡ 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.23
PAROTH 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.36 0.50 0.52 0.41 0.45
‡ Some patient benefit/profit pairs are covered by two (or more) different categories. In particular, the social optimal quantity (qsocj ) coincides
for some decisions with either the profit maximal quantity (qˆj) or the patient optimal quantity (q
∗
j ).
In FFS: (pi(qˆj), B(qˆj)) = (pi(q
∗
j ), B(q
∗
j )) = (pi(q
soc
j ), B(q
soc
j )) for patient 1A (j = 1); (pi(qˆj), B(qˆj)) = (pi(q
soc
j ), B(q
soc
j )) for patients 1E and 2A
(j = 5, 6); (pi(q∗j ), B(q
∗
j )) = (pi(q
soc
j ), B(q
soc
j )) for for patients 3A,..,3D (j =11,..,14).
In CAP: (pi(q∗j ), B(q
∗
j )) = (pi(q
soc
j ), B(q
soc
j )) for for patients 1A,...,2E (j = 1, . . . , 10).
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Figure A.3.1: Pareto frontiers per decision in FFS
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This figure contrasts the patient benefit (vertical axis) and the physician profit (hor-
izontal axis) for each decision in FFS. Further, it illustrates the Pareto efficient ben-
efit/profit pairs on the Pareto frontier, the patient optimal choice (symbol: +), the
social optimal choice (×) and the profit maximizing choice for the physician (∆). Cir-
cles indicate relative frequencies of physicians’ choices for each benefit/profit pair.
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Figure A.3.2: Pareto frontiers per decision in CAP
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This figure contrasts the patient benefit (vertical axis) and the physician profit (hor-
izontal axis) for each decision in CAP. Further, it illustrates the Pareto efficient ben-
efit/profit pairs on the Pareto frontier, the patient optimal choice (symbol: +), the
social optimal choice (×) and the profit maximizing choice for the physician (∆). Cir-
cles indicate relative frequencies of physicians’ choices for each benefit/profit pair.
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A.3.2 Instructions
[translated from German]
General Information
In the following experiment, you will make a couple of decisions. Following the instructions
and depending on your decisions, you can earn money. It is therefore very important to
read the instructions carefully.
You take your decisions anonymously in your cubicle on your computer screen. During
the experiment you are not allowed to talk to any other participant. Whenever you have a
question, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your question in private in
your cubicle. If you disregard these rules you can be excluded from the experiment without
receiving any payment.
All amounts in the experiment are stated in Taler. After the experiment, your earnings
will be converted at an exchange rate of 1 Taler = 0.05 EUR and paid to you in cash.
Your decisions in the experiment
During the entire experiment you are in the role of a physician. You have to decide on
the treatment of 15 patients. All participants of this experiment are taking their decisions
in the role of a physician. You decide on the quantity of medical services you want to
provide for a given illness of a patient.
You decide on your computer screen where five different illnesses, A, B, C, D and E, of three
different patient types, 1, 2 and 3, will be shown one after another. For each patient you
can provide 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 medical services. Your remuneration is as follows:
• Treatment FFS :
A different payment is assigned to each quantity of medical services . The payment
increases in the quantity of medical services.
• Treatment CAP :
For each patient you receive a lump-sum payment that is independent of the quan-
tity of medical services.
While deciding on the quantity of medical services, in addition to your payment you
determine the costs you incur when providing these services. Costs increase with in-
creasing quantity provided. Your profit in Taler is calculated by subtracting your costs
from your payment.
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To each quantity of medical services a certain benefit for the patient is assigned, the pa-
tient benefit that the patient gains from your provision of services (treatment). There-
fore, your decision on the quantity of medical services not only determines your own
profit but also the patient benefit. An example for a decision situation is given on
the following screen.
Screen shot FFS
Screen shot CAP
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You decide on the quantity of medical services on your computer screen by typing an
integer between 0 and 10 into the box named “Your Decision”.
There are no real but abstract patients participating in this experiment. Yet the patient
benefit an abstract patient receives by your providing medical services will be benefi-
cial for a real patient. The total amount corresponding to the sum over all 15 patient
benefits determined by your decisions will be transferred to the charity Christoffel Blin-
denmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim, to support an ophthalmic hospital where
patients with cataract are treated.
Earnings in the experiment
After having made your 15 decisions, your overall earnings will be calculated by summing
up the profits from all your decisions. This amount will be converted from Taler into
Euro at the end of the experiment.
The overall patient benefit resulting from your 15 quantity decisions will be converted
into Euro as well and will be transferred to the Christoffel Blindenmission.
The transferral will be made by the experimenter and a monitor. The monitor writes
a check on the amount of money corresponding to the aggregated patient benefits of
this experiment. This check issued to the Christoffel Blindenmission will be sealed in an
envelope addressed to this charity. The monitor and experimenter then walk together to
the nearest mailbox and deposit the envelope.
After all participants have taken their decisions, one participant is randomly assigned the
role of the monitor. The monitor receives a payment of 4 EUR in addition to the payment
from the experiment. The monitor verifies, by a signed statement, that the procedure
described above was actually carried out.
Next, please answer some questions familiarizing you with the decision situation.
After your 15 decisions, please answer some further questions on your screen.
144
A.4 Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure A.4.1: Proportional sacrifices per decision and subject in Med-FFS
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Figure A.4.2: Proportional sacrifices per decision and subject in Non-Med-FFS
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Figure A.4.3: Proportional sacrifices per decision and subject in Med-CAP
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Figure A.4.4: Proportional sacrifices per decision and subject in Non-Med-CAP
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